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The first chapter examines whether funding for public schools affects
parents’ decision to send their children to private schools in the US. In the
wake of the Great Recession, funding for public K-12 education fell precipi-
tously and stayed low for several years. Exploiting the fact that states with
greater reliance on state appropriations and states with no income tax expe-
rienced larger cuts, I instrument for local public school funding. I find that
students exposed to a $1,000 (9.0 percent) decrease in per-pupil funding are
more likely to enroll in private schools by 0.48 to 0.59 percentage points (4.5
to 5.6 percent). I show further that the effect is strongest among high socioe-
conomic status students living in disadvantaged areas. These findings suggest
that reductions in public school resources lead to greater inequality in edu-
cation and negatively change student composition in public schools through
school choice.
In the second chapter, I investigate the effect of Facility-Based Child-
birth Policy (FBCP) to promote facility-based child delivery (FBD) and pre-
natal care in Rwanda. To identify the causal effect on childhood mortality
vi
rates, I utilize the geographical variation of FBD in the baseline period and
the timing of the policy in a difference-in-difference framework. The reform
has a substantial effect on infant (under one year) and child (under five years)
mortality, with reductions of 12 and 25 deaths per 1,000 live births, respec-
tively. However, the overall reduction in newborn (seven days) neonatal (30
days) mortality is not statistically significant despite a large increase in FBD.
I also show that other policy interventions like performance-based financing
schemes can strengthen the treatment effect on newborn and neonatal mor-
tality, implying the importance of multiple approaches to reduce mortality
rates.
The third chapter explores whether the increase in service outsourcing
to India has reduced the employment of the occupations with greater exposure
to Indian service imports. To account for endogeneity, I instrument for the
growth of the US’s service import from India, exploiting the change in Indian
import in European countries. The occupation-level analysis produces a mixed
result. An increase in service imports reduces the total employment from 2000
to 2006; however, the effect attenuates in the later period of 2006 to 2016.
The change is skill-biased: the reduction in employment is smaller for college-
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Chapter 1
Competition Between Public and Private
Education: Evidence from the Great Recession
1.1 Introduction
Private schools serve 10.3 percent or 5.7 million schoolchildren in the US
primary and secondary education (Snyder, de Brey and Dillow, 2019). Besides
the size of the market, private schools play an essential role in the education
sector, both positive and negative. On the one hand, private schools provide
parents with more options in education and compete with public schools, po-
tentially improving the quality of public schools and overall education (Dee,
1998; Hoxby, 1994). On the other hand, private school opponents often argue
that such schools increase inequality and reduce intergenerational mobility be-
cause they tend to attract high socioeconomic status (SES) students (Davies,
Zhang and Zeng, 2005; Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Iyigun, 1999).
The fact that public and private schools compete over students means
parents consider characteristics of local public schools when enrolling in pri-
vate schools (and vice versa). In this paper, I investigate the effect of public
K-12 education funding on private school participation in the US, a topic that
has received limited attention in the literature. There are two primary chan-
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nels in which public education funding may affect private school participation.
First, public education resources may crowd-out household investment in ed-
ucation (Houtenville and Conway, 2008). Thus, when there is a decline in
school funding, parents respond by increasing childcare time (Kim, 2001) and
providing tutoring (Yuan and Zhang, 2015), implying a potential switch to pri-
vate schools, another form of education investment. Second, whether school
funding improves the quality of education measured by student achievement
is ambiguous (Hanushek, 2003); however, it could improve the perceived qual-
ity of public schools, such as smaller class sizes and new equipment, which
is inversely associated with private school attendance (Brasington and Hite,
2012).
While we expect public school funding would negatively affect private
school attendance, the exact causal relationship is difficult to estimate be-
cause they are endogenously determined, and large-scale changes in education
funding—either from policy interventions or economic downturns—are lim-
ited. I utilize states’ idiosyncratic characteristics that generated exogenous
variation in large funding cuts for public education followed by the Great Re-
cession to overcome these identification challenges. In the wake of the Great
Recession, funding for K-12 fell precipitously in many states, on average of
5.3 percent per pupil from 2007 to 2012 and stayed low for several years. Us-
ing the Great Recession as a natural experiment seems concerning given the
far-reaching impact of the Recession on multiple areas of the economy and
society. However, I show that the magnitude of funding cuts depended on two
2
plausibly exogenous characteristics of state tax appropriation which increased
the sensitivity of education funding to the Great Recession. This allows me to
isolate the changes in school funding from other elements that occurred in the
same period. First, states that historically relied more on state appropriations
to fund K-12 rather than on local and federal appropriations experienced a
deeper cut during the Great Recession (Jackson, Wigger and Xiong, Forth-
coming). State tax revenues mostly consist of sales and income taxes, which
are more volatile than property tax, a major component of local tax revenues,
making states’ funding for K-12 volatile as well. Further, unlike local govern-
ments, state governments are responsible for meeting increasing demand for
other welfare programs, crowding-out spending for K-12. (Evans, Schwab and
Wagner, 2019; Jackson, Wigger and Xiong, Forthcoming; Moffitt, 2013). Sec-
ond, I show that K-12 funding stayed lower after the Great Recession in seven
states without an individual income tax. These states lack diversification in
their tax portfolio (Cornia and Nelson, 2010), which improves the fiscal health
by reducing volatility in the tax revenue during recessions (Jordan, Yan and
Hooshmand, 2017; Yan and Carr, 2019). The seven states could not recover
their tax revenues as quickly as other states, and consequently, their funding
for K-12 in 2016 was still lower than the pre-recession level.
The two factors—funding scheme and tax structure—were determined
years and decades before the Recession, changed little over time, and are
unrelated to several state characteristics relevant to the impacts of the Great
Recession, including the intensity of the economic shock (unemployment rate),
3
property value, and the overall wealth of each state before and after the Re-
cession. Thus, these features provide conditions for an instrument by isolating
the effects of funding cuts for K-12 from the Great Recession itself. I combine
the two sources of variation with the onset of the Great Recession in an event
study framework as an instrument to predict the local K-12 education revenue
per pupil. Using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) model, I compare private
school enrollment in regions with larger and smaller funding cuts.
The 2SLS results suggest that a $1,000—approximately nine percent—
decrease in K-12 revenue per pupil increases the private school enrollment
rate of schoolchildren by 0.48-0.59 percentage points or 4.5-5.6 percent. The
estimated elasticity is -0.62 in the most preferred specification, meaning a one
percent decrease in public education funding raises private school enrollment
by 0.62 percent. This implies that, in response to a 5.3 percent funding cut
(the average cut from 2007 to 2012), 162,445 switched to private schools. The
results are also robust to a variety of confounding factors, including selective
migration and the introduction of government-funded school choice programs
like vouchers and tax credits.
To further understand why students switch to private schools, I esti-
mate the impact on spending categories and staff-to-student ratios. My results
reveal that areas with larger budget cuts ended up with fewer teachers and
instructional aides per student as well as less generous employee benefits for
teachers, relevant to the quality of education (Card and Krueger, 1992). I
cannot directly connect these changes to changes in private school attendance
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because my instrument does not allow me to separate the impact on school
qualities. However, Jackson, Wigger and Xiong (Forthcoming) show that stu-
dents’ test scores had fallen in the same period, supporting that a decline in
education quality is the most likely mechanism.
Finally, I test for heterogeneous effects by race and household income:
the impacts of public school funding on private school enrollment are not found
for black students and are concentrated in middle-income families. Addition-
ally, I divide the sample by high and low SES areas in terms of poverty rate
and the share of minorities and immigrants. I find that high SES students
(from high-income and white households) are more likely to flee to private
schools when they live in low SES regions. My heterogeneity analysis not just
shows that certain groups are more responsive than others; it also sheds light
on a potential change in the student composition in public schools especially
in low SES areas. These results indicate a potential increase in inequality in
educational attainment as high SES students can avoid the negative impact of
funding cuts by leaving public schools.
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, this is
one of the first papers estimating the elasticity of the demand for private
school enrollment with respect to the public K-12 education budget. Due to
the challenges of identification, few empirical papers examine the causal re-
lationship between public K-12 expenditure and private school attendance.
Goldhaber (1999) structurally estimates the relationship between public fund-
ing and private schooling, relying on cross-sectional variation across regions for
5
instrumental variables. My paper leverages tighter identification using vari-
ation in funding both across regions and over time and obtains more robust
results, finding larger elasticity. The closest work is Dinerstein and Smith
(2014), finding an increase in public school funding may increase public school
enrollment especially for low SES students in New York City. This paper also
shows a decrease in private school enrollment is accelerated by private school
closures. My paper provides evidence that while the impact of public school
funding on private school enrollment is symmetric, the mechanism through
which private school enrollment changes is different in case of funding cuts.
Second, I provide evidence of how education funding cuts can deepen
the racial gap in educational attainment through school choice. Public school
spending has an important role in reducing inequality (Johnson and Jack-
son, 2019); however, my results complicate this role because some high SES
students can avoid funding cuts by switching to private schools, thus exacer-
bating inequality. My heterogeneity results also indicate that school funding
cuts affect student composition, especially in disadvantaged regions, making
student composition disproportionately low SES. Thus, without considering
this compositional change, the impact of public school spending on student
outcomes could be overestimated. Moreover, peer effects may intensify the di-
rect impact of school funding on students’ test scores because losing high SES
peers can lower the performance of remaining students (Akyol, 2016; Dills,
2005). Either because of compositional change or peer effects, recent papers
find a large impact of school funding on student outcomes and heterogeneity
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by social and ethnic groups (Baron, 2019; Hyman, 2017; Jackson, Wigger and
Xiong, Forthcoming; Kreisman and Steinberg, 2019; Lafortune, Rothstein and
Schanzenbach, 2018).
Third, I contribute to the identification of education spending cuts
driven by the Great Recession initiated by Jackson, Wigger and Xiong (Forth-
coming). They explore how the K-12 funding cuts after the Great Recession
affected test scores and college enrollment by leveraging the variation in fund-
ing cuts induced by historical reliance on state-appropriated funds. While
being clever, this identification has a weak first stage, so they rely on the fact
that the decline in the slope of the K-12 spending was greater in states with
higher reliance on state appropriations. This increases the statistical power of
the first stage but assumes a specific functional form. I extend their strategy
by adding another source of variation: whether a state collects an individual
income tax. This strategy improves the precision of the estimates. To my
knowledge, this is the first paper showing that slower tax revenue recovery
in no-income-tax states affected education funding stability while using the
income tax status to identify variation in public school funding.
1.2 Background: K-12 Budget and the Great Recession
Funding for K-12 education is not stable over time. A primary factor
is the business cycle. This is because tax revenue declines during recessions
(income effect), and at the same time, state governments need to spend more
money on other social safety net programs like unemployment benefits and
7
food stamps, crowding-out expenditure for K-12 (Jackson, Wigger and Xiong,
Forthcoming; Moffitt, 2013). Thus, the growth rate of K-12 revenue per pupil
declines during and after recessions.1 In most recessions, this fall is small;
however, the funding cut followed by the Great Recession was unprecedented.
Nationally, education funding decreased by $673 per pupil or 5.3 percent from
2007 to 2012, which was the first decline in funding since the 1980s recession,
and lasted for years (Figure 1.1). The magnitudes of the funding cuts differ
substantially across states in Figure 1.2. For example, Florida, the state with
the deepest cut, curtailed its K-12 revenue by 28 percent during these years,
much greater than the national average.
The Great Recession affected parents’ demand for private schools in
two opposite ways. The Recession pushed students out of private schools by
reducing parents’ income. (Ewert, 2013; Lamb and Mbekeani, 2017). Sepa-
rate from this income effect, the devastating funding cuts for public schools
may induce some parents to substitute into private schools. Figure 1.3 clearly
shows these two dynamics. While overall private school enrollment drops in
the wake of the Great Recession (income effect), the decline is smaller in states
that experienced larger funding cuts, implying a relative increase (substitution
effect). In the remainder of this section, I show that two state-level charac-
teristics unrelated to the Great Recession allow me to isolate this substitution
1K-12 revenue is interchangeable with K-12 budget, funding, or appropriations. This
is not the realized spending, but the amount of money appropriated to K-12. From the
school district’s perspective, appropriations are revenue because they receive it from the
governments. This terminology is widely used in the official school district and government
documents on school funding.
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effect and estimate the causal impact of public school funding.
First, states that relied more on the state appropriations to fund K-12
before the Great Recession experienced deeper cuts, first used by Jackson,
Wigger and Xiong (Forthcoming) to examine the impact of K-12 spending
on student achievement. K-12 education revenue is funded by three different
sources: state, local, and federal governments. This identifying variation uti-
lizes the fact that state-funded revenue had declined more substantially than
local and federal revenues in the wake of the Great Recession. To be specific,
I visualize the trend of K-12 funding per pupil by the source in Figure 1.4.
There was an immediate and steep drop in state revenues, which was compen-
sated by the federal government, making total education funding stable for
the first two years from the beginning of the recession. On the other hand,
local funding remained stable over time.
Why were the trends of state, local, and federal K-12 funding so differ-
ent? First, state tax revenues experienced both large revenue and crowding-out
effects and resulted in an immediate funding freeze for K-12. State tax rev-
enue mostly consists of income and sales taxes (66 percent (US Census Bureau,
2020)), which fluctuate along with the business cycle. At the same time, state
governments are responsible for other welfare programs such as unemployment
benefits and food stamps together with the federal government, crowding-out
expenditure for K-12. In contrast, local K-12 funds face smaller income and
crowding-out effects. Local tax revenues rely heavily on property tax (72 per-
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cent (US Census Bureau, 2020)), which is stable during recessions.2 Local
governments smooth property tax revenues by raising the tax rate or slowly
adjusting the assessed value on which the tax is based. This is also true for the
Great Recession, although it started from the collapse in the housing market
and was followed by substantial foreclosures (Lutz, Molloy and Shan, 2011).
Also, public K-12 education is the largest expenditure for local governments,
so the crowd-out effect for local governments is smaller than the state. Federal
funds are mostly earmarked to specific federal programs such as the National
School Lunch Program and Title I. During the Great Recession, the federal
government substantially increased the funding through the American Rein-
vestment and Recovery Act, and when the fund ran out, a deep funding cut
followed (Evans, Schwab and Wagner, 2019).
Because of this different trend by sources, the composition of K-12
funding in each state played an essential role in the magnitude of the funding
cut. There was a considerable variation in the share of funding coming from
state revenue (Ss =
State Revs
Total Revs
, state share henceforth) before the Great Reces-
sion, which becomes the first identifying variation.3 On average, 47 percent of
2The reliance on each tax source is calculated using tax revenues in the fiscal year 2007
(US Census Bureau, 2020). See Appendix Table A.1 for variation across states.
3State revenue here is the K-12 revenue “distributed” by the state government. For
example, California’s Proposition 98 guarantees a minimum spending level for public schools.
Proposition 98 dollars are state funds raised primarily through income, sales, corporate
taxes, combined with locally raised property tax (EdSource, 2009). This is considered as
state revenue in the CCD, although it includes locally raised property tax. Although smaller
than California, Texas also redistributes local property taxes through recapturing, and the
recaptured property tax is classified as state revenue in CCD. To address a potential problem
arising from this, I exclude California and Texas from the sample in the robustness check,
10
the total K-12 revenue came from the state government in School Year 2006,
varying from 86 percent in Vermont to 27 percent in Nevada in Panel A of
Figure 1.5. The variation in the share is associated with the variation in the
magnitude of the funding cuts; because state revenue was more sensitive to
the recession, funding cuts were larger in states with greater state share, as
displayed in Panel B.
The state share is determined by the particulars of the state’s funding
formula, which is a combination of multiple factors including state and local
law, tax rate and base, government programs, and overall fiscal centralization
(Alm, Buschman and Sjoquist, 2011). Thus, education funding structure is a
combination of multiple factors that were determined years or even decades
before the Great Recession and changed little over time, implying little rel-
evance to the Great Recession itself.4 I test this more formally by showing
the share does not predict several state-level characteristics relevant to the
impacts of the recession that may affect private school enrollment in Section
1.4.3. Critically, a greater share in a given state does not mean the state cares
more about public education: it appears that there is no correlation between
the share and total K-12 revenue per pupil before the recession (Panel C in
Figure 1.5).
and the result does not change much. (See Appendix Table A.5.)
4State share had been very stable during 2000-2007 (Appendix Figure A.3). The cor-
relation coefficient between state share in 2000 and 2007 is over 0.9. The correlation is
weaker for the share in 1990 (0.6); however, the correlation between rankings is 0.75. In
the robustness check, I use the share in 1990, 2000, and the five-year average of 2002-2006
instead of the share in 2006 and obtain very similar results (See Table 1.5).
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Along with the education funding structure, tax structure is an impor-
tant factor that predicts the trend of tax revenue and funding for K-12 in each
state after the Great Recession. I find that funding cuts for K-12 were greater
in states that do not collect individual income tax. While states constantly
change the income tax structure and tax rates, whether a given state collects
income tax or not was determined decades ago, providing exogenous variation
in changes to the education budget.5 There are seven states with no individual
income tax—Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and
Wyoming.6 Three factors led to a larger decline in education revenue in these
seven states. First, because they lack one tax source with a very wide base, it
is difficult for these states to diversify their tax revenue (Cornia and Nelson,
2010). Lack of diversification in their tax portfolio is potentially problematic,
especially during recessions, because diversification improves fiscal health by
reducing volatility without sacrificing the expected revenue (Jordan, Yan and
Hooshmand, 2017; Yan and Carr, 2019). Second, while these states tend to
heavily rely on sales tax (Cornia and Nelson, 2010),7 states with higher reliance
on sales tax had suffered longer to recover their tax revenues after the Great
5The state income tax status was mostly determined during the early 20th century. In
1901, Hawaii was the first state that adopted a state income tax. Since then, 44 states
had implemented state income tax up until 1976. In 1979, Alaska repealed its income tax,
and since then, seven states do not have a state income tax(US Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, 1995).
6New Hampshire and Tennessee collect tax on dividend and interest income, but not on
labor income. In the robustness check, I include these two states as no income tax states as
well. The results are very similar (See Table 1.5).
7This is not true for Alaska, which collects most of its tax revenue through natural
resource taxes.
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Recession Alm and Sjoquist (2014). Finally, states also attempted to recover
their tax revenues quickly. One way is to make income tax more progressive,
not a viable option for no-income-tax states. In addition to the progressive
income tax, these states were not very successful in revising their tax portfolio
(Seegert, 2015). Consequently, states without income taxes faced a longer-
lasting reduction in tax revenues after the Great Recession.8 While education
funding in other states recovered to the pre-recession level by 2014-15, it was
still lagging in no-income-tax states.
Panel A of Figure 1.6 compares the trend of real total tax revenue per
capita in states with and without personal income tax relative to the fiscal
year 2007. The tax revenue had increased for years and decreased after the
start of the recession in 2008. While states with an income tax have steadily
recovered their real tax revenue, the seven states without personal income
tax had struggled long, having much slower revenue recovery.9 The different
trends in total tax revenue influenced the total K-12 revenue as well in Panel
B. To my knowledge, I am the first to show that having an income tax can
affect education funding stability after the Great Recession.
8This is not true for five states with no general sales tax (Alaska, Delaware, Montana,
Oregon, and New Hampshire). Reliance on income tax in these five states is no different
from other states with sales tax, from 5 to 40 percent, except for Oregon (see Appendix
Table A.1). These four states diversify their tax sources from other sources such as excise
taxes and license fees.
9This is even true when excluding property tax revenue. The figure comparing tax
revenue without property tax is available in the Appendix Figure A.4.
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1.3 Data
My analysis draws data on two sources. First, I use the 2000 Census
and the 2005-2016 American Community Survey (ACS) IPUMS data (Ruggles
et al., 2020) to obtain information on private school enrollment. The Census
and ACS ask every respondent whether she is enrolled in a private school if
she is in school. I restrict my sample to children between the ages of 6 and 17
years (equivalent to grade 1 to 12) to make sure they are school-aged.10 I also
exclude children living with no parents, about 4 percent of the sample, because
students raised by an extended family member or foster parents may have
different decision-making processes. I omit 2001-2004 ACS because I cannot
identify geographical units smaller than the state in these years.11 Washington
D.C. is also removed from the main sample because the state share is zero by
definition and thus D.C. becomes an outlier.12 My final sample consists of
7,744,432 children.
I collect the financial data of all school districts in the U.S. during
the 2000-2016 fiscal year from the Common Core of Data (CCD) from the
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). CCD provides rich data on
school financing such as funding sources (state, local, and federal government)
10I remove five years old because some states don’t have public funding for pre-
Kindergarten at all or provide only a half-day Kindergarten program. I exclude eighteen
years old because some of them are not school-aged anymore.
11ACS in 2001-2004 is also known not to be representative. Nonetheless, I include these
years and use the state-level education revenue in the robustness check.
12In the robustness check, I estimate the impact of public education revenue including
Washington D.C.
14
and expenditure in broad categories as well as school enrollment and staffing. I
exclude school districts with no enrolled students, negative total revenue, and
only with vocational schools or adult schools. I also restrict to school districts
with a valid address because I match school districts to the geographical unit
in the Census and ACS using the location address.13 The total number of
school districts varies every year; however, there were 15,187 school districts
in the school year 2006-2007 after removing the invalid districts that account
for 5-6%.14 To merge two datasets, I aggregate the school finance data into the
Consistent Public Use Microdata Areas (CPUMA) in the Census and ACS.15
I also take a weighted average of two fiscal years to construct school finance
data at the calendar year level because the Census and ACS do not provide
information on survey month.16 See Appendix Section A.1 for the further
details of the crosswalk.
In Table 1.1, I show the summary statistics in the pre- and post-
recession period. Slightly more than 10 percent of the total student is en-
rolled in private school (as opposed to in public school or not enrolled at all).
This number marginally decreases after the Great Recession because the in-
13I use the address of the school district’s main office to assign its CPUMA.
14This number changes every year, from 15,000 to 16,000.
15PUMA is the smallest geographical unit available in the Census and ACS PUMS files.
PUMA boundaries change every ten years., and the Consistent PUMA is an aggregate of
some of contingent PUMAs to make the boundary consistent over time. While there are
slightly more than 2,000 PUMAs, they are aggregated to 1,078 CPUMAs.
16I use fiscal year instead of the school year because it is the 12-month period to which the
annual operating budget applies, according to NCES. The results are robust to alternative
ways of defining years–using school year level constructed by fiscal year data and the fiscal
year matched to the same calendar year (Available upon request).
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come effect of the recession made it difficult for some families to afford tuition.
The average inflation-adjusted total revenue per pupil is about $11,139 before
the recession. The funding is larger after the recession because it was in an
increasing trend from 2000 to 2007. The average composition of the revenue
also changes: the share coming from state government decreases, and the share
coming form the federal government increases, as seen in Figure 1.4.
1.4 Econometric Model and Validity
1.4.1 Estimation Equations
Local public education revenue and private school enrollment are en-
dogenously determined, making the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) biased.
While area and year fixed effects control the bias coming from selection to ar-
eas and national shocks, they cannot absorb localized economic shocks. A lo-
cal economic boom may increase both public school budget and private school
participation, biasing the OLS estimates upward. Additionally, private school
attendance may also influence spending for local public schools while the di-
rection of this reverse causality is indeterminate (Goldhaber, 1999). When
students leave the public sector, the local public education funding per pupil
mechanically increases because fewer students share the school resource. If the
flight to private schools continues, public education funding per pupil may de-
cline because of the political pressure to cut taxes for public schools, as many
parents become uninterested in public schools. Thus, OLS cannot identify the
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causal relationship, and to address these identification challenges, I leverage
the Great Recession as a natural experiment for reasons I explain in Section
1.2.
I estimate the following system of equations using two-stage least squares
(2SLS):




[ βkSs×1(k = t)+γkNTs×1(k = t)] +Xipstλ+Ppstψ+ρp+τt+νipst,
(1.2)
where Privateipst is an indicator whether individual i in CPUMA p of state s in
(calendar) year t is in a private school (as opposed to in a public school or not
in school) and Revpst is the total K-12 revenue per pupil in thousands (in 2010
dollars).17 I include a vector of student and household level controls (Xipst)
and time-variant CPUMA characteristics (Ppst), respectively. CPUMA fixed
effects (µ, ρ) absorb the time-invariant differences across CPUMA, and year
fixed effects (θ, τ) controls for any common national shocks specific to given
years. The standard errors are clustered at the state level, and the regressions
are weighted using sample means of the Census and ACS.
I instrument for Revpst by combining Ss, the share of total K-12 revenue
coming from state-appropriated funds in the school year 2006-2007 (State Revs,2006
Total Revs,2006
),
17I use levels instead of logs to avoid the assumption that a one dollar increase of revenue
has stronger impact on low-spending CPUMAs than high-spending CPUMAs. The results
using logs are available in the Appendix Table A.3.
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and NTs, the indicator for having no state income tax, with the year dummies
in an event study setting. I take 2007 as the base year, so all coefficients can
be interpreted as changes relative to 2007.18 This framework helps me extract
the exogenous variation in education funding cuts induced by the Great Reces-
sion. Because funding did not decline until 2010 and slowly recover until 2016
(Figure 1.1), I prefer an event study model because it has more flexibility than
the traditional difference-in-differences model (DiD). In the Appendix Table
A.6, I show that my results are robust to using alternative instruments such
as traditional DiD and using only one source of variation.
The Great Recession-induced funding cuts for public education pro-
vides a chance to test the impact of massive funding changes. However, using
them as identification raises the question of the extent to which my results are
generalizable when public school funding increases or decreases for different
reasons than recessions. While it is an area for future investiviation, studies on
school finance reforms give suggestive answer. Downes and Schoeman (1998)
and Husted and Kenny (2002) find opposite impact on private school enroll-
ment in districts that have and have not benefited from the reforms, implying
my results are somewhat generalizable for other funding changes.




In this section, I present the first stage result to confirm the relevance of
the instrumental variables using Equation 1.2. When estimating this equation,
I scale the per-pupil public education revenue to thousands of 2010 dollars. The
first stage result is presented in Figure 1.7. This figure displays the excluded
instrumental variables, the set of coefficients of state share (green dots), and
no income tax indicator (orange diamonds) interacted with the year dummies,
along with 95% confidence intervals. All estimates are estimated relative to the
base year of 2007. The regression includes the full set of individual, household,
and CPUMA controls (preferred specification).19 The first stage F-statistics
is 16.9, which passes the weak IV test threshold.20
The figure shows that my identifying variation strongly predicts the
extent of funding cuts. The coefficients are generally larger for state share
because their scales are different. The state share is a continuous variable
ranging from zero to one, while the no-income-tax indicator is binary. The
coefficient means that in 2013, a ten percentage points (0.1) increase in the
state share decreases the education budget by $500 per pupil, and states with
no income tax have $1,000 less education budget per pupil than states with
income taxes. Considering the average revenue per pupil before the recession,
19Regressions with different specifications are available in the Appendix Figure A.9; how-
ever, there are no noticeable differences.
202001-2004 ACS are not included in my sample. To examine the pre-trend including
this period, I estimate the event study equation only with school finance data in Appendix
Figure A.7. I find little evidence of pre-trend.
19
about $11,048, this is a very large impact. The funding cuts induced by the
Great Recession was long-lasting even after 2012 when the economy bounced
back to the pre-recession period. The funding cuts driven by the state share
seem to gradually fade out, but not for the no-income-tax indicator, as in
Panel B of Figure 1.6. The figure shows little evidence of pre-trend; however,
to address potential pre-trending in education funding, I add CPUMA-specific
linear time trend as robustness check, showing very similar results (Table 1.5.).
1.4.3 Placebo Tests
The crucial identifying assumption of my empirical strategy is that the
instruments should not affect private school attendance through channels other
than the change in public K-12 revenue. This assumption is fundamentally
unprovable because I cannot show my instruments are unrelated to any po-
tential confounding factors (or it is impossible to show my instruments are
independent of the error term εipst). However, in this section, I provide evi-
dence that my instrumental variables are uncorrelated with important state-
level characteristics that may affect private school participation. Particularly, I
demonstrate that my instruments are independent of the characteristics closely
relevant to the income effects of the Great Recession, the most concerning con-
founding factor, showing they can separate the substitution effect caused by
cuts for education funding from the overall impact of the Great Recession.
I choose six state-level characteristics that represent the income effects
of the Great Recession: personal income per capita, median household in-
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come, poverty rate (share under 150 percent of the federal poverty line), the
unemployment rate of household heads, homeownership, and the median hous-
ing value. The first three variables represent the overall wealth and earnings.
The unemployment rate indicates the economic condition in each state. It is
also important to check homeownership and median housing value, given the
Great Recession’s impact on the housing market. Except for personal income
per capita, which comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, I calculate the
state-level variables from the Census and ACS. When calculating the mean, I
restrict the sample to households with at least one school-aged children (age
6 to 17) for relevancy.
Using the event study model similar to Equation 1.2, I first test whether
these six variables are correlated with my identifying variation. The unit of
observations of the regressions is state-year, and I weigh the regressions with
the population of school-aged children in each state. Figure 1.8 displays the
coefficients of the event study variables, along with a 95 percent confidence
interval. None of the six variables are correlated with state share or no-income-
tax status before and after the recession.
Next, to confirm the education revenue per pupil is not related to these
characteristics, I estimate the impact of education revenue with the 2SLS
model using the instrumental variables described above. I rescale the point
estimates and standard errors by multiplying 10,000 for display and present
the result in Table 1.2. Although statistically insignificant, the coefficients are
all nearly zero, confirming that they are irrelevant to public education funding
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per pupil. Therefore, both the reduced form and 2SLS estimates support that
my instruments can remove the income effects of the Great Recession and fo-
cus on the variation in education funding.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Main Results
I begin by estimating the main model presented in Equations 1.1 and
1.2 in Table 1.3, where the outcome variable is the indicator for private school
attendance. I multiply the coefficients and standard errors by 100 to represent
changes in private school enrollment in percentage points. All specifications
include the year and CPUMA fixed effects. In columns 1 to 4, the coefficients
are consistent and robust to the inclusion of controls, falling within the small
range of -0.48 to -0.59 percentage points. When I control for individual de-
mographic characteristics, the point estimate increases in magnitude by 0.06
percentage point or 12 percent (column 3). This jump is consistent with the
correlation between individual characteristics and private school enrollment.
Controlling for household and parental characteristics, the coefficient slightly
increases by 0.02 percentage points. I add time-variant CPUMA controls in
column 4, and the point estimate increases by 0.038 percentage points without
losing precision. The magnitude of the impact is much larger (more negative)
in 2SLS regressions than OLS results (-0.087 to -0.132, see the Appendix Table
A.3.), which means the OLS estimate is biased toward zero.
22
In column 4, my preferred specification, the coefficient indicates that a
$1,000 reduction in public education revenue per pupil in CPUMA increases
private school enrollment by 0.59 percentage points. This represents a nine
percent decrease in the public education budget and a 5.6 percent increase in
private school enrollment, given that the mean of budget and private school
attendance was $11,048 and 10.61 percent before the Great Recession, re-
spectively. This implies the elasticity of the demand for private schools with
respect to public school funding is -0.62.21 Using this elasticity, I calculate
that roughly 159 in the average CPUMA or 162,455 students in the country
leave for private schools in response to a 5.3 percent funding shock, the average
funding cut from 2007 to 2012.22
1.5.2 Comparison to Existing Literature
This elasticity estimate is larger than the two only existing estimates.
Work by Goldhaber (1999), estimating a structural model, suggests that a
$1,000 (in 1983 dollars) increase in public school expenditure per pupil de-
creases private school enrollment by 1.5 percentage points in the school dis-
21−0.62 = 5.6%−9% . It means a one percent decline in public education revenue increases
private school enrollment by 0.62 percent.
22The 5.3 percent decline in K-12 revenue implies a 3.29 percent increase (-5.3×-0.62) in
private school enrollment. In the average CPUMA, there are 45,638 school-aged children,
and 10.61 percent of them are in private schools in 2007. The back in the envelope calculation
suggests that 159 students (= 45, 638× 10.61%× 3.29%) transfer to a private school system
in this CPUMA. We can do a similar calculation for the total school-aged children in the
US, 46,536,645.
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trict, indicating the elasticity of -0.5.23 A more recent study by Mavisakalyan
(2011) estimates the relationship between public education spending and pri-
vate school enrollment in more than 80 countries. The point estimate suggests
that a one percentage point increase in public education spending relative to
the country’s GDP decreases private school enrollment by -8.5 percent, imply-
ing the elasticity of -0.34, about half of mine.24 While they both investigate
different periods and regions, the cross-sectional instrumental variables used
in these papers may not completely rule out reverse causality and omitted
variables, generating a smaller elasticity. If this is the case, then I would ex-
pect estimates to be biased toward zero, consistent with the results of my OLS
estimation.
1.5.3 Possible Mechanism: Impact on Expenditures and Staffing
A subsequent critical question is whether students switch to private
schools because of a decline in (observable) quality of public schools. As
Hanushek (2003) points out, input-based schooling policy does not necessarily
improve school quality because the resources could be distributed inefficiently.
In this section, I test whether the funding cut happened for expenditure cat-
egories related to the education quality. I also focus on average instructional
salary and teacher employment benefits, which may hint at the actual quality
23Average private school enrollment is 4.64 percent in his sample, New York State in 1981,
and the instructional revenue per pupil is $1,565.
24The K-12 education spending accounts for 4 percent of US GDP in 2016 (Snyder, de Brey
and Dillow, 2019), so a one percentage point increase corresponds to a 25 percent increase
in education spending. The estimated elasticity is -0.34 (-8.5/25).
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of education, and staff-to-student ratio, which is relatively easily observable by
parents and children. To match the main specifications, I aggregate relevant
variables into the CPUMA level and estimate the impact of revenue per pupil
with the 2SLS model. Overall, my results are consistent with Jackson, Wigger
and Xiong (Forthcoming), showing a decline in education quality represented
by student test scores in the same period because of the Great Recession in-
duced funding cuts.
In Panel A of Table 1.4, I regress the level of spending in each category:
expenditure on the total operation, instruction, capital, and student support.
There are statistically significant increases in all spending categories, except for
capital spending. The impacts on total operational, instruction, and student
support are all somewhat proportionate to the change in revenue ($1,000 or
nine percent), from eight to eleven percent. There is a small and insignificant
impact on capital expenditure in column 3. This does not mean there was
no decline in capital investment. Instead, school districts that experienced
relatively small funding cuts also cut capital spending to secure instructional
expenditure, especially when they expect a long funding freeze. The result for
capital expenditure is not consistent with the literature (Jackson, Wigger and
Xiong, Forthcoming), which finds a large effect on capital spending reduction
in the same period, because I rely on different specification.25
25Baron (2019) finds that an increase in capital spending does not improve student achieve-
ment compared to instructional expenditure, which implies that the instructional spending
is more critical to the education quality.
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Next, I examine teacher compensation, an important characteristic cor-
related with the quality of education (Card and Krueger, 1992). Although
teacher salary and employee benefits may not be directly visible to students
and parents, higher monetary compensations can attract productive teachers
from other school districts or outside of the education market and prevent
competent teachers from leaving. In column 1 of Panel B, a $1,000 reduction
in K-12 revenue per pupil results in a statistically insignificant decrease in real
average teacher salary (total instructional salary expenditure divided by the
number of teachers) by $1,957 or 3 percent. There is a strong influence on
employee benefits for teachers in column 2, about $3,404, or 18 percent. The
result seems reasonable; it may be difficult to cut teachers’ salaries, and thus
the school districts curtail employee benefits, which are less salient, to save
expenses.
In Panel C, I examine whether the number of staff per 100 students
declined during the budget cut.26 I find that a $1,000 decrease in K-12 rev-
enue per pupil led to a significant decline in the teacher-student ratio by 0.175
(column 1). This corresponds to a 2.8 percent decline compared to the mean
in the pre-recession period. The impact on instructional aides is much larger,
a reduction in the ratio by 0.207 or 16 percent. The interpretation is anal-
ogous to Panel B. It is difficult to reduce the number of teachers because of
teacher unions (Young, 2011) or regulations to maintain a certain level of class
26I use the staff-to-student ratio instead of the student-to-staff ratio (class size) not to
lose observations because some CPUMA don’t have any instructional aides or library staff.
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size; thus, schools may let go of instructional aides to save expenses. Guid-
ance counselors and library staff are also supplementary compared to teachers;
however, they often cover the entire school alone, leaving little room to reduce
them. Thus, the coefficients are close to zero and not statistically significant
in columns 3 and 4.
1.6 Robustness Checks
1.6.1 Alternative Specifications
In this section, I provide several additional robustness checks to assess
the sensitivity of my result, including alternative specification and definitions
of instrument and education funding. In column 1 of Table 1.5, I control for
CPUMA specific linear time trend (ηp × t). Adding this term explicitly con-
trols for any effects through differential trends across CPUMAs and addresses
potential pre-trend issues in education funding. The point estimate in column
1 is essentially the same with a slightly larger standard error, implying that
differential trends cannot explain the main finding. In columns 2 to 4 in Table
1.5, I test whether the point estimate is robust to using an alternative defini-
tion of the state share: five-year average share, the share defined in 2000, and
in 1990, respectively. Although the share stayed very stable from the school
year 2000 to 2006, with a very high correlation coefficient over 0.9.27 Because
several states implemented school finance reform in the 1990s, the correlation
27See Appendix Figure A.3 to compare across states.
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between 1990 and 2006 is weaker, but still over 0.6 (0.75 when comparing
ranking). Because of the large correlation with the share in 2006, the point
estimates stay almost the same in columns 2 to 4. In column 5, I include New
Hampshire and Tennessee in the no-income-tax states because these states
collect income tax only on interest and dividend income, but not on labor
income. When including these two states, the point estimate increases by 0.6
percentage points, suggesting these two states also have experienced a relative
increase in private school attendance.
I use state-level K-12 revenue per pupil and include the 2001-2005 ACS
in column 6. Some states have a considerable variation in K-12 revenue within
the state, so I examine whether using state-level K-12 revenue substantially
changes the main result in column 6. The point estimate gets smaller by 17%
but not statistically different from the main specification.28 In column 7, I
use the realized expenditure rather than the appropriated funds. If there is
a large discrepancy between K-12 revenue and spending, for example, if the
states could take on debt, then the negative impact of funding on private school
enrollment is underestimated (biased upward). In general, this is not the case
for K-12 education because the balanced budget is highly recommended to
school districts and often required by law in some states and cities. However,
the budget deficit is sometimes inevitable, especially during an economic crisis.
Column 6 gives a consistent result, disregarding this concern. The point esti-
28Note that 2001-2004 ACS is considered not to be nationally representative. When
I exclude these years, the point estimate is -0.598(0.184), almost identical to the main
specification.
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mate is slightly larger by 7% because the unexpected funding cuts may have
forced some school districts to accrue debt; however, not statistically different.
In Appendix Table A.5, I estimate using alternative samples such as
including DC and removing some states that may respond differently. The
results are robust to all alternative samples, showing small differences to the
main result. I also use lagged revenue per pupil in Panel B of Table A.6 to
test whether students are sensitive to the cumulative experience of funding
cuts and show they are.
1.6.2 Selective Migration
People strategically migrate due to their preference for public goods
(Tiebout, 1956). This is specifically true for education (Barrow, 2002); thus,
when observing or expecting budget cuts for education, families with a high
preference for public schools may relocate to higher spending school districts.
Assuming pre-existing students in these districts tend to stay in public schools,
this migration pattern would increase the public school enrollment rate (and
reduce the private school enrollment rate) in high spending areas and overes-
timate my results. If selective migration is prevalent, this means funding cuts
for public education rather stimulate competition among public schools than
between public and private schools, which is a serious challenge to my results.
Thus in this section, I examine whether issues of selective migration confound
my results.
To analyze it, I use the migration history within a year available in the
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ACS. The 2000 Census is excluded in this analysis for consistency because it
identifies migration history within five years. The ACS asks where each re-
spondent lived one year earlier and identifies the Migration PUMA (MPUMA)
she lived in if she did not live in the same residence. This information allows
me to determine each respondent’s migration status and where she moved
from if migrated. The MPUMA here is different from either the regular or
CPUMA; it aggregates the regular PUMAs to resemble the commuting zone
and is specifically used to collect workplace or migration information. Us-
ing this information, I can determine the amount of in- and out-migration
in a given MPUMA. In Appendix Table A.7, I estimate the impact of K-12
revenue per pupil on the total number of school-aged children and in- and
out-migration, showing public school funding is not correlated with any of
them.
Although I show evidence of little selective migration between MPUMAs,
this is not sufficient to rule out the possibility of selective migration because
MPUMAs or CPUMAs are often larger than school districts, and households
may strategically relocate within MPUMA. If migration for education is a
prevalent reason for relocation, then migrants’ response to the funding cuts
for public school would be different than non-migrants. In Table 1.6, I test
whether the impact of public school funding varies by migration status and
show it does not.29
29Critically, my specification is robust to migration because my specification utilizes the
state-level variation and between-state migration is rare. After the Recession, only 1.6
percent of households relocated between states.
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I first split the households by migration status in columns 1 to 3.30
From columns 1 to 3, I divide the sample into those who have migrated between
MPUMAs (column 1), stayed in the same MPUMA (column 2), lived in the
same house (column 3, a subset of column 2) compared to 12 months ago. In
column 1, the point estimate shows that a $1,000 increase of K-12 revenue
per pupil decreases private school enrollment of migrated households by 0.662
percentage points. However, it is not precisely estimated because of the small
sample size. This is very similar to those who have not migrated (column 2)
and who have not moved within a year (column 3), implying that the migrants’
behavior is no different from stayers.
In column 4, I estimate the impact on children whose household head
has lived in the same house for five or more years.31 The coefficient increases to
-0.73, by 16 percent. Although it is not statistically different, the larger point
estimate is interesting. These households consist of adults who are on average
older and more likely to be homeowners (and therefore have higher SES). As
further discussed in Section 1.7, higher SES families are more likely to respond
to the shock by fleeing to private schools than the average population. Finally,
in column 5, I use the K-12 revenue per pupil in the state of birth, excluding
foreign-born children.32 Using birth state instead of current resident CPUMA
30For reference, the point estimate (SE) is -0.629 (0.229) for the sample of the year 2005-
2016.
31The ACS asks when the household head moved into the resident. This information is
only available for household heads, so I assume the children in the households also have
stayed five or more years when the head has.
32From 2000-2007, 82 percent of native-born children stayed in the birth state.
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would be more robust to selective migration because it is determined before
the educational choice. The point estimate in column 5 is larger than the main
estimate by 0.09 percentage points, but not statistically different.
1.6.3 Statewide School Choice Programs
Several states have school choice programs. The programs include (but
are not limited to) private school programs like vouchers and tax-credit schol-
arships, charter schools, and magnet schools. The most well-known private
school program is a voucher, and extensive literature proves that vouchers
increase private school enrollment for some students (Epple, Romano and
Urquiola, 2017). States have implemented a variety of school choice programs
since the Great Recession. While only 12 states and DC had any school choice
program in 2007, it has increased to 28 states in 2016 (EdChoice, 2020).33
Charter schools and magnet schools are also popular alternatives to traditional
public schools (TPS). Thus, the existence of these school choice programs could
partially drive the result, regardless of public school funding.
In Table 1.7, I address this potential problem and show school choice
programs do not drive my results. In columns 1 to 3, I add a time-variant
indicator for whether a state has any school choice policy (column 1), only a
voucher program (column 2), or only a tax credit program (column 3). The
point estimates have little difference from the main impact estimated with
33Several cities and local governments have their own programs. Thus, the population
living in an area with school choice policies is much larger in 2007.
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the main specification (-0.589), suggesting the indicator for the school choice
program does not absorb the effects on private school enrollment. Next, I
add number of charter schools (column 4), magnet schools (column 5), and
total public schools (column 6) in the CPUMA as control variable. The point
estimates in columns 4-6 are also not statistically different from the main es-
timate. Especially, the result in column 4 is consistent with Chakrabarti and
Roy (2016)’s findings that charter schools have little impact on private school
enrollment.
1.7 Heterogeneity in Effect
In this section, I present the impact of per-pupil public education fund-
ing in different subgroups. The fact that private schools increase inequality
implies that the demand for private schools is stronger for high SES house-
holds. This does not necessarily mean high SES families are more sensitive to
public school expenditure as well. However, a model constructed by Sonstelie
(1979) suggests heterogeneity in demand for private schools with respect to
public school funding. In his model, households enroll in public schools only
when they get greater utility than choosing private schools. Funding cuts for
public schools reduce the utility from choosing public schools, making parents
who marginally prefer public schools leave for private schools.
Sonstelie (1979)’s work implies that parents’ preferences for private
schools affect how sensitive they are to public education funding. The lit-
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erature shows that the preference for private schools is related to the demo-
graphics and the SES of students and parents (Brunner, Imazeki and Ross,
2010; Long and Toma, 1988). In addition, extensive research exists on the
relationship between regional characteristics and private schools attendance,
indicating that private school enrollment depends on the poverty rate (Winkler
and Rounds, 1996), the share of minorities (Fairlie, 2002; Fairlie and Resch,
2002; Li, 2009) and immigrants (Betts and Fairlie, 2003; Cascio and Lewis,
2012; Murray, 2016; Tumen, 2019).34 In the following subsections, I empir-
ically evaluate how responses vary by these characteristics and examine the
types of households that exhibit stronger responses to changes in funding.
1.7.1 Heterogeneity by Age, Race, and Household Income
I start by examining heterogeneity by children’s age. Preference for
private schools may vary across age for various reasons: accessibility, belief
in critical stages and experience in previous (public) schools (Goldring and
Phillips, 2008). In columns 1 and 2 in Panel A of Table 1.8, I separately
estimate the impact of K-12 revenue on private school enrollment for elemen-
tary/middle and high school age. The estimate is larger for lower grade age
students by 0.18 percentage points. The higher point estimate for younger age
students does not necessarily mean the effect is stronger for younger students
as the two coefficients are not statistically different from each other.
34Preference for private schools depends on other (unobservable) factors as well. Parents’
religious beliefs and desire for disciplined education are examples. The listed characteristics
here are the ones I examine in this paper.
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Next, I consider race. Racial variation in private school enrollment is
well-documented; however, whether a particular racial group is more respon-
sive to the public school resources is not evident. I examine heterogeneity by
three race categories and present them in columns 3 to 5 of Panel A of Table
1.8. I find significant effects for whites and Hispanics, but not for African
Americans. The impacts on whites and Hispanics’ private school enrollment
are very similar to one another: a $1,000 increase in public education revenue
per pupil decreases private school enrollment by 0.604 and 0.586 percentage
points, respectively. When restricting the sample to US-born Hispanics, the
point estimate increases to 0.682 percentage points (not reported in the Table),
even larger than whites. The effect on black students in column 5 is smaller
and not statistically significant and statistically different from columns 3 and
4. While the point estimates are similar between whites and Hispanics, a
smaller baseline mean of private school enrollment for Hispanics suggests the
elasticity is larger for Hispanics. The point estimate of -0.604 and -0.586 for
whites and Hispanics corresponds to the elasticity of -0.5 and -1.11, respec-
tively. Back in the envelope calculation suggests 100,195 and 26,776 white and
Hispanic students were leaving for private schools in the country in response
to -5.3 percent funding shock from 2007 to 2012, respectively.35
The similar point estimate for whites and Hispanics is interesting, im-
plying it is not just a “white effect”. Previous literature suggests that Hispanics
35The total number of white and Hispanic school-aged children before the Great Recession
is 28,216,266 and 8,428,589, respectively.
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are as sensitive as their white peers to some situations that affect preference for
private schools. Fairlie (2002) finds the existence of “Latino flight”, similar to
“White flight,” that Hispanic students transfer to private schools as the black
population increases in their neighborhoods, and the impact is no smaller than
whites. Also, results of Neal (1997) and Evans and Schwab (1995) indicate
that Hispanic students have a high preference for Catholic schools and benefit
more from them than whites. These papers suggest Hispanics may have a
relatively strong preference for private schools, and the funding cuts for public
schools made some marginal Hispanics transfer to private schools.36
In Panel B, I divide the sample by household income and separately
estimate the impact of the K-12 budget. Household income percentile thresh-
olds are defined within state and year. In other words, I divide the sample by
their relative standing within the state of residence and survey year.37 The
Table shows evident heterogeneity in response to budget cuts across income
groups. While middle-income households strongly respond to the education
budget, the richest (above 90th percentile) and the poorest (below 25th per-
centile) are not as responsive. These two groups are not elastic for different
reasons. Wealthiest families have a high baseline private school enrollment
36In Appendix Section A.3.3, I use the Private School Universe Survey (PSS) to examine
which types of schools are most responsive by religious affiliation. The results reveal that
Catholic schools are receiving more students than other religious and nonsectarian schools.
Hispanics in Hispanic-concentrated CPUMAs tend to switch to Catholic private schools too.
37I divide the sample in this way to include all states in each group, as I use the state-
level variation as the identifying variation. Results using the national income percentiles are
available upon request. The coefficients and standard errors change a little, but the overall
patterns–concentrated in the middle-income families–remain the same.
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rate, suggesting always-takers of private schools are disproportionately in this
group. These people are not sensitive to public school funding because they
will never choose it. On the other hand, most of the poorest households are
never-takers of private schools, either because of low preference or affordability
and stay in public schools no matter what happens.
The point estimates in columns 2 to 4 suggest that a $1,000 increase in
public education revenue leads to a reduction in private school enrollment by
-0.65, -0.82, and -0.55 percentage points, for the income percentile of 90th to
75th, 75th to 50th, and 50th to 25th households, respectively. The coefficients
for the three groups are not statistically different from each other; however,
they are all different from the richest (column 1) and the poorest households
(column 5).
Overall, heterogeneity analysis indicates that high SES students can
avoid the adverse effects of a funding freeze by switching to private schools.
Given that private education may increase inequality (Glomm and Ravikumar,
1992), cuts for public school spending can have a broader impact on inequality
and intergenerational mobility than expected. While the adverse effects of
funding cuts on remaining students could be partially alleviated by high SES
students leaving for private schools (Akyol, 2016), public school funding cuts
may increase inequality in student outcomes by directly affecting remaining
students in public schools (Johnson and Jackson, 2019) and by inducing some
students to opt-out from public schools.
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1.7.2 Heterogeneity by CPUMA Characteristics
While the exodus of high SES students from public schools may increase
the overall inequality, it would not significantly affect student composition if it
only happens in high SES areas. On the other hand, if high SES students in low
SES areas flee to private schools, this would lower the peer quality and remove
heterogeneity within the schools. In this section, I examine the potential
change in student composition in public schools by exploring the effect of the
public education budget by the neighborhood characteristics and household
income. I investigate three CPUMA level characteristics: the poverty rate,
minority population, and foreign population. In Table 1.9, I first divide the
sample into high and low CPUMA using the state means in 2000.38 To further
assess who is exactly leaving for private schools in disadvantaged areas, I divide
the sample one more time by household income. Thus, four groups for each
regional characteristics are separately estimated, and the results are presented
in Table 1.9.
Columns 1 and 2 divide the sample by the poverty rate (high and low
CPUMAs in columns 1 and 2, respectively). I then show the results of high
and low-income families in each area in Panels A and B, respectively. For
38Again, I use the relative standing of CPUMAs within states to ensure each group has
all 50 states. Because these three variables have large regional variations within the state,
using national-level means does not change my point estimates much. However, it increases
the standard errors and makes some point estimates not different from each other. The
result using national means is available upon request. Also, I divide the CPUMAs by their
characteristics in 2000 to avoid any endogenous change happening together with the change
in the education budget.
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example, Panel A in column 1 is the impact on high-income families in high
poverty areas. The Table also shows the p-value of the difference in point
estimates. When comparing the same income group in high and low poverty
rate CPUMAs, we can refer to the end of the Panel. When comparing the
income groups within the same region, the corresponding p-value is presented
at the bottom of each column.
The point estimates are always larger for high-income families (Panel
A) than low (Panel B) in all columns, consistent with the results in Table 1.8.
On the other hand, the impacts are larger in disadvantaged regions (columns
1, 3, and 5) for both income groups, meaning households in low SES areas are
more responsive than people in high SES areas. Interestingly, the point esti-
mate is the largest for high-income families in high areas for all three regional
characteristics. In other words, the results show that high-income families in
low SES areas are responding to education funding cuts the strongest. The
point estimates for high-income households in high areas are all statistically
different from low-income families in high areas (end of the columns) and high-
income families in low areas (end of Panel A). I observe similar pattern when I
conduct the same analysis by CPUMA characteristics and race, finding larger
impacts for whites in low SES areas than other races in Appendix Table A.8.
Together with Table 1.9, high-income and white families in low SES areas
tend to opt-out from public schools when exposed to funding cuts for public
education.
The results imply that school funding can change student composi-
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tion in public schools, especially in disadvantaged areas. Consequently, we
should take this into account when we interpret the impacts of public educa-
tion spending on students in public schools; otherwise, they may be overstated.
Critically, the adverse effects of funding cuts on student achievement could be
stronger in low SES areas even without any direct causal impact because stu-
dents remaining in public schools would be disproportionately low SES. In
line with this result, several recent papers find that K-12 funding increases
standardized test scores and college enrollment for students in public schools
with a larger effect in high poverty areas (Jackson, Wigger and Xiong, Forth-
coming; Jackson, Johnson and Persico, 2016; Kreisman and Steinberg, 2019;
Lafortune, Rothstein and Schanzenbach, 2018). In addition, the composition
change can be one channel amplifying the effects of school resources because
of peer effects. If high SES students who flee to private schools tend to be high
achievers as well, the performance of low-scoring children remaining in public
schools would be especially undermined (Akyol, 2016; Dills, 2005).
Schools in high SES areas are somewhat immune to this competition
between public and private schools. It may be that public schools in high SES
areas are already highly resourced relative to their local private schools, or the
teachers and the school administration in these schools can more efficiently
manage the financial hardships. Or, it may be that households with a very
high preference for public schools have already sorted in these areas. This
study cannot answer why these school districts could be exempt from this
competition, and it could be an important topic for future research.
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1.8 Conclusion
Private schools serve a significant portion of students in K-12 and play
an essential role in improving education quality by providing an alternative
and inducing competition. Parents often choose private schools because they
believe private schools are better resourced than public schools. Considering
this, a shock to the public school budget may influence parents’ choice to
enroll their children in private schools. Understanding how sensitive students
are to public school funding is important for policymakers to make an informed
decision on K-12 spending, one of the largest government expenditures.
By leveraging the education funding cuts caused by the Great Reces-
sion, I find robust evidence that private K-12 enrollment is responsive to public
education resources. I separate the impact of the funding cuts from that of
the Great Recession by exploiting two plausibly exogenous sources of variation,
the share of state-appropriated funds for K-12 and an indicator for no-state-
income-tax in a given state. I combine these two sources with the timing of
the Great Recession in an event study framework and use the event study
interaction terms as the instruments for the local K-12 revenue per pupil.
I find that a $1,000 decrease in public education budget per pupil in-
creases private school enrollment by 0.59 percentage points, implying the elas-
ticity is -0.62. A decline in public schools’ perceived quality represented by
the student-staff ratio and spending per teacher seems to be a likely mecha-
nism. Moreover, the impact of funding cuts is concentrated within white and
Hispanic students and middle-income households. I also show that high SES
41
children are responsive, especially when they live in disadvantaged areas. My
heterogeneity results shed some light on how public school funding increases
inequality through school choice and change in student composition.
Finally, the Great Recession has an important lesson in handling the
current economic crisis caused by COVID-19. We may experience another fi-
nancial shock for K-12. It has been only a few years since the schools have
fully recovered from the Great Recession, and another cut may result in even
larger impacts. Some families may leave for private schools which are under
fewer regulations and have greater resources than public schools. This is es-
pecially critical during the current crisis where public schools physically shut
down, and if private schools can avoid this, it could lead to a striking learning
inequality.
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1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
School Year
Total Revenue per pupil Annual growth of Revenue
Notes: Data from the Common Core of Data (CCD) of the National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES). Data aggregates the K-12 revenue in 50 states and divides by the full-
time equivalent enrollment. The revenue per pupil is adjusted for inflation (in 2010 dollars).
The orange dash line depicts the annual growth rate of the revenue per pupil in percent.
Shaded areas represent recessions retrieved from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The
Great Recession is marked with a darker shade. The figure presents that the growth rate of
education revenue per pupil decreases during or after recessions, and the Great Recession
is followed by an unprecedented revenue cut that lasted for almost a decade.
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Figure 1.2: Change of Revenue Per Pupil from 2007 to 2012
Notes: This figure shows the variation in funding cut across states induced by the Great Recession from 2007 to 2012. The
percent change is calculated using real value of revenue per pupil in 2010 dollars. Darker shade means larger cuts and the 16
states with the brightest shade are states with growths in K-12 funding.
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Figure 1.3: Trend of Private School Enrollment Relative to 2007 by the






































































Large cut states Small cut states + growth states
Budget cut during 2007−2012 (by 50th percentile)
Mean in 2007: Large cut states=8.91%, Small cut states=12.32%
Notes: The figure shows the trend of private school enrollment relative to 2007 separately by
large and small budget cut states using the Census and ACS. Large cut states are 25 states
with the growth rate below the median (-5 percent). Small budget cut states include 16
states with positive growth. The mean private school enrollment has no difference relative
to the 2007 level before the Great Recession. After the recession, while both groups of
states had experienced a decline in private school enrollment, there is a smaller decline or a
relative increase in large cut states.
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2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
School Year
State Local Federal Total
Notes: This figure shows the trend of the change in public education revenue by source. I
calculate the dollar difference from the school year 2007-2008 level by sources to show how
the budget had changed over time since the start of the Great Recession. All monetary
values are in 2010 dollars.
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Figure 1.5: Share of State Appropriations and Relation to Total Revenue
and Funding Cut
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State share in SY 2006/07
b = −23.29, se = 8.92

















































































.2 .4 .6 .8 1
State share in SY 2006/07
b = 797.88, se = 3368.00
Notes: Panel A displays the variation in state share (Ss =
State rev
Total rev ) in SY 2006-2007, a
year before the Great Recession in the 50 states. The numbers above the bars indicate the
state share in 2006. Panel B shows the relationship between state share and total K-12
revenue per pupil before the Great Recession. Panel C shows a negative correlation between
the state share in 2006 and the change in revenue per pupil in percent from 2007 to 2012.
Coefficients and standard errors of the linear fitted values in Panel B and C are presented
below each figure. All monetary values are in 2010 dollars.
47
Figure 1.6: Trend of Real Tax Revenue and K-12 Funding Compared to 2007, by State Income Tax
Status






































































Mean in FY 2007: no income tax states=$3983, others=$4541







































































Mean in FY 2007: no income tax states=$10658, others=$12102
Notes: Panel A shows the trend of the mean tax revenue per capita relative to FY 2007 in two groups of states (states with
and without an individual income tax). The mean of each group is the weighted mean with state population in 2000. Panel
B shows the trend of mean K-12 funding per pupil relative to FY 2007, also weighted with the school-aged population in
each state in 2000. All monetary values are in 2010 dollars.
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State share No income tax
Notes: N=7,744,432. The first stage result in the most preferred specification (including
the full sets of controls) is presented in this figure. I display the coefficients of interaction
terms of year dummies and state share, and income tax status (βk’s and γk’s) along with
95% confidence intervals. The state share is a continuous variable from 0 to 1 representing
the contribution of state-distributed revenue to the total education revenue, and the no
income tax indicator is a binary indicator. 2001-2004 ACS are excluded from the sample
because CPUMA is not identified in these years. See the notes of 1.3 for further information
on the controls. Standard errors clustered at the state level. F-statistics for 24 excluded
instrumental variables is 16.243. See Appendix Figure A.7 for the impact on state-level K-12
revenue per pupil, including 2001-2004. See Appendix Figure A.9 for other specifications.
See Appendix Table A.2 for the table version of this figure.
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Figure 1.8: Placebo Test: State and Household Characteristics
Notes: Personal income per capita from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The other five variables are from the Census and
ACS by aggregating the household level characteristics to the state-year level. I only include households with at least one
school-aged children to only include relevant households. The solid green line represents the interaction terms between state
share (Ss) and year dummies, while the orange dashed line does the interaction terms between no income tax indicator (NTs)
and year dummies. Shaded areas show 95 % confidence intervals calculated using standard errors clustered by the state level.
All regressions are weighted with the school-aged population in each state. All monetary values are in 2010 dollars.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics in the Pre-Recession Period
Year≤2007 Year≥2008
Mean SE Mean SE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private school enrollment in percent 10.61 [0.016] 10.08 [0.015]
Real revenue per pupil Total $11,139 [1.540] $11,967 [1.860]
(in 2010 dollars) State $5,244 [0.972] $5,462 [1.032]
Local $5,039 [1.452] $5,448 [1.680]
Federal $856 [0.288] $1,057 [0.259]




Notes: This table presents the mean and standard error of private school enrollment and
public education revenue per pupil before and after the Great Recession. The sample for
private school enrollment includes children who are not in school as well. The average
education revenue per pupil by the funding source is displayed below with the composition.
The private school enrollment rate decreased after the Great Recession, consistent with
Figure 1.3. Total education revenue is larger in the post-period because it was increasing
before the recession. All monetary values are in 2010 dollars.
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Table 1.2: Placebo Test in 2SLS
Personal Income HH Income Under 150% HH head Home House Value
per capita ($10K) ($10K) Poverty Unemployed Ownership ($10K)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rev per pupil 0.0791 -0.0306 0.0088 0.0040 -0.0894 -1.031
(in thousand) (0.076) (0.127) (0.060) (0.031) (0.097) (1.166)
Notes: N=850. Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 10,000 for display. The dependent variables of the
regressions are indicated in the column title and defined in the state level. Unit of observation is state-year. Each entry
is a coefficient from a separate 2SLS regression of the dependent variable on real K-12 revenue per pupil in the state (in
thousands of 2010 dollars). The instruments are the sets of interaction terms of state share and no state income tax status
interacted with year dummies. Regressions are weighted using the schoolchildren population of the state in 2000. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses clustered by state. First stage F-stat is 7.84 for all regressions. * significance at 10%; **
significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.52
Table 1.3: Main Effects on Private School Enrollment
Dependent variable: private school enrollment(in percentage point)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rev per pupil -0.477*** -0.534*** -0.551*** -0.589***
(in thousand) (0.173) (0.172) (0.177) (0.177)
First stage F-Stat 23.20 23.24 23.11 16.24
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes
CPUMA Controls Yes
Notes: N=7,744,432. This table reports the estimates of the impact of K-12 revenue per
pupil on private school enrollment using Equation 1.1. Each entry is a coefficient from a
separate regression. The coefficients are rescaled to represent private school enrollment in
percentage points. All regressions are estimated with the 2SLS model using Equation 1.2 as
the first stage. The instruments are the sets of interaction terms of state share and no state
income tax status with year indicators dummies. See the main text for further information.
The K-12 revenue per pupil is adjusted for inflation in 2010 dollars and scaled in $1,000.
All specifications include students’ age in the full set of dummy variables with CPUMA
and year fixed effects and controls described in the table. The point estimate is interpreted
as following: in column 4 (preferred specification), a $1,000 increase in revenue per pupil
decreases private school enrollment by 0.589 percentage points. Individual controls include
race, sex, number of siblings, and an indicator for limited English proficiency and foreign-
born. Household controls include log of total household income, parental characteristics such
as education, race, foreign-born indicator, and employment status, and the composition of
parents (presence of both parents and same-sex parents). CPUMA controls include share of
minority, foreign-born, under 150% of the poverty line in the CPUMA level and CPUMA
median household income. Regressions are weighted using sample weights from the Census
and ACS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered by state. * significance at
10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table 1.4: Impact on Staff and Expenditure Categories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Expenditure per pupil
Total Student
Operational Instruction Capital Support
Rev per pupil 732.5*** 477.9*** 58.09 43.80***
(in thousand) (77.28) (71.02) (68.03) (15.55)
9,248 5,678 1,253 452
Panel B. Expenditure per teacher
Salary Employee
Benefits
Rev per pupil 1957 3404***
(in thousand) (1571) (944.6)
62,944 18,854
Panel C. Staff per 100 students
Guidance Library
Teacher Aides Counselor Staff
Rev per pupil 0.175** 0.207*** 0.007 0.020
(in thousand) (0.087) (0.059) (0.006) (0.013)
6.166 1.313 0.200 0.151
Notes: N=13,730. First stage F-stat = 11.18. Dependent variables defined at the CPUMA
level are indicated above the point estimates. Each entry is a coefficient from a separate
2SLS regression of the dependent variable on real K-12 revenue per pupil in CPUMA (in
thousands of 2010 dollars). The instruments are the sets of interaction terms of state
share and no state income tax status with year indicators dummies. All regressions include
year and CPUMA fixed effects and CPUMA controls. Regressions are weighted using the
schoolchildren population of the CPUMA in 2000. Robust standard errors are in parentheses
clustered by state. The sample includes only 2000 and 2005-2016 to match the main sample
of the paper. Means of the dependent variables are in italics below the standard errors. *
significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table 1.5: Alternative Specifications and Samples
Dependent variable: private school enrollment(in percentage point)
Alternative definition of state share and NT Different measure of rev
Add CPUMA 5-yr avg 2000 1990 Add NH,TN
time trend state share state share state share in NT states State rev Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rev per pupil -0.600** -0.597*** -0.564*** -0.596*** -0.654*** -0.488** -0.630***
(in thousand) (0.294) (0.177) (0.160) (0.219) (0.194) (0.220) (0.205)
First stage F-Stat 9.426 14.72 16.05 19.42 8.790 13.36 13.79
Observations 7,744,432 7,744,432 7,744,432 7,744,432 7,744,432 8,498,386 7,744,432
Notes: Each entry is a coefficient from separate 2SLS regressions of the private school enrollment on real K-12 revenue
per pupil in CPUMA (in thousands of 2010 dollars). The coefficients are rescaled to represent private school enrollment in
percentage points. The instruments are the sets of interaction terms of state share and no state income tax status with year
indicators dummies. All regressions include year and CPUMA fixed effects and the full sets of controls, as in column 4 of Table
1.3. Regressions are weighted using sample weights from the Census and ACS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses
clustered by state. Column 1 includes a linear time trend of CPUMAs (ηp×t). In column 2, I use the average state share from
2002 to 2006 instead of the state share in 2006. Columns 3 and 4 use state share in 2000 and 1990, respectively. In column
5, I add New Hampshire and Tennessee to no income tax states. Columns 6 uses state-level revenue, including 2001-2004
ACS as well. The estimate without 2001-2004 is -0.598(0.184). Column 7 uses realized expenditure instead of CPUMA-level
appropriated funding. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table 1.6: Selective Migration and Private School Enrollment
Dependent variable: private school enrollment(in percentage point)
Migration status from last year 5yr+ Funding of
Different CPUMA Same CPUMA Same house Not moved State of birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rev per pupil -0.662 -0.632*** -0.648*** -0.728*** -0.672***
(in thousands) (0.531) (0.224) (0.238) (0.248) (0.236)
7.88% 10.75% 11.21% 12.68% 10.62%
First stage F-Stat 5.860 11.58 12.08 11.37 8.752
Observations 185,230 5,188,968 4,785,526 3,209,403 7,297,042
Notes: Each entry is a coefficient from separate 2SLS regressions of the private school
enrollment on real K-12 revenue per pupil in CPUMA (in thousands of 2010 dollars). The
coefficients are rescaled to represent private school enrollment in percentage points. The
instruments are the sets of interaction terms of state share and no state income tax status
with year indicators dummies. All regressions include year and CPUMA fixed effects and
the full sets of controls, as in column 4 of Table 1.3. Regressions are weighted using sample
weights from the Census and ACS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered by
state. I use the ACS question asking where each respondent lived 12 months ago to determine
the migration status in columns 1-3. The sample includes only 2005-2016 because the 2000
Census asked location 5 years ago. The main estimate without the 2000 Census is -0.629
(SE: 0.229). Each regression uses the subsample indicated in the title of each column. Area
refers to Migration PUMA (MPUMA, the geographical unit the ACS uses to determine
migration status), which resembles the commuting zones. Column 3 is a subset of column
2, who lived in the same house for more than 12 months. Column 4 restricts the sample to
children whose household head had lived in the same house for more than five years. Because
I only know how long the household head had lived in the same house in the ACS, I assume
children’s migration patterns would be the same as the household head. In column 5, I use
the funding per pupil in the state of birth, which is robust to migration. Thus, all foreign-
born children are excluded. Means of the private school enrollment in the pre-recession
period are in italics below the standard errors. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%;
*** significance at 1%.
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Table 1.7: Private School Choice Policies and Impact of Public School Revenue
Dependent variable: private school enrollment(in percentage point)
Private school choice program Number of
Any policy Voucher Tax credit Charter schools Magnet Schools All Public
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rev per pupil -0.604*** -0.615*** -0.601*** -0.630*** -0.576*** -0.602***
(in thousands) (0.169) (0.175) (0.179) (0.170) (0.181) (0.182)
First stage F-Stat 26.72 21.91 10.75 15.97 18.12 16.67
Notes: N=7,744,432. Each entry is a coefficient from separate 2SLS regressions of the private school enrollment on real
K-12 revenue per pupil in CPUMA (in thousands of 2010 dollars). The coefficients are rescaled to represent private school
enrollment in percentage points. The instruments are the sets of interaction terms of state share and no state income tax
status with year indicators dummies. All regressions include year and CPUMA fixed effects and the full sets of controls, as
in column 4 of Table 1.3. Regressions are weighted using sample weights from the Census and ACS. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses clustered by state. Column 1 adds indicator for any statewide policy helping enrollment of private schools.
In columns 2 and 3, I consider statewide voucher program and tax credit, respectively. Theses indicators are time variant
as states differentially implement private school programs. Columns 4 to 6 include the number of charter schools, magnet
schools, and all public schools as control variable, respectively. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance
at 1%.
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Table 1.8: Heterogeneity in Effect by Age, Race, and Household Income
Dependent variable: private school enrollment (in percentage point)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. By age and Race
Age Race
6-13 14-17 White Hispanic Black
Rev per pupil -0.647*** -0.474*** -0.604*** -0.586*** -0.138
(in thousand) (0.213) (0.151) (0.215) (0.160) (0.226)
11.27% 9.30% 13.35% 5.37% 5.94%
First stage F-Stat 16.66 14.97 15.42 12.78 53.84
Observation 5,139,254 2,605,178 4,835,452 1,382,743 862,474
Panel B. By household income
Richest Poorest
>90 90-75 75-50 50-25 <25
Rev per pupil -0.242 -0.645** -0.821*** -0.552** -0.0942
(in thousand) (0.282) (0.250) (0.250) (0.206) (0.203)
22.53% 13.33% 9.87% 6.85% 4.70%
First stage F-Stat 10.97 14.95 13.79 9.463 16.56
Observation 1,058,362 1,538,369 2,170,024 1,690,188 1,287,489
Notes: Each entry is a coefficient from separate 2SLS regressions of the private school
enrollment on real K-12 revenue per pupil in CPUMA (in thousands of 2010 dollars). The
coefficients are rescaled to represent private school enrollment in percentage points. The
instruments are the sets of interaction terms of state share and no state income tax status
with year indicators dummies. All regressions include year and CPUMA fixed effects and
the full sets of controls, as in column 4 of Table 1.3. Regressions are weighted using sample
weights from the Census and ACS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered by
state. In Panel A, the sample is divided by age and race, respectively in columns 1-2 and 3-5.
Panel B divides the sample by the household income. The percentile is defined within state
and year. Thus, the 90th percentile means that a household is at the 90th percentile in the
state and year when the household is observed. Means of the private school enrollment of
each group in the pre-recession period are in italics below the standard errors. * significance
at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table 1.9: Heterogeneity by CPUMA Characteristics and Household Income
Dependent variable: private school enrollment (in percentage point)
Poverty Minority Population Foreign Population
High Low High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. High income households
Rev per pupil -1.221*** -0.383** -1.264*** -0.338* -0.968*** -0.399**
(in thousand) (0.353) (0.183) (0.331) (0.200) (0.267) (0.191)
14.16% 13.49% 16.48% 12.16% 16.29% 11.89%
p-value of column difference <0.01 <0.01 0.017
First stage F-Stat 16.87 7.604 11.84 15.22 5.056 14.23
Observations 1,810,104 2,956,651 1,562,443 3,204,312 1,735,320 3,031,435
Panel B. Low income households
Rev per pupil -0.458 -0.179 -0.550* -0.117 -0.486** -0.182
(in thousand) (0.286) (0.149) (0.285) (0.152) (0.240) (0.189)
5.80% 6.02% 5.90% 5.91% 6.17% 5.69%
p-value of column difference 0.239 0.039 0.129
First stage F-Stat 16.96 12.84 14.63 13.74 9.879 13.08
Observations 1,637,378 1,340,299 1,271,212 1,706,465 1,139,620 1,838,057
p-value of difference
of panel A and B 0.014 0.392 <0.01 0.403 0.051 0.416
Notes: Each entry is a coefficient from separate 2SLS regressions of the private school enrollment on real K-12 revenue per
pupil in CPUMA (in thousands of 2010 dollars). Other details are same as in Table 1.3. The sample is first divided into
two groups by CPUMA characteristics presented in the title of each column. High and low is defined by whether the mean
in CPUMA in 2000 was higher or lower than the state average in 2000. Then, I divide each group by the household income
percentile within state and display them in Panels A and B. Thus, each regional characteristic has four subgroups. The
p-values of the difference in coefficients of same income group in high and low CPUMAs are presented it the bottom of each
panel (column difference). p-values of the difference between different income groups in same area are also presented in the
bottom of the column. Means of the private school enrollment of each group in the pre-recession period are in italics below
the standard errors. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Chapter 2
Does Facility-Based Delivery Save Lives?
Evidence from Rwanda
2.1 Introduction
Despite the substantial reduction in the mortality rate for children in
developing countries, it is still high compared to the developed world. To
prevent premature deaths, one of the most critical goals in developing coun-
tries, governments have designed various policy interventions. Most developing
countries have at least one public program to induce safe birth (skilled atten-
dant at birth) to meet their Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set by the
United Nations by 2030 (Doctor, Nkhana-Salimu and Abdulsalam-Anibilowo,
2018).
One of the most known programs is promoting safe birth and facility-
based delivery (FBD).1 Sound clinical studies prove that a skilled attendant’s
presence during labor significantly reduces the chance of maternal and neonatal
deaths provided that the quantity and quality of the birth attendants are high
enough (De Bernis et al., 2003; De Brouwere, Tonglet and Van Lerberghe,
1998; Kumar et al., 2008). This is largely true for developed countries where
1Other similar interventions include educating midwives and nurses and banning tradi-
tional midwives.
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high-quality facilities are abundant. However, it is not clear whether FBD
helps reduce mortality in developing countries (Fadel et al., 2015). There
are several reasons why FBD can be ineffective. First, the quality of health
facilities might be poor, or such countries lack proficient health assistants
equipped with skills to deal with emergencies during labor. Second, traveling
to facilities could increase the risk of deaths if the facility is too remote or
transportation is poorly prepared. Finally, being surrounded by other patients
may also cause other infections that lead to death (Graham, Bell and Bullough,
2001). Therefore, whether FBD and related policies in developing countries
reduce newborn mortality is an empirical question.
This paper examines the causal relationship between FBD and child-
hood deaths by exploiting a policy intervention in Rwanda. Rwanda achieved
its Millennium Development Goals of safe childbirth by increasing FBD from
35 percent in 2005 to 96 percent in 2015 after implementing a series of health
policies. The most relevant policy is the Facility-Based Childbirth Policy
(FBCP), which, in 2006, provided a full package of prenatal care and FBD
for all pregnant women free of charge. A rapid increase in FBD rate follows
the policy intervention as Figure 2.1 shows.
To evaluate the effect of this policy, I exploit the spatial variation in
the program exposure represented by the extent of FBD in the baseline period
and construct a difference-in-difference estimator. The assumption is that the
regions with lower baseline FBD rates have more scope to increase FBD and
prenatal care utilization by the reform in 2006. I use the Rwandan Demo-
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graphic and Health Survey (RDHS), which contains rich information on the
birth history and socioeconomic and demographic variables of mothers and
households. I define the low FBD districts in which the historical FBD rate is
relatively low and show those areas have a greater increase in FBD by 9.9 to
13 percent.
Despite a substantial increase in FBD in the treatment districts, I find
weak evidence on any reduction in the newborn (death in seven days) and
neonatal (death in 30 days) mortality. The newborn and neonatal mortality
rate is 5.1 and 4.9 lower per 1,000 live births in the low-FBD districts after the
reform, respectively, in the most conservative specification, although they are
not statistically significant. I also expand the analysis to the later mortality
rates. The difference-in-difference estimator suggests that the pre-period low
FBD use is associated with a decline of 12 deaths and 25 deaths lower infant
death (in one year) and child death (in five years) per 1,000 live births, which is
equivalent to 15 and 20 percent reduction, respectively. The results are robust
to using alternative treatment definitions, such as using continuous treatment
or adjusting the threshold of defining low FBD districts.
Next, I examine whether the treatment effect varies depending on the
exposure to other health policies. The Rwandan Ministry of Health im-
plemented universal health insurance (Community-Based Health Insurance,
CBHI) and Performance-Based Financing (PBF) scheme in a similar period,
which was intended to improve access to and the quality of health services,
respectively (Bucagu et al., 2012). The treatment effect does not vary by expo-
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sure to the CBHI scheme. However, the impact on mortality rates is stronger
in districts exposed longer to PBF.2 This result implies that the quality of a
facility quality plays a vital role in increasing the impact of FBD and prenatal
care.
This paper has two important contributions. First, it contributes to the
scant literature investigating the causal effect of FBD on childhood mortality
rate. Because it is difficult to find an exogenous variation in FBD, very few
papers attempt to identify a causal effect without a policy intervention (Fadel
et al., 2015; Okeke and Chari, 2018). Most prior studies have evaluated the
impact of certain policies. A notable example is the Janani Suraksha Yojana
(JSY) program in India, a conditional cash transfer program that rewards
mothers and health providers for FBD. This program has successfully increased
the FBD rate, especially among poor and rural households in India; however,
there is scarce evidence that it helped reduce NMR (Lim et al., 2010; Powell-
Jackson, Mazumdar and Mills, 2015; Randive et al., 2014). Studies in other
countries tell a similar story: a financial incentive program in Nepal (Powell-
Jackson et al., 2009) and the ban on the traditional birth attendants in Malawi
(Godlonton and Okeke, 2016). The results of my paper are consistent with
these previous studies. On the other hand, some studies find a meaningful
reduction in neonatal mortality through government intervention (Feng et al.,
2011; McKinnon et al., 2015). However, there are very limited studies on FBD
2The Ministry of Health started the CBHI and PBF pilot programs in 1999 and expanded
nationwide in 2006. Thus, pilot districts had been exposed longer to CBHI and PBF.
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and mortality rates beyond the neonatal period. My paper fills this gap.
Second, this paper is one of the few studies examining FBD in Rwanda.
Rwanda has experienced a surprising increase in FBD during the last decade,
but its causal effect is not well-known. Thus, it is important to confirm whether
the seemingly successful free FBD policy has achieved its ultimate goal of
reducing mortality rates. To my knowledge, there is only one more paper
studying Rwanda. Chari and Okeke (2014) use the staggered roll-out of the
performance-based financing program in Rwanda, where its performance de-
termines the budget of each facility, and also find no effect of FBD on NMR.
My paper focuses on a different policy, the free FBD policy, exploiting the pre-
period prevalence of FBD in each district. Also, I expand the focus to later life
mortality and find an improvement in infant and child mortality rates. Given
that early life intervention potentially impact health in later childhood, it is
crucial to examine the effect on other mortality measures. My paper implies
that Rwanda was successful in reducing child deaths through promoting FBD
and prenatal care.
2.2 Institutional Background
The Rwandan genocide in 1994 destroyed most of the health facilities
and workforce, leading to a surge in mortality and morbidity rates. Further-
more, the health care utilization rate had severely dropped after the genocide
with extreme inequality across the population. Wealthier, more educated, and
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urban households had a much greater propensity to pursue health care and
have safe child delivery (Comfort, Peterson and Hatt, 2013).
Since 1999, at the end of the civil war, the Rwandan government had
implemented a variety of health policies and public programs to improve peo-
ple’s health status. There are three notable policies: (1) Facility-Based Child-
birth Policy (FBCP), which provides a full package of maternity care and
delivery service free of charge, (2) community-based health insurance (CBHI)
scheme, a universal health insurance plan eligible to the entire population,3
and (3) performance-based financing (PBF), which determines the budget of
each facility based on its performance in the previous year (Bucagu et al.,
2012). Note that (1) and (2) are intended to improve access to health service
while (3) is to improve the quality of the care. Table 2.1 shows the timeline
of these events. It is noteworthy that most of the changes and expansion oc-
curred together in 2006. While all of the three policies played a significant
role in improving facility access and quality, I focus on the increase in facility-
based delivery (FBD) in Rwanda induced by (1). The FBCP emphasized the
benefits of FBD and provided pregnant women with free prenatal care and
delivery service at health facilities regardless of insurance possession (Rwanda
Ministry of Health, 2017). FBD rate had increased from 35 percent in 2005
to 95 percent in 2010 thanks to this effort (Figure 2.1). This increase is no-
table compared to other sub-Saharan African countries with similar health
3The premium and co-payment varies depending on the income and wealth of the house-
hold. Poorest households are exempt from premium or co-pay, depending on the region
(Bucagu et al., 2012).
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initiatives (Doctor, Nkhana-Salimu and Abdulsalam-Anibilowo, 2018).
Under the Rwandan health system, Health Centers handle prenatal care
and normal childbirth (vaginal delivery). Complicated pregnancies are referred
to the higher-level health facilities such as District Hospitals and Provincial
Hospitals that are generally well equipped and capable to perform surgical
procedures (Bucagu et al., 2012).4 Most of the prenatal and normal delivery
service is provided by midwives and nurses (Lundeen et al., 2019).
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Data Sources
The main dataset is the Rwandan Demographic and Health Survey
(RDHS). I use the birth history data of 2005, 2008, 2010, and 2014/2015 waves
of RDHS and stack them according to birth year to create a continuous set of
births from 2000 to 2014. The birth history data includes all birth happened to
the respondent (woman of reproductive age, 15–49 years old) retrospectively
regardless of child’s survival. For the children who have died, the respondents
provide detailed information on the age of death (in months when they died
before 60 months). The RDHS also collects information on the place of birth
4The healthcare system in Rwanda reaches from community-level care to the national
hospitals. At the most basic level, community workers visit households and identify each
household member’s healthcare needs. Health posts and centers are the primary care unit.
Health posts are smaller than centers, reaching out to the most remote portions of the
country. The more complicated illness that cannot be treated in primary care units is
referred to higher-level facilities, such as district hospitals (secondary) and provincial and
national referral hospitals (tertiary).
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and prenatal visits for children under five years old. The data also provides
useful information on households and mothers’ socioeconomic status (SES),
such as household wealth and mother’s education.
I use four measures of mortality rates: Newborn Mortality (death in
seven days, NMR7), Neonatal Mortality (death in 30 days, NMR), Infant
Mortality (death in one year, IMR), and Child Mortality (death in five years,
CMR). Following the traditional definition, the mortality rates are scaled per
1,000 live births.
The Rwandan Government reformed its administrative areas in 2006
from 12 provinces and 106 districts to five provinces and 30 districts. Because
of this change, it is difficult to compare the spatial change of FBD and other
health outcomes across time. Fortunately, RDHS provides GPS coordinates of
the primary sampling units (PSU, or clusters),5 making it possible to identify
the old district of each PSU in the later surveys. I match 2008-2014 PSUs to
the 106 old districts to have a greater variation. Because the DHS displaces
the GPS coordinates for privacy issues,6 some measurement error still exists.
For additional information on the district characteristics, I use the Inte-
grated Household Living Condition Survey (EICV) of Rwanda, 2005 and 2014
waves. This survey provides information on changes in people’s well-being,
such as economic conditions, education, health and housing conditions, house-
5Available from 2005 wave.
6The coordinates are displaced with some error; zero to two kilometers for the urban
clusters and zero to five kilometers for rural.
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hold consumption, etc. I use it as a supplementary data set to calculate the
average insurance coverage rate and total population by district and survey
year that RDHS does not provide. When calculating the average insurance
coverage by district, I restrict the EICV cample to women 15-45 years old as
the RDHS sample consists of reproductive-aged women.
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics of the resulting data. I
present the pre- and post-period relative to the free FBD policy. Panel A
and B show the birth characteristics and mother’s and household’s charac-
teristics, respectively. I have data on 58,660 births after removing missing
variables.
Two things are noticeable in Panel A. First, the Facility-Based Child-
care Policy seems to be effective in terms of service utilization. FBD rate had
increased significantly, from 31 percent to 76 percent. Prenatal care utilization
did not increase substantially; however, the number of visits increased, and the
month of pregnancy at the first visit decreased. Second, the overall mortality
rates had declined during this period. For example, CMR had declined the
most, from 124 death to 66 death per 1,000 birth.7
Panel B shows that the overall socioeconomic status of the household
7When defining mortality rates, I only include the births that passed the threshold pe-
riods.For NMR and NMR7, I include births that happened at least one month before the
survey. For IMR and CMR, births that occurred one year and five years before the survey
date are included, respectively.
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had improved during this period. Especially, the fraction of households with
piped water had increased significantly, from 17 percent to 34 percent. Fur-
thermore, Rwandan women become more educated and literate over time,




To identify the causal effect of the FBCP in 2006 on facility use and
mortality rates, I exploit spatial and temporal variation in the ‘intensity of ex-
posure’ to the policy in a difference-in-difference framework. I use the baseline
district-level home delivery rate (1-FBD rate) as the proxy for the intensity
of exposure. In other words, I use the fact that districts with low FBD rates
experienced a greater increase in FBD rates following the old literature.8
The geographic unit I use is old districts that were used until 2006.
I take the districts with a low FBD rate (below median) as the treatment
districts and call them low-FBD districts. Figure 2.2 displays how the treat-
ment and control districts are distributed in Rwanda. Kigali area (capital)
and other large cities are mostly control treatment; however, some rural areas
are classified as control districts as well.
8Using the baseline means as exposure measures is found in previous works like Bleakley
(2007); Godlonton and Okeke (2016); Osili and Long (2008).
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Specifically, the main regression equation is as follows:
yidpmt = β1Low FBDd×1(t ≥ 2006)+Xit+τd+ηm+θt+αp×t+εipdmt, (2.1)
in which yidpmt is an outcome for child i born in district d in province
p in month m of year t. The outcome variables include an indicator for FBD,
information on prenatal visits, and mortality rates, such as newborn (deaths
within seven days) neonatal (deaths within 30 days), infant (deaths within a
year), and child (deaths within five years) mortality rate. Low FBDd is one
if the district has a low baseline FBD rate (or high home delivery rate) and
1(t ≥ 2006) is an indicator function whether t is greater or equal to 2006. Xit
is a vector of birth and household characteristics. τd is the district fixed effect,
and θt is the year fixed effect. ηm is the birth month fixed effect, controlling any
possible seasonality. I allow province-level time trends to vary by the district
to absorb any long-term linear trend in the outcome variables that may vary
across provinces. 2005 RDHS is representative at the old district level while
rest of the waves are at the new district level. Thus, I use the proper districts
to cluster the standard errors.
The coefficient of the interest is β1, the reduced-form impact of the
policy change on the outcome variables, capturing the difference in change in
the outcome variables before and after the reform between the districts of high
and low FBD.
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2.4.2 Validity of Identification Strategy
The identifying assumption for Equation 2.1 is that the high FBD dis-
tricts are a good control group for the low FBD districts. In other words, the
outcome variables should evolve in parallel in treatment and control districts.
Women and children in low-FBD districts are disadvantaged, to begin with:
low FBD rate is correlated with lower SES and fewer and worse quality health
facilities in the district. This discrepancy can cause a differential change in
relevant variables and affect the outcome variables. Thus, it is important
to examine whether the changes in other factors that could affect FBD and
mortality rates are correlated with the treatment status.
In Figure 2.3, I display the trend of FBD and prenatal care in treatment
and control districts. The pre-trends in treatment and control districts are very
similar for all three variables. Especially in Panel A, there is a much larger
increase in FBD rate in treatment districts, suggesting that the baseline FBD
rate is a good proxy for treatment intensity.
Figure 2.4 graphically presents the coefficients of Low FBDd × 1(t ≥
2006) with different outcome variables. If the point estimate is statistically
significant, it indicates a differential change between two groups. Most of the
coefficients are not distinguishable from zero. Birth characteristics such as sex,
twin indicator, and whether the mother is under 20 (young mother) are all un-
correlated. Whether the child is a first child and current marital status are
statistically significant. I suspect that this stems from a decline in total fertil-
ity and an increase in men’s survival rates. I also test mother and household
71
SES, such as an indicator for primary school completion, living in an urban
area, possession of a car or motorcycle and piped water, and wealth index, all
of which are not associated with LowFBDd × 1(t ≥ 2006). Overall, results
in Figure 2.4 indicate that treatment status balances almost all observable
characteristics, and the research design is unlikely to be biased by changes in
unobservable variables.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Effect on Facility-Based Delivery and Prenatal Care
Table 2.3 presents β1’s of Equation 2.1 with different specifications for
three outcome variables: an indicator for FBD, number of prenatal visits, and
month at the first visit. In all panels, the coefficients are robust to the inclusion
of birth-related controls and SES controls in columns 2 and 3. In my preferred
specification, column 4, I include province-specific time trends to adjust to
the differential time trend of each area. In Panel A, the coefficient means that
the FBD rate had increased by 9.9 FBD districts in the preferred specification.
Overall, Table 2.3 implicates that the policy changes effectively increased FBD.
The policy was also intended to increase prenatal care at health facilities, and
Panels B and C show it was effective. The number of prenatal visits increased
by 0.113 times, and the month at first visit declined by 0.125 months in my
preferred specification (column 4). The results in Table 2.6 are consistent with
Figure 2.3.In Appendix Figure B.1, I present the results in the event study
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framework.
2.5.2 Effect on the Mortality Rates
The previous results show that the health reform in 2006 successfully in-
creased FBD rate and prenatal care use in Rwanda. Here, I examined whether
this is associated with a reduction in mortality rates. Since the mortality rates
had surged during the Rwandan genocide and thus led to a very different trend
in the late 90s, I only include births after 1999 even though the RDHS asks
the full history of the birth career.9 The primary outcome is the binary indi-
cator for deaths. To match the standard definition of the mortality rates in
developing countries (deaths per 1,000 lives), I assign 1,000 to the deaths.10
I tested deaths in seven days (newborn death), 30 days (neonatal mortality),
one year (infant mortality), and five years (child mortality).
Figure 2.5 presents the mortality trends in treatment and control dis-
tricts. The relatively small sample size of RDHS gives the unsmoothed trend
of mortality rates. Consistent with Table 2.2, there is an overall reduction in
mortality rates in all panels. It is not clear there is a larger decline in newborn
and neonatal mortality rates in treatment districts in Panels A and B. How-
ever, infant and child mortality rates in treatment and control districts seem
9Including earlier birth can be potentially problematic for following reasons as well. First,
it is more likely that mothers imprecisely remember the child’s information, especially when
she did not survive (age at death, year of birth, and even omitting the birth). Second, I
need to assume that the birth happened in the same district where the respondent currently
lives. When including older births, the measurement error increases.
10This is to scale the mortality rates per 1,000 live births. This method is used in Geruso
and Spears (2018).
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to converge after the health reform (Panels C and D).
The difference-in-difference results with the preferred specification are
presented in Table 2.4.11 Each cell is from separate regressions with Equation
2.1, and dependent variables are described in the column title. There is an
insignificant decline in the newborn and neonatal mortality rates in columns
1 and 2, respectively. Infant and child mortality rates declined by 12 and 25
deaths per 1,000 live births, corresponding to 15 and 20 percent, respectively,
in low FBD districts. These point estimates are both statistically significant.
2.5.3 Alternative Specification
My main specification defines low FBD districts as the districts whose
baseline FBD rate is below the median (of all districts). In Table 2.5, I use
alternative specifications to examine the robustness of my result. Overall,
Table 2.5 shows my results are robust to using an alternative definition of the
treatment.
Panel A uses the home delivery (1-FBD) rate in a continuous form as
the treatment variable. FBD rate increased by 47 percent when the baseline
FBD rate decreases from 100 to 0 percent. Because of the scale of the treatment
variable, the point estimates in Panel A are larger than the results in Tables
2.3 and 2.4. Panel B defines the low FBD districts as districts whose FBD rate
is below the top 25th percentile. By defining the treatment variable this way,
11See Appendix Figure B.2 for event study results.
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I get larger and more precise estimates for most outcome variables. However,
limiting control districts to the top 25 percent of the FBD rate results in
comparing rural and urban areas. To include rural areas in the control group,
a more generous definition of treatment status is necessary.12
In Panel C, I define a composite index representing the exposure to
FBD and prenatal care in the baseline period. I perform Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) with district-level FBD rate, frequency of prenatal visits, and
month at the first prenatal visit and take the first principal component (PC1)
as the indicator.13 Similar to the main specification, the treatment variable is
one when the composite index is lower than its median (low use of prenatal care
and FBD). Because I include the two prenatal care measures as the treatment
intensity measure, the point estimates get larger and more precise in columns
2 and 3. The impact on mortality rates is similar to the main specification
with slightly smaller point estimates, although not statistically significant.
Prenatal care and FBD may be associated with the overall use of health
facilities. Areas with high utilization of health services are often areas with
higher accessibility and more well-equipped facilities. Also, the free FBD pro-
gram happened together with other policies like universal insurance. Thus,
I test whether the results are substantially different when using an index for
pre-period facility use in Panel D. Included variables are whether the respon-
12This specification much more precisely estimates the result. However, there is a differ-
ential pre-trend in FBD rates between treatment and control districts, thus, I did not use
it as the main specification.
13See Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006) for further information on PCA.
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dent (mother) visited a facility within 12 months, whether she uses modern
contraceptives, whether she got tested for HIV, and whether a child was taken
to a facility for diarrhea or fever. I also include FBD and prenatal care vari-
ables. Similar to Panel C, I take the PC1 and define the low index status if
the index is below the median. The point estimates are similar, however, more
precisely estimated. This result suggests that low facility use and low FBD
rate before the reform are somewhat correlated.
2.5.4 Impact on Other Health Services Utilization
My results show that promoting FBD successfully reduced mortality
rates, although the impact on newborn and neonatal deaths is not precisely
measured. Free prenatal care and FBD may induce mothers to visit health
facilities for other reasons after birth, as they learn facilities are accessible and
affordable. In this case, it is difficult to determine whether more frequent use of
health facilities after birth or prenatal care and FBD resulted in reductions in
mortality rates. In Table 2.6, I test whether the free FBD policy is associated
with an increase in facility visits for other reasons than prenatal care and
delivery.
Panel A shows little impact on children’s facility visits. Interestingly,
children born from cesarean section (C-section) did not increase due to the free
FBD program. This result suggests that while the overall FBD rate increases,
C-section does not increase accordingly. In Rwanda, C-sections are available
at the district or provincial hospitals (secondary or tertiary facilities); however,
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this process is often not smooth (Harrison and Goldenberg, 2016; Niyitegeka
et al., 2017). If complicated deliveries were not successfully transferred in
some areas, it might explain why newborn and neonatal mortality rates are
relatively less affected. Surprisingly, the use of postnatal care does not increase
as well, although postnatal care is included in this free FBD program. In Panel
B, there is evidence that women in treatment districts are more likely to use
health services. Especially, they tend to visit any health facilities within 12
months and get an HIV test. However, there is an insignificant increase in the
tendency to visit fertility planning (column 3) or use modern contraceptives
(column 4) conditional to using any birth control methods. To summarize, the
FBCP may have increased the overall facility use to some extent; however, it
seems that it is not the primary reason for the decline in mortality rates.
2.6 Relation to Other Health Policies
Previously I show there were three critical programs in the 2006 health
reform in Rwanda. This section examines whether the treatment effect varies
depending on the intensity of two other health programs: free universal insur-
ance (community-based health insurance, or CBHI) and performance-based
financing (PBF).
From 2006, insurance coverage had increased significantly in Rwanda
thanks to CBHI. In 1999, the Rwandan Ministry of Health started a pilot
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program of CBHI in three Health Districts.14 After the success in these three
districts, the Ministry of Health decided to expand the program nationwide
(Nyandekwe, Nzayirambaho and Kakoma, 2014). Even before the expansion,
some districts independently offered CBHI or other public health insurance
schemes and some wealthy households were able to possess their insurance.
Thus, the intensity of exposure to health insurance also varied across regions.
In other words, districts without CBHI experienced a greater increase in in-
surance coverage after 2006.
Due to the lack of data, I cannot match each PSU to the Health Dis-
tricts. Thus, I use EICV and estimate the insurance coverage change between
2005 and 2014 in each (new) district and use it to measure the intensity of
exposure to CBHI. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.7, I compare the treatment
effects on outcome variables in districts with larger vs. smaller change in in-
surance coverage.15 FBD rate tended to increase much larger in districts with
a larger increase in insurance coverage. However, point estimates on the rest
of the outcomes are not statistically different in columns 1 and 2. Insurance
may have increased access to health services and thus FBD; however, impact
on mortality rates is limited.16
14There are 40 Health Districts in Rwanda, which is a separate administrative area. They
largely match to new 30 districts.
15Large increase districts are districts with low baseline insurance coverage. Separating
the sample by baseline insurance coverage results in a similar result (Results available upon
request).
16I test the treatment effect of CBHI using Equation 2.1 in Appendix Table B.2. It seems
that the expansion of CBHI is not associated with a reduction in mortality rates, except for
CMR.
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Performance-based financing (PBF) intends to improve health facili-
ties’ quality by rewarding them based on their performance in the previous
year. Like CBHI, PBF also had a pilot study period in a few health districts
and became nationwide in 2006 (Chari and Okeke, 2014). Districts that imple-
mented PBF earlier (i.e., pilot districts) are more likely to have better quality
facilities if PBF is effective. In columns 5 and 6, I divide the sample by the
timing of PBF implementation (earlier or later). The impact on FBD and pre-
natal care is mixed. The treatment effect on FBD is similar; however, effects
on the number of prenatal visits are statistically different in columns 5 and 6.
On the other hand, there is a consistent pattern in effects on mortality rates.
The decline in mortality rates is greater in districts that implemented PBF
earlier, although it is significantly different only for newborn mortality. While
PBF itself may not have increased the treatment effect of free FBD policy,
my results imply that it may have improved health facilities’ quality and thus
reduce mortality rates.17
2.7 Discussion
Despite the remarkable success in promoting FBD in Rwanda, there
is limited evidence that FBD reduces newborn and neonatal mortality in this
paper. It is hard to believe that FBD reduces infant and child mortality
17Papers like Basinga et al. (2011); Chari and Okeke (2014) finds that PBF itself increased
FBD rate. However, they both did not find PBF reduced mortality rates.
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without reducing newborn and neonatal mortality rates because FBD is more
directly related to earlier life deaths (Moyer, Adanu and Engmann, 2013).
However, prenatal care and FBD may reduce infant and child mortality by
improving the child’s long-term health status. For example, prenatal cares
play an essential role in promoting women’s health literacy (Lori et al., 2014)
and positively affect child health.
There are several possible explanations why the impact on newborn
and neonatal deaths is limited. First, the quality of the facilities or the care
provided may not have been sufficient enough to have a meaningful impact on
newborn and neonatal mortality rates. Very basic causes of death could be
prevented by primary care in the health facility. However, more resources are
required to deal with complicated causes. In fact, about 84 percent of health
centers did not have an ambulance in 2014. The majority of health centers
own a motorcycle as the main means of transportation, not appropriate for
patient transfer. Almost none of the health centers have an X-ray or anesthesia
machine. Even in the provincial and district hospitals, 15 percent did not
own anesthesia machine (Rwanda Ministry of Health, 2015). Although both
devices may have little to do with safe delivery (especially X-rays), it implies
how low the overall quality of Rwandan health facilities is. Because of the
data limitation, I cannot examine the differential treatment effect based on the
quality of the nearby health facility. The negative and significant estimates on
the newborn and neonatal mortality rates in column 5 in Table 2.7 suggest the
quality matters, although the coefficients are not statistically distinguishable
80
from column 6.
Second, the increase in the use of prenatal care and family plan may
have made high-risk women successfully deliver their children. In other words,
without the reform, some of the children might not have been born alive, not
contributing to the death rates. Alternatively, a high-risk woman who would
not have been able to conceive may have got pregnant as she became health-
ier. Either way, the chance of high-risk children being born increases, and the
overall neonatal mortality does not go down. In Figure 2.4, the average birth
order in the treatment group increases (because the likelihood of being the
first birth decreases), supporting that there has been more birth in treatment
districts after the reform.
2.8 Conclusion
Today, still more than 2.5 million children die within a month after birth
every year. Many developing countries have made enormous efforts during
the last thirty years, but premature deaths are still far more frequent than
their developed counterparts. Because a health professional can readily treat
some causes of deaths during labor, FBD and safe delivery very important.
However, several empirical studies do not support the positive impact of FBD
on neonatal mortality.
Rwanda is recognized as one of the most successful countries promoting
FBD. Rwanda’s experience is unique in that only a few countries went through
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such a rapid surge in FBD. Today, most Rwandan children are now born in
a health facility, and women have access to pre-and postnatal care thanks to
FBCP initiated in 2006. By leveraging variation in the district-level FBD rate
in the baseline period in a difference-in-difference framework, I find evidence
that the policy effectively improved FBD and prenatal care utilization.
The estimates show that the policy had reduced the infant mortality
rate and child mortality rate by 12 and 25 deaths per 1,000 births. I also
find that newborn and neonatal mortality declined, although not statistically
significant. My results are robust to using alternative treatment definitions.
The size of the treatment effect of free FBD and prenatal care programs is
not related to other health policies in this period, such as universal health
insurance or PBF.
It seems Rwanda has a little problem with access to maternal health
services. However, anecdotal evidence tells the quality of Rwandan facilities is
far below the standards in developed countries. Even secondary and tertiary
level facilities lack basic equipment in the developed countries’ standards. For
a country like Rwanda, where its quantitative success is widely known, it is
time to seek qualitative improvement in the health sector.
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Notes: Data from the Rwandan Demographic and Health Survey (RDHS). I combine mul-
tiple rounds of RDHS to show the trend of FBD. The Facility-Based Childbirth Policy
(FBCP) was implemented in 2006, and the dashed line separates before and after the policy
intervention. The figure presents a steep increase in FBD rate after the policy implementa-
tion.
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Figure 2.2: Treatment/Control Assignment
Control: High FBD districts
Treatment: Low FBD districts
Notes: This figure shows the map of Rwanda with its administrative districts in 2005. The
treatment districts or the low FBD districts are depicted in the darker shade. The treatment
districts are districts whose baseline average FBD rates are below the 50th percentile. High
FBD or control districts are concentrated on the Kigali area and other urban cities, however,
not entirely.
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(c) Months at the first prenatal visit
Low FBD districts(Treatment) High FBD districts(Control)
Notes: This figure shows the trend of FBD (Panel A), the number of prenatal visits (Panel B), and the month at the first
visit (Panel C) in treatment and control districts. Treatment and control status is defined as the same in Figure 2.2. The
solid green line and dashed orange line represent treatment and control districts, respectively. Three figures all show that
the difference between treatment and control districts got smaller after 2006, implying the policy was effective.
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Notes: This figure graphically shows the result of the balance test. I separately run regres-
sions using Equation 2.1 with the dependent variables described in the vertical axis and
plot the difference-in-difference estimates (β1 with 95% confidence interval. Controls are
not included. Standard errors are clustered at the proper district level. (Old districts for
the 2005 wave and new districts for the rest of the data.)
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Low FBD districts(Treatment) High FBD districts(Control)
Notes: This figure shows the trend of the newborn (death in seven days), neonatal (in 30
days), infant (in one year), and child (in five years) mortality rate by the treatment status.
Treatment and control status is defined as the same in Figure 2.2. The solid green line and
dashed orange line represent treatment and control districts, respectively. Because I cannot
determine the survival status of children who have lived less than the threshold period, I
drop the observations when estimating the mortality rates. For example, babies born less
than a year ago are all omitted when estimating the infant mortality rate. Therefore, the
sample size is smaller when estimating infant mortality and child mortality. While it is not
clear for the newborn (Panel A) and neonatal (Panel B) mortality rates, it seems that infant
and child mortality rates relatively declined in treatment districts.
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Table 2.1: Rwanda Health Policy Events, 1999-2010
Year Policy Description
1999 Pilot project on community based health insurance (CBHI)
2001 Performance-based financing contracts (PBFC) pilot projects
2005 Rwanda Health Sector Policy (including Sexual and Reproductive Health)
2006 Facility-Based Childbirth Policy
PBFC introduced in all districts
CBHI becomes mandatory
National family planing policy
2007 Government declares family planning a development priority
2008 Health facilities made autonomous
Community health program enhanced
Maternal death reviews institutionalized
Source: Bucagu et al. (2012)
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Year≤2005 Year≥2006
Mean SD Observation Mean SD Observation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Birth Characteristics
Male 0.51 0.50 33559 0.50 0.50 25363
Birth Order 3.62 2.30 33559 3.31 2.24 25363
Twin 0.03 0.17 33559 0.03 0.17 25363
FBD 0.31 0.46 11279 0.76 0.43 18778
Prenatal Care 0.95 0.22 6430 0.98 0.13 14261
Number of Prenatal Visit 2.52 1.15 6421 3.13 0.97 14257
Month at First Prenatal Visit 5.64 1.50 6096 4.15 1.48 14021
Newborn Mortality (NMR7) 28.75 167.10 33455 19.39 137.88 25205
Neonatal Mortality (NMR) 35.07 183.96 33455 23.22 150.59 25205
Infant Mortality (IMR) 79.40 270.36 31810 42.86 202.56 21179
Child Mortality (CMR) 123.60 329.13 22097 65.68 247.74 6531
Panel B. Mother and Household Characteristics
Age at Birth 28.22 6.31 33559 28.41 6.28 25363
Currently Married 0.85 0.36 33559 0.84 0.36 25363
Some Education 0.74 0.44 33559 0.81 0.39 25363
Urban 0.13 0.34 33559 0.14 0.35 25363
Has Pipewater 0.31 0.46 33559 0.34 0.47 25363
Has Car/Truck 0.01 0.09 33559 0.01 0.10 25363
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics of the entire data used. In Panel A, I present the variables related to children
or births. The unit of observation is each birth. Pre- and post-policy is divided by birth year. There is a considerable
variation in the observation number because some detailed birth information is only available for the births in recent five
years. The place of birth (facility or not), prenatal care, and vaccination information are available for recent births only.
Survival status, gender, birth order (from the same mother), twin indicator, and the mother’s age at birth is available for the
whole sample. Because the observation unit is birth, some children (births) in the sample are from the same mother. Panel
B presents the summary statistics of the variables of the mothers and households. Like Panel A, the unit of observation is
birth, so some mothers are duplicated if she has more than one child.
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Table 2.3: Effect on Facility-Based Delivery and Prenatal Care
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Facility Based Delivery
Low FBD District 0.135*** 0.143*** 0.133*** 0.0985***
× Post (0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0168) (0.0159)
Observations 30,057 30,057 30,057 30,057
Panel B. Number of Prenatal Visit
Low FBD District 0.151*** 0.157*** 0.149*** 0.113**
× Post (0.0419) (0.0417) (0.0439) (0.0438)
Observations 20,678 20,678 20,678 20,678
Panel C. Month at the First Prenatal Visit
Low FBD District -0.194** -0.209*** -0.202** -0.125*
× Post (0.0769) (0.0763) (0.0788) (0.0755)
Observations 20,117 20,117 20,117 20,117
Birth Controls Yes Yes Yes
SES Controls Yes Yes
Province Time Trend Yes
Notes: This table presents the treatment effect on FBD and prenatal visits. Dependent
variables are presented as the panel title. Each column presents β1 of Equation 2.1 with
different specifications described in the bottom part of the table. The point estimate is
interpreted as following: in column 4 (preferred specification) of Panel A, the FBD rate
increases by 9.9 percentage points in treatment districts. SES controls include maternal
education, household wealth, urban indicator, and an indicator for possession of a car and
piped water. Birth controls include gender, twin indicator, a full set of dummies of birth
order, marital status, and mother’s age at birth and its square term. Because Rwanda
changed its administrative boundaries in 2006 (from 106 to 30 districts) and the RDHS
is representative at the district level at the survey time, I use the districts appropriate
to the time to cluster standard errors, i.e., the old districts in the 2005 survey and the
new districts in 2008-2014 surveys. Regressions are weighted using sample weights from
the RDHS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered by the proper district. *
significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table 2.4: Effect on Mortality Rates
NMR7 NMR IMR CMR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low FBD District -5.121 -4.895 -12.15* -25.06**
× Post (3.205) (3.401) (6.573) (10.98)
Observation 58,660 58,660 52,826 28,628
Notes: This table shows the treatment effect on different mortality rates. Dependent vari-
ables are presented as the column title. Each column presents β1 of Equation 2.1 with the
preferred specification (column 4 in Table 2.3). Because I cannot determine the survival
status of the children who did not pass the thresholds for each definition, I drop all the chil-
dren who did not reach the threshold at the survey. This makes the number of observations
smallest for CMR. Controls are as same in Table 2.3. See the notes of Table 2.3 for further
information. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered by the proper district. *
significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table 2.5: Alternative Definitions of Treatment
Prenatal Care Mortality Rates
FBD Frequency First Month NMR7 NMR IMR CMR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Continuous Home Delivery (1-FBD) Rate
Treatment 0.472*** 0.584*** -0.652** -9.479 -10.08 -29.41* -63.09**
× Post (0.0488) (0.150) (0.261) (9.117) (10.08) (16.60) (29.97)
Panel B. Home Delivery Rate Above 25th Percentile
Treatment 0.120*** 0.166*** -0.239*** -5.392* -6.887** -11.94** -23.86**
× Post (0.0204) (0.0513) (0.0880) (3.128) (3.017) (5.290) (11.02)
Panel C. Composite Index of FBD and Prenatal Care
Treatment 0.0824*** 0.216*** -0.299*** -3.734 -3.584 -7.337 -20.80
× Post (0.0165) (0.0429) (0.0756) (3.502) (3.809) (6.642) (12.84)
Panel D. Composite Index of Facility Use
Treatment 0.0833*** 0.165*** -0.179** -4.824 -6.316* -10.91** -21.35**
× Post (0.0162) (0.0411) (0.0730) (2.958) (3.392) (5.301) (9.507)
Observation 30,057 20,678 20,117 58,660 58,660 52,989 28,628
Notes: This table shows the treatment effect on different outcome variables using alternative definitions of treatment. De-
pendent variables are presented as the column title. Each column presents β1 of Equation 2.1 with the preferred specification
(column 4 in Table 2.3). Panel A uses the continuous home delivery rate (1-FBD) of each district as the treatment variable.
Panel B defines low FBD districts as those whose home delivery rate is above the 25th percentile (FBD rate below the 75th
percentile). I define a composite index combining FBD and prenatal care utilization in Panel C. In Panel D, I add other
facility utilization measures, such as whether the mother visited a facility in the last 12 month, utilizing modern contraceptive,
whether got an HIV test, and whether the child got treatment for diarrhea and fever at the health facility. In Panels C and D,
I construct the index using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and taking the first component (PC1). The treatment
variable is defined as the same in the main specification: low use if the index is below the mean. See the main text for further
information. Controls are as same in Table 2.3. See the notes of Table 2.3 for further information. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses clustered by the proper district. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table 2.6: Effect on Other Facility Utilization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Children
C-section Postnatal care Treated Diarrhea Treated Fever
Low FBD District -0.00414 -0.0258 -0.0348 0.0061
× Post (0.00690) (0.0228) (0.0345) (0.0283)
Observation 27,517 17,974 3,686 9,638
Panel B. Mothers
Visited Facility HIV Test Fertility Planing Contraceptive
Low FBD District 0.0694*** 0.0868*** 0.0238 0.0310
× Post (0.0223) (0.0211) (0.0172) (0.0209)
Observation 22,772 22,744 22,764 16,700
Notes: This table shows the treatment effect on children’s and mother’s health facility
utilization. Dependent variables are presented at the top of each column. Each column
presents β1 of Equation 2.1 with the preferred specification (column 4 in Table 2.3). Panel
A shows the health service utilization of children. Treated diarrhea and fever are one when
the child was taken to a health facility for treatment conditional on having symptoms within
a week. In Panel B, I present treatment effects on mothers’ facility utilization. Visited
Facility is one when the mother had visited a facility within 12 months. Contraceptive is
one when the mother uses modern contraceptive methods conditional on the intention of
birth control. Controls are as same in Table 2.3. See the notes of Table 2.3 for further
information. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered by the proper district. *
significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table 2.7: Heterogeneity by Exposure to Other Policies
Change in Insurance Coverage Difference Performance-Based Finance Difference
Large Small (1)-(2) P-value Earlier Later (5)-(6) P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. FBD and Prenatal Care
Facility-Based Delivery 0.1216*** 0.0489** 0.0726 0.0324** 0.1045*** 0.0988*** 0.0058 0.862
(0.0240) (0.0242) (0.0270) (0.0197)
Number of Prenatal Visit 0.0914 0.0893** 0.0021 0.9794 -0.0185 0.1618*** -0.1803 0.0798*
(0.0689) (0.0410) (0.0922) (0.0488)
Month at the First Prenatal Visit -0.1043 -0.0256 -0.0786 0.57 -0.1722 -0.0986 -0.0736 0.6652
(0.1078) (0.0892) (0.1504) (0.0850)
Panel B. Mortality Rates
Newborn Mortality (7 days) -5.0103 -4.0353 -0.975 0.8819 -15.4270*** -1.6214 -13.8057 0.0370**
(4.1166) (5.1760) (5.1853) (4.1828)
Neonatal Mortality (30 days) -3.6721 -4.4702 0.7981 0.9057 -11.8010** -3.1236 -8.6774 0.2331
(4.8196) (4.7809) (5.7794) (4.4927)
Infant Mortality (1 year) -15.4167 -7.1691 -8.2476 0.5216 -28.9349** -5.2105 -23.7244 0.1469
(11.4747) (5.9042) (14.6791) (7.4832)
Child Mortality (5 years) -22.4734 -29.4191*** 6.9457 0.7608 -37.6575 -21.1826* -16.4749 0.5615
(20.4609) (10.4823) (25.7400) (12.6050)
Notes: This table shows the heterogeneity in the treatment effect by the exposure to other related policies. In 2006, the
Rwandan Ministry of Health implemented universal health insurance (CBHI) and Performance-Based Financing (PBF)
nationwide. Because the government earlier started these programs as pilot programs, the exposure to the program varies
by district. In columns 1 and 2, I divide the sample by districts with large and small changes in insurance coverage. The
district-level insurance coverage is estimated with EICV data. I estimate the insurance coverage change between 2014 and
2005 and separate them into two groups. The cutoff is an 80 percent increase, which is the median. In columns 5 and 6, I split
the sample by the timing of the implementation of PBF. The PBF pilot districts are identified by Rusa and Fritsche (2007).
Early indicates districts where PBF was implemented before 2006 and later is after. PBF intends to improve the health
facility’s quality, so in principle, the early implemented districts are expected to have better quality facilities. The districts
are also in the new administrative boundaries. The differences between the two groups are presented with the p-value. Panel
A shows the effect on the outcomes of children, and Panel B shows the women’s outcomes. The joint-significant test is also
conducted and presented with the p-value at the bottom part of the panels. Controls are as same in Table 2.3. See the notes
of Table 2.3 for further information. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered by the proper district. * significance
at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Chapter 3
Outsource to India: The Impact of Service
Outsourcing to India on the Labor Market in
the US
3.1 Introduction
Service trade has dramatically increased since the 1980s, thanks to
technological advances. A fraction of service imports is considered outsourcing
or offshoring. Outsourcing is a common and well-known practice in firms to
save costs by transferring certain tasks to a third party that can produce
them at cheaper costs. While the impact of outsourcing in manufacturing
has been studied extensively (Ahmed, Hertel and Walmsley, 2011; Bhagwati,
Panagariya and Srinivasan, 2004; Hummels, Munch and Xiang, 2018), studies
on service import are still limited and nascent.
Service outsourcing has a different implication to domestic workers
than merchandise trade. The traditional outsourcing literature documents
the collapse of manufacturing industries in high-income countries as unskilled
domestic workers start to compete with cheaper labor force overseas (Bhag-
wati, Panagariya and Srinivasan, 2004). In fact, technological advances have
brought occupations that traditionally have not been threatened by globaliza-
tion at risk (Blinder, 2009). Thus, for the first time in history, skilled workers
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in developed countries are now competing with the skilled labor force in low-
income countries, where the skill level is very high with a significantly lower
hourly pay (Liu and Trefler, 2019). Analogous to manufacturing outsourcing,
some people blame service outsourcing for taking jobs away from domestic
workers and argue that outsourcing is harmful to the labor force. While service
outsourcing may improve the productivity of firms (Amiti and Wei, 2009b),
impact on the labor market is controversial and ambiguous (Amiti and Wei,
2009a,b; Amiti et al., 2005).
This paper examines the impact of the substantial increase in US service
import from India on the US labor market. In order to estimate the causal
effect of the service import, I exploit the substantial increase in the service
export from India stimulated by technological advances and expansion of the
Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) market since the late 1990s. The growth
in service export from India stems from the advance of high-speed internet
(broadband) in the early 2000s (Choi, 2010; Freund and Weinhold, 2002) as
well as the country’s massive effort to promote the BPO sector. I follow Autor,
Dorn and Hanson (2013) and instrument for the service trade from India to
the US utilizing India’s export to the 15 European Union countries in this
paper.
I construct an occupation level import penetration measure following
Ebenstein et al. (2014); Liu and Trefler (2019), and examine the impact on
occupational employment and median wage during 2000-2016. Results in this
paper suggest a non-linear and multidirectional impact of service import on
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employment. The overall effect of service import on occupational employment
is negative: a one standard deviation increase in import penetration decreases
total employment by 0.25 percent annually during 2000-2016. However, when
I break the sample into two periods, 2000-2006 and 2006-2016, the impact is
concentrated in the earlier period only. In fact, the point estimate is positive
(but statistically insignificant) in the later period.
My results suggest there is a skilled-bias change in employment. The
earlier period’s negative impact is smaller for college-educated workers (-0.282)
than the overall impact (-0.403). More importantly, the employment impact is
positive and large in the later period for college-educated workers, increasing
the employment by 0.47 percent. The increase in service import changes the
composition of workers within occupations toward skilled workers. Skill-biased
change is found across occupations as well. The negative impact on employ-
ment in the earlier period is stronger for low-skilled (occupations with a lower
share of college-educated workers) and high-routine occupations. In fact, the
negative impact on these low-skilled and high-routine jobs continues to the
later period, where the overall impact was small and positive.
I find a positive effect on occupation-level median weekly wages. The
impact on wages is consistent over time, without a large difference unlike
impact on employment. An increase in import penetration by one standard
deviation raises the median weekly wage by 0.13 percent annually. The im-
pact on wage should be interpreted with caution because of the compositional
change suggested by the effect on employment. Considering the skill-biased
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change in employment, the positive impact may represent the compositional
change, not an increase in productivity.
This paper is closely related to small literature studying the impact of
service import on the labor market. Service trade is more difficult to research
than merchandise trade because services are not measured at the border like
tangible goods. There are very limited harmonic datasets across countries,
most of which are available only recently after 2010. Despite the difficulties,
there are a few valuable studies. Liu and Trefler (2019) find service import
from India and China induces job switching of affected occupations in the US,
both upward and downward in terms of average earnings. Crinò (2010b) finds
a skill-biased change in employment resulting from service import in the US
along with his other papers in European countries (Crinò, 2007, 2010a, 2012).
The impact on wages is partially supported by Geishecker and Görg
(2013). They find service import polarizes the income distribution by reward-
ing high-skilled workers and penalizing low-skilled workers with similar import
penetration in the UK. If service import from India has a similar impact, the
positive impact on wages is amplified by the compositional change toward
skilled workers and the positive impact on wages itself.
My paper has three major contributions. First, to my knowledge, this
is the first paper studying the impact of service imports from low-income coun-
tries on the domestic labor market in the US beyond 2006. Most of the research
uses the service trade data in the balance of payment (BOP) from The Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis (BEA); however, the data structure had changed in
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2006, making it difficult to study beyond this year. Because the data structure
change is not problematic for India as much as in other countries, I overcome
this problem by focusing on service import from India.1 Although I focus on
a single country, India’s BPO market is the largest globally and accounts for
a significant fraction of service outsourcing in the US (Burange, Chaddha and
Kapoor, 2010). It is crucial to include beyond 2006 because the service trade
has increased significantly since then, with a steeper growth than before.
Second, this paper provides evidence that the impact of service out-
sourcing on total employment may not be single-directional. I find that the
employment of skilled workers even increases in the later period (2006-2016)
as the service import grows exponentially. My result supports the existence of
skill-biased change in employment, which even increases the total employment
in the end. My paper’s result is consistent with previous works before 2006,
like Amiti and Wei (2009a); Crinò (2007, 2010a,b); Liu and Trefler (2019),
showing a reduction in employment and a skill-biased change, and I find that
this pattern may flip in the later period.
Finally, my paper captures both affiliated and unaffiliated imports from
India. Because of the BEA data structure, most of the literature studying the
US focus on unaffiliated trade only (Amiti et al., 2005; Crinò, 2010a; Liu and
1BEA has aggregated affiliated and unaffiliated trade together for each country since
2006. Until 2005, information on unaffiliated trade was only available for each country. This
structural difference makes it difficult to research beyond 2006 together with the previous
years. Because affiliated trade with India was minimal in the late 1990s, I could extend the
study period beyond 2006 by ignoring affiliated trade in the earlier period. See Section 3.3
for further information.
99
Trefler, 2019). Although there is a measurement error caused by ignoring af-
filiated trade in the late 1990s, I estimate the impact of aggregated service
import, unlike other research. Affiliated import accounts for more than 40
percent of total service import in 2006 (Koncz, Mann and Nephew, 2006).
Thus, omitting affiliated trade may underestimate the impact of service out-
sourcing. I attempt to avoid this problem by focusing on a single country.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
3.2.1 Defining Import Penetration
To examine the impact of service import on occupation level employ-
ment and wage, I define occupation level import penetration following Ace-
moglu et al. (2016); Ebenstein et al. (2014); Liu and Trefler (2019). The
previous literature uses the industrial composition of each occupation to cap-
ture the relevancy to each service. Next, I estimate the industrial composition
of each occupation to measure the importance of each service. A large pro-
portion of computer scientists, for example, are working in the computer and
information service industry because the service is relevant to the task they
perform.















where ωsk,00 is the share of workers of occupation k working in industry s in
2000.2 In this equation, the change in occupation level import penetration
is a weighted average of the change in each service import normalized by the
initial size of the sector (Y USs,96 + IMP
US
s,96 − EXPUSs,96).
Table 3.2 displays the 20 year ∆IP of top 35 occupations. Because
growth in computer and information service is the greatest among all tradable
services, the top 2 occupations are computer and data related jobs. Scientists
and researchers are also on the top list because they are overrepresented in
the R&D sector. Note that the top 35 jobs are not necessarily high-skilled
occupations. For example, data entry keyers (19th), typists (34th), and proof-
readers (35th) can be considered a low-skilled service occupation. The full list
is available in the Appendix Table C.1.
3.2.2 Instrument Variable
Import penetration is endogenous as, in part, it reflects domestic shocks
to US industries and occupations. In this section, I explain the instrument
variable strategy to address the endogeneity of import penetration. The main
idea is coming from Acemoglu et al. (2016); Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013)
that studies the impact of an increase in Chinese import in manufacturing
industries on labor market outcomes in the US. In these papers, the authors
instrument for the growth in Chinese imports in the US exploiting the Chinese
export to other high-income countries in the same period. Analogous to this, I
2The base year is 2000 because I use decinnial Census to obtain this share.
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instrument the increase in service import penetration from India with India’s
export to 15 EU countries (EU member countries before the enlargement in
May 2004). The underlying assumption of the identification is that the com-
mon rising of Indian service imports comes from the technological shock that
made certain services tradable (high-speed internet) and the massive invest-
ment in the BPO service industry in India.










It is similar to the endogenous variable in Equation 3.1, the numerator replaced
with the Indian import of EU. The denominator and industrial share in 3.2
are constructed using data in the previous period. By using the share defined
in the previous decade, the instrument can mitigate the problem coming from
the concurrent change in the industrial composition of each occupation.
3.2.3 Data
I obtain service trade data between the US and India from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA). I use the official balance of payment (BOP) data
of the US by combining the Survey of Current Business (SCB) October report
from 1997 to 2017. The BOP provides payment and receipt of various services
between the US and major countries in dollars.3 While the exact structure
3Unlike physical goods, service trade is not anchored in any observation of physical
movement. Thus, there is no single standard to measure service trade, making the figures
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of the reported data varies over time, SCB provides both unaffiliated and
affiliated imports of private services.
Similarly, I use Eurostat data on the trade between the European Union
(EU) and India. Eurostat reports service trade between India and the entire
EU in detail; however, the trade between individual European countries and
India is not available at the detailed level until 2010. Using trade between the
entire EU and India is problematic because the EU member countries are not
consistent during my study period (1997-2017).4 Fortunately, the countries
that joined later to the EU did not actively trade with India. The sum of
total Indian service imports of these ten countries accounts for less than 0.5
percent of India’s total EU import in 2007. Thus, I consider 15 EU countries
equivalent to 25 EU countries in 1997 and 2007.5
The outsourcing services I consider in this paper are often called trad-
able white-collar services, including finance, insurance, telecommunication,
computer and information, management and business consulting, research and
development, advertisement, construction and architecture, accounting, legal
vary by the reporting agency. Moreover, the measurement in a single agency is often not
consistent over time, and it is difficult to expand the study period. Most of the previous
research uses BOP data in monetary terms.
4The EU had expanded from 15 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom) to 25 (adding Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) countries in 2004.
5Starting from 2010, detailed trade data at the country level is available. Assuming the
trend of trade between the ten countries and India has remained constant from 2007 to 2010,
I adjust the values of imports in 2007. For example, if the 15 original countries accounted
for 95 percent of legal service imports in 2010, I assume that the share remained the same
in 2007.
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services, and other business professionals, and technical services, following
the literature (Amiti and Wei, 2009a; Crinò, 2010b; Liu and Trefler, 2019).6, 7
While the BOP data from US BEA and Eurostat is complete at the most
detailed level after 2006, each service’s exact trade amounts are sometimes
ambiguous before then. The aggregate import and export of each service sec-
tor are necessary for 1992 and 1996 as they are used in the denominator of the
definitions of import penetration. Because the 1992 or earlier trade data is very
unreliable, I obtain the total production and trade data using the benchmark
Input-Output(I/O) table of 1992.8
Table 3.1 shows the change in US import from India by sector. There
is a substantial growth in importing all types of services in the table, es-
pecially computer and information service by 140,000 percent. In addition,
other sectors that are less known, such as accounting (1,000 percent), man-
6The name of services is used in BEA and Eurostat. These services are a subset of other
private services in BEA classification.
7Note that accounting, legal, and management services were reported together as “pro-
fessional and management consulting services” until 2005. Thus, it is impossible to know the
exact amount of trade between the US and India for each service with the official data. To
utilize more variation in service trade, I estimate the import of the three services using the
share for which each sector accounts for the total unaffiliated professional and management
consulting services trade from India to the US. Total unaffiliated trade data is available at
the most detailed level. For example, if legal service accounts for 20 percent of total profes-
sional and management consulting services, I assume the same share for trade between the
US and India. See Appendix C.1 for the details.
8The I/O table provides the monetary value of the input and output of the entire economy
along with foreign import and export. The advantage of using the benchmark I/O table is
that the total output and trade data are available in detail. However, the import is only
available if it is used as an intermediate good, so the total amount of import is not available.
Fortunately, the tradable services on which this paper focuses are mostly used as input in
various industries, not as final goods for consumers. Nonetheless, measurement error exists
for the trade data in the benchmark I/O table.
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agement (20,225 percent), and R&D (14,133 percent) services, had signifi-
cantly increased. Telecommunication, one of the most well-known services
outsourced to India besides IT service, had not increased much since 1996. In
fact, telecommunication outsourcing started in the late 1980s, and outsourcing
this service was already prevalent in 1996.
The occupation level data is constructed with the 1990 and 2000 Census
and 2007 and 2017 American Community Survey (ACS) IPUMS data Ruggles
et al. (2020). To keep the consistent definition of occupations, I use the oc-
cupation crosswalk provided by David Dorn used in Autor, Dorn and Hanson
(2013), leaving me 330 consistent occupations over time. To define occupation
level import penetration in Equation 3.1, I concord the trade service sectors
to industries in the Census. For example, computer and information services
in BEA correspond to the “Computer and data processing services” industry
(732 in 1990 industry code) in Census. The exact crosswalk is available in
Appendix Table C.2.
3.2.4 Estimation Equation
The main specification has the following form:
∆ ln(ykt) = αt + β1t∆IP
US
kt +XktΓ + εkt, (3.3)
where ∆ ln(ykt) is the difference of outcome variable of occupation k. The
outcome variables examined are the employment and median hourly wage of
occupation k. I normalize to the annual change and multiply 100 for in-
terpretation. ∆IPkt represents the annual change in occupation k’s import
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penetration between t + 1 and t. My data period spans from 2000 to 2016,
and I stack the ten-year equivalent first differences for two periods, 2000 to
2006 and 2006 to 2016. I use the Z-score of ∆IPkt for interpretation. Xkt is
the vector of occupation level controls, including service occupation indicator,
employment, college share, weekly wage, average age, sex ratio, and racial
composition at the start of the period. The change of IPUSkt is instrumented
by the variable ∆IPEUkt as described above. Because I use the first difference
model, the stacked model is similar to the three periods fixed effect model
with a less restrictive assumption made on the error term (Autor, Dorn and
Hanson, 2013). The standard errors are clustered at the broader classification
of occupations.9
Figure 3.2 graphically shows the first stage result. The figure reveals a
strong positive correlation between ∆IPUSkt and ∆IP
EU
kt . The coefficient and
standard error of the formal first stage regression are denoted in the figure.
The F-statistics of the instrument variable is 21.01, which is above the rule of
thumb of 10.
3.3 Importance of India in Service Trade
Service import in the US has significantly grown thanks to the develop-
ment of communication technology since the 1980s. In the interest of expense,
9I crosswalk 1990 Census occupations to the 4-digit Standard Occupational Classification
(SOC) System. Here, I use the 3-digit SOC codes to cluster the standard errors.
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countries with relatively low income and a large English-speaking population
became popular outsourcing hubs. These include India, Ireland, the Philip-
pines, China, Malaysia, and a couple of Eastern European countries (Amiti
et al., 2005).
India is especially famous for IT and BPO services. The increase in
India’s service export is primarily due to high-speed internet and its massive
growth in the BPO market. First, the commercialization of broadband tech-
nology around in 2002 made it easier to offshore complicated service. Also, in
the same period, the Indian government’s support through several laws and
investment accelerated the growth of the BPO industry (Thite and Russell,
2007). The BPO market gained a competitive edge by merging small firms into
a mega-firm, completed by 2004. The combination of the effort from public
and private entities made a synergy effect, and thanks to high-speed internet,
the service export has surged in India. This is presented in Figure 3.1.
In this paper, I focus on the impact of service outsourcing to India.
There are three reasons for this. The first reason is relevant to the importance
of India, and the other two reasons are to the data issue. To begin with, India
has an extensive BPO market: India is best known for its IT consulting and
computer programming outsourcing, not limited to those services. Also, India
is one of the most popular destinations for outsourcing in the US, accounting
for 10 percent of all white-collar service imports and 40 percent of ICT ser-
vices in the US in 2016 (BEA, 2021). India also exports a large amount of
accounting, legal, and financial services. India’s BPO market produced 143
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billion dollars in 2016, equivalent to about eight percent of India’s total GDP
(NASSCOM, 2017).
Second, India was not as much engaged in affiliated trade with the US
as other countries in the late 1990s. There are two important forms of ser-
vice trade, trade through affiliated and unaffiliated parties. Affiliated trade is
gaining importance over time, especially in the tradable white-collar service
sector. Hence, to capture the entire impact of service trade, we must take both
affiliated and unaffiliated into account. The BEA trade data had a structural
change in 2006. While BEA had reported trade data for each type of service
only for unaffiliated trade until 2005, it started to provide the aggregate (affil-
iated and unaffiliated) trade by type from 2006. This structural change makes
it difficult to connect before and after 2006, and most of the previous papers
study before 2006. Focusing on India resolves this problem. In 1996, affiliated
trade accounted for about 30 percent of the US’s total service import; however,
less than three percent of Indian service imports came from affiliated trade.
Considering that Indian service import was very low in 1996, I assume there
was no affiliated import from India in 1996. In this way, I can extend the
study period beyond 2006, which is never done in the literature, and where
the increase in imports is more rapid.
Third, trade data in both US and EU keep records on India relatively
better than other middle- and low-income countries in the 1990s and early
2000s. Although some middle and low-income countries like Ireland and the
Philippines are important outsourcing partners, some of the data are limited
108
or confidential in the publicly available BEA trade data. India has relatively
complete information both in the US and EU databases, which is a great ad-
vantage.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Main Impact on Employment
In Table 3.3, I present the main impact on the occupational employment
during 2000-2016 using Equation 3.3. In Panel A, I estimate the impact on
total employment by occupation, and in Panel B, I do with the employment
of the college-educated workers. Column 1 estimates the impact of import
penetration with the OLS model, and columns 2 to 5 use the 2SLS model
using the import penetration in the EU countries as the instrument for the
US import penetration. In columns 1 to 3, I stack two periods and estimate
the impact of import penetration together, while in columns 4 and 5, I do the
regressions separately for two periods.
The OLS estimate in Panel A of column 1 shows a minimal correlation
between IP and occupation level employment. However, as I switch to the 2SLS
model, the point estimates increase by 90 percent, although not statistically
significant (column 2). The point estimate becomes statistically significant
with control variables in column 3. The most important variable is the share
of the college-educated at the beginning of the period. Some of the occupations
with high IP are highly educated jobs, such as computer scientists and workers
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in the R&D sector, so if these occupations have experienced larger growth
over time, the point estimate of the impact of IP is underestimated. The
point estimate in column 3 implies that a one standard deviation increase in
occupational import penetration decreases employment by 0.25 percent.
When I separately estimate the impact of IP in columns 3 and 4, it
appears that the negative effect is concentrated on the earlier period. While
there is a strong negative impact of IP on occupational employment during
2000-2006 (column 4), the sign of the point estimate reverses and becomes
insignificant in the later period of 2006-2016 (column 5). This is notable
because the steeper increase in service imports from India started after 2005
(Figure 3.1).
This result seems to be counterintuitive. However, it may be possible
that IP does not work cumulatively. In other words, IP may have hurt employ-
ment to a certain point, and the sign of the point estimate reverses after that.
When service import first increases, the substitution of tasks happens. The
service trade is first concentrated on relatively easier tasks and then progresses
to more complicated tasks. After the substitution of task reaches the equilib-
rium, and together with the technological advance, trade in more complicated
tasks begins. If these services are complementary to the service produced do-
mestically, then employment eventually increases. Although not completely
comparable, automation has a similar implication. Automation substitutes
labor as its intention; however, it also complements labor by increasing output
and demand for total labor, leading to the polarization of the workers (Autor
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and Salomons, 2018; Autor, 2015).
The following results support this hypothesis. In Panel B, I estimate
the impact on college-educated workers for all 316 occupations. The over-
all pattern is similar to columns 4 and 5 in Panel A. While the magnitude
(absolute value) of the point estimate in the earlier period is smaller than
the main results (-0.282 vs. -0.403), it is larger in the later period (0.467 vs.
0.166). This means that the negative impact on employment in the first period
is weaker for college-educated workers, but the positive effect is stronger for
them later. The result suggests the employment has moved toward in favor of
college-educated workers. It may be true for most occupations considering the
increase in college enrollment and graduation in the given period; however,
the significant coefficients imply it is stronger for more affected occupations
by the Indian service import.
Next, I estimate the impact of IP by age group in Table 3.4. The
table shows there is a clear distinction across age groups. The impact on the
youngest (25-34 years old) workers is analogous to the overall result: negative
effect during the first period and positive for the later period. The magnitude
of the impact is much smaller for middle-aged workers, and especially, the
effect in the second period is almost zero. Because the youngest and middle-
aged workers constitute as twice as oldest workers, these two groups drive the
overall impact. The oldest workers are experiencing a substantial increase in
employment in both periods. Especially, the employment effect of IP is positive
for these ages, even in the first period, where the overall impact in Table 3.3
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is negative. This table implies a compositional change in employment; switch
to the older, experienced, and educated workers.
In Table 3.5, I divide the occupations into two groups by share of
college-educated workers and routine tasks defined by (Autor, Dorn and Han-
son, 2013). I separately estimate the impact of import penetration by a period
as in the previous tables. Table 3.5 shows that low-skilled workers were more
affected by the increase in import penetration. When comparing columns 1
and 2, there is a much larger decrease in employment of occupations with a
low share of college-educated workers. A one standard deviation increase in
import penetration results in a 0.9 and -4 percent decline in total employment,
for high and low college-educated occupations, respectively, during 2000-2016.
While the overall impact on employment disappears in the later period (col-
umn 5, table 3.3), it gets even stronger for low-skilled occupations. The point
estimate for 2006-2016 (column 4) is about twice as large as in 2000-2005
(column 2).
Next, I divide the occupations by how much the tasks of occupations
are based on routine tasks. Consistent with columns 1-4, the impact of import
penetration is much stronger for routine occupations than nonroutine ones.
However, the pattern of larger point estimates in the later period, like columns
2 and 4, is not observed. An increase of one standard deviation of import
penetration decreases employment of high routine jobs by 1.12 and 0.3 percent
during 2000-2006 and 2006-2016, respectively.
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3.4.2 Impact on Wages
Table 3.6 presents the impact on the median weekly wages. The wage
estimates must be interpreted with caution because of the previous results
on employment. If the employment impact is concentrated on a particular
group within the occupation, the compositional change in occupation may
drive most of the effect on wages. Furthermore, the inconsistent pattern of
employment over time complicates the interpretation. The negative impact
on the employment of college-educated workers is smaller than the overall
effect, in Table 3.3, suggesting that high-skilled workers within occupation were
less vulnerable from Indian service import. Employment of college-educated
workers increases in the later period by 0.5 percent, while the overall impact
is smaller and statistically insignificant. The pattern observed here suggests
the possibility of upward bias caused by compositional change.
The impact on weekly wage is consistent over time, unlike on employ-
ment, in Table 3.6. Overall, a one standard deviation increase in import
penetration raises the median weekly wage by 0.13 percent. There is not
much difference between the earlier (2000-2006) and later (2006-2016) period,
0.11 and 0.10 percent, respectively. The results here are consistent with my
suspicion that the overall wage would increase.
3.4.3 Robustness Check: Using Alternative Definition of IP
There is no single way to define occupation level import penetration
(IP). In this subsection, I examine whether my results vary by the definition
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of the occupation level IP. Liu and Trefler (2019)’s IP definition uses the
fraction in each service sector as the weight to calculate the occupation level
IP. This is very straightforward; however, it may not represent how important
the service is as a task. For example, some accountants are hired in different
industries than accounting industries but still producing accounting services.
If a large fraction of accountants is directly hired in various industries, then
the share (ωsk,90 in Equation 3.1) may not truly reflect how much accounting
services matter to accountants.
I emulate Criscuolo and Garicano (2010)’s definition to examine the
robustness to the definition of IP. Criscuolo and Garicano (2010) uses the I/O
table to define the industry-occupation level exposure to service import. I take
a weighted average of this exposure measure similar to Equation 3.1 to define











The first term in Equation 3.4 is the occupation k’s fraction in industry j,
which is shown in Equation 3.1 as well. The second term comes from the
I/O table: service sector s’s share of production in industry j. This term
represents how much the service sector s (as a task) is important in industry
j. For example, a great fraction of computer and information services are
produced in the same industry, meaning the certain task plays a crucial role
in the industry. Using ξsk’s, I define a weighted average as in Equation 3.1 to
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define an alternative IP, and estimate the impact on employment and weekly
wages.
Table 3.7 shows the estimation results using the alternative definition
of IP. Columns 1 and 2 are the main specification for comparison. Columns 1
to 4 use the narrowly defined occupation level IP (316 occupations), and 5 to
6 use broadly defined occupations (SOC 3-digits, 88 occupations). When com-
paring columns 1 to 2 and 3 to 4, the overall patterns are consistent regardless
of the measure. The results are robust to using broadly defined occupations in
columns 5 to 8. The point estimates are larger in this specification (in absolute
terms), although not statistically distinguishable.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that service imports from India had im-
pacted domestic employment in the US. The direction and magnitude of the
impact are not consistent over time, unlike Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013)
who find a consistently strong impact of Chinese import penetration in manu-
facturing. To be specific, the overall impact on total occupational employment
is negative. The employment reduces by 0.25 percent during 2000-2016 with
an increase in import penetration by one standard deviation. However, when
I split the sample into two periods, the impact is concentrated in the earlier
(2000-2006) period and becomes positive but insignificant during 2006-2016.
The paper’s subsequent analyses suggest that the Indian service import
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had had a differential impact over time. The monetary value of imports started
to grow exponentially from 2005, with a slower but steady growth rate from
the 1990s and early 2000s. If the impact of service import is linear or single-
directional, there should be a substantial effect in the later period. This paper
clearly shows that this is not the case.
There is no sufficient evidence on substitutability and complementarity
of service import and outsourcing. This paper shows that while the service
purchase from overseas substitutes the domestic workers at first, the role of
service import changes as the skill-biased employment change continues. Ini-
tially, firms in the US purchase cheaper services from India and other low-
income countries. Firms do not substitute the entire service with a cheaper
one because certain services are difficult to import, and in-shoring may be
more efficient. As the sorting of service continues, firms become more efficient,
and they can now hire high-skilled service inshore. As a result, high-skilled
employment increases, as in my analysis.
This implies the task composition within occupation moves toward
more complicated and sophisticated tasks, especially for more vulnerable jobs
in terms of service import. Further work must be done to prove this hypoth-
esis. The economy would find a way to the new equilibrium by sorting less
efficient and skilled workers out of the vulnerable occupations.
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Source: Current Business Survey, Bureau of Economic Analysis. A subset of the total
other private service is considered as tradable white-collar service in the literature.
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Change in (predicted IP)
coef=0.710, SE=0.155, F=21.013
Notes: N=316 ×2=632. Two periods of 2000-2007 and 2007-2017 are stacked. The IP
measures are normalized in each period (to Z-scores). First stage F-statistics is 21.013.
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Table 3.1: US Service Import from India (in million USD)
Service type 1996 2006 2011 2016
Advertising 2 17 61 32
Construction 0.5 127 127 181
Financial 15 104 312 543
Insurance 0.98 15 27 84
Accounting 8.1 81 331 483
Legal 5 14 57 82
Management 4 813 1,057 1,275
Computer 2 2,798 9,395 14,235
R&D 3 427 2,165 3,482
Telecommunication 300 399 302 404
Installation 0.5 7 26 47
Industrial Engineering 2 66 83 234
Leasing 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Other tradable service 18 99 401 545
Notes: Data from the balance of payment (BOP) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). From 2006 to 2016, the figures include both affiliated and unaffiliated imports from
India. In 1996, the figures included only unaffiliated imports; however, affiliated imports
comprised a tiny fraction of total service imports. Thus, the unaffiliated imports were almost
the same as total imports. See Section 3.2 and 3.3 for further information.
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Table 3.2: Ranking of ∆IPUSkt
Rank Occupation Title ∆IP × 100 Rank Occupation Title ∆IP × 100
1 Computer software developers 67.5502 24 Statistical clerks 11.5795
2 Computer systems analysts and computer scientists 49.3654 25 Agricultural and food scientists 11.4366
3 Technical writers 40.6995 26 Office machine operators, n.e.c. 11.2605
4 Physicists and astronomists 38.7210 27 Management support occupations 10.8143
5 Technicians, n.e.c. 34.6463 28 Economists, market and survey researchers 10.6534
6 Physical scientists, n.e.c. 33.0064 29 Sales engineers 10.4142
7 Medical scientists 29.2978 30 Personnel, HR, training, and labor rel. specialists 9.7391
8 Repairers of data processing equipment 25.6408 31 Managers and specialists in marketing, advert., PR 8.6551
9 Biological scientists 25.3492 32 Designers 8.5078
10 Social scientists and sociologists, n.e.c. 24.7227 33 Managers and administrators, n.e.c. 8.1676
11 Mathematicians and statisticians 21.8731 34 Typists 7.3658
12 Lawyers and judges 20.4851 35 Proofreaders 6.7203
13 Computer and peripheral equipment operators 19.8436 ..
.
14 Atmospheric and space scientists 18.5570 303 Barbers 0.0000
15 Chemists 18.5544 303 Mail carriers for postal service 0.0000
16 Geologists 18.2476 303 Hotel clerks 0.0000
17 Legal assistants and paralegals 17.2559 303 Air traffic controllers 0.0000
18 Management analysts 17.0138 303 Primary school teachers 0.0000
19 Data entry keyers 14.3558 303 Food roasting and baking machine operators 0.0000
20 Operations and systems researchers and analysts 13.7050 303 Postal clerks, exluding mail carriers 0.0000
21 Biological technicians 13.5794 303 Secondary school teachers 0.0000
22 Engineers and other professionals, n.e.c. 12.9407 303 Managers of medicine and health occupations 0.0000
23 Electrical engineers 11.6488 303 Purchasing agents and buyers of farm products 0.0000
Notes: This table shows the ranking of change in occupation level import penetration (IP) measure from 2000 to 2016,
defined in Equation 3.1. Occupation titles are defined in the Census. See Appendix Table C.1 for the full list.
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Table 3.3: Impact of Import Penetration on Employment
Dependent variable: ∆ln(Employment) × 100
OLS 2SLS
All period All period All period 2000-2006 2006-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Total Employment
Z-score of -0.0166 -0.110 -0.247** -0.403** 0.166
∆IP (0.114) (0.137) (0.111) (0.171) (0.159)
First Stage F-Statistics 11.35 14.40 19.46 6.36
Panel B. College Employment
Z-score of -0.128 -0.236 -0.0804 -0.282* 0.467***
∆IP (0.128) (0.156) (0.0942) (0.152) (0.159)
First Stage F-Statistics 11.35 14.40 19.46 6.36
Observations 632 632 632 316 316
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the impact of occupation level IP on employment
using Equation 3.3. Each entry is a coefficient from a separate regression. The coefficients
are rescaled to represent the annual change in employment in percentage. I also normalize
IP to Z-socre for interpretation. In the 2SLS model, the instrument is the IP defined with
Indian export to 15 EU countries. See the main text for further information. In column 3,
the point estimate is interpreted as the following: a one standard deviation increase in IP
reduces employment by 0.25 percent annually. Controls include the log of employment, the
fraction of college-educated workers, log of median weekly wage, average age and its square
term, percent of female, and the fraction of white and black at the beginning of each period.
Regressions are weighted using the size of employment in 2000. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses clustered by three-digit SOC codes. * significance at 10%; ** significance at
5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table 3.4: Impact of Import Penetration on Employment, by Age
Dependent variable: ∆ln(Employment)× 100
Age: 25-34 Age: 35-44 Age: 45-60
2000-2006 2006-2016 2000-2006 2006-2016 2000-2006 2006-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Total Employment
Z-score of -0.502** 0.413 -0.230 -0.0440 0.266* 0.454***
∆IP (0.208) (0.254) (0.149) (0.184) (0.145) (0.153)
Panel B. College Employment
Z-score of -0.695** 0.841* 0.007 0.215 0.378* 0.766***
∆IP (0.317) (0.432) (0.255) (0.294) (0.195) (0.258)
Notes: N=316. This table reports the estimates of the impact of occupation level IP on
employment using Equation 3.3 separately by age. Each entry is a coefficient from a separate
2SLS regression. The coefficients are rescaled to represent the annual change in employment
in percentage. I also normalize IP for interpretation. The instrument is the IP defined with
Indian export to 15 EU countries. See the main text for further information. All regressions
include control variables. See the notes of Table 3.3 for the details for the controls. Panels A
and B present the total and skilled (college-educated) employment, respectively. I separately
estimate the impact in each period. Regressions are weighted using the size of employment
in 2000. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered by three-digit SOC codes. *
significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table 3.5: Impact on Employment by Occupation Characteristics
Dependent variable: ∆ln(Employment)× 100
Share of College-Educated Routine
2000-2006 2006-2016 2000-2006 2006-2016
High Low High Low High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Z-score of -0.905** -3.961** -0.194 -7.257** -1.124** -0.182 -0.305* 0.159
∆IP (0.426) (2.003) (0.161) (2.847) (0.541) (0.406) (0.163) (0.401)
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the impact of occupation level IP on employment using Equation 3.3 separately
by share of college-educated workers and how routine the occupation is. Each entry is a coefficient from a separate 2SLS
regression. The coefficients are rescaled to represent the annual change in employment in percentage. I also normalize IP
for interpretation. The instrument is the IP defined with Indian export to 15 EU countries. See the main text for further
information. All regressions include control variables. See the notes of Table 3.3 for the details for the controls. In columns
1 to 4, I use the share of college-educated workers in 2000 to separate the sample (above and below median). In columns 5
to 8, I separate the occupations by how routine the tasks are. For routine measures, I use the measure defined by (Autor
and Dorn, 2013). I separately estimate the impact in each period. Regressions are weighted using the size of employment in
2000. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered by three-digit SOC codes. * significance at 10%; ** significance
at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
123
Table 3.6: Impact of Import Penetration on Median Weekly Wages
Dependent variable: ∆ln(Median weekly wage)× 100
OLS 2SLS
All period All period All period 2000-2006 2006-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Z-score of 0.141*** 0.180** 0.129*** 0.112* 0.100**
∆IP (0.0413) (0.0698) (0.0410) (0.0586) (0.0390)
Observations 632 632 632 316 316
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the impact of occupation level IP on median
weekly wage using Equation 3.3. Each entry is a coefficient from a separate 2SLS regression.
The coefficients are rescaled to represent the annual change in employment in percentage. I
also normalize IP for interpretation. The instrument is the IP defined with Indian export to
15 EU countries. See the main text for further information. All regressions include control
variables. See the notes of Table 3.3 for the details for the controls. Regressions are weighted
using the size of employment in 2000. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered
by three-digit SOC codes. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at
1%.
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Table 3.7: Using Alternative Definition of Import Penetration
Dependent variable: ∆ln(Employment) × 100
Occupation Definition (Narrow) Occupation Definition (Broad)
LT (2019) CG (2010) LT (2019) CG (2010)
2000-2006 2006-2016 2000-2006 2006-2016 2000-2006 2006-2016 2000-2006 2006-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Total Employment
Z-score of -0.403** 0.166 -0.515** 0.0939 -0.624** 0.173 -0.545** 0.221*
∆IP (0.171) (0.159) (0.226) (0.188) (0.289) (0.144) (0.242) (0.125)
Panel B. College Employment
Z-score of -0.282* 0.467*** -0.337* 0.351** -0.403** 0.408*** -0.406** 0.492***
∆IP (0.152) (0.159) (0.173) (0.172) (0.191) (0.151) (0.186) (0.161)
Panel C. Median Weekly Wage
Z-score of 0.112* 0.100** 0.134** 0.0854** 0.154** 0.125*** 0.143** 0.129***
∆IP (0.0586) (0.0390) (0.0663) (0.0409) (0.0663) (0.0389) (0.0618) (0.0384)
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the impact of occupation level IP on employment and median weekly wage using
Equation 3.3 using alternative IP definitions. Each entry is a coefficient from a separate 2SLS regression. The coefficients are
rescaled to represent the annual change in employment in percentage. I also normalize IP for interpretation. The instrument
is the IP defined with Indian export to 15 EU countries. See the main text for further information. LT (2019) and CG(2010)
stand for Liu and Trefler (2019) and Criscuolo and Garicano (2010), respectively. See Equation 3.1 and 3.4 for the precise
definitions of the IP measures. Narrowly defined occupations are occupation codes used in the Census (and modified by
David Dron in Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013)). Broadly defined occupations are three-digit SOC codes. All regressions
include control variables. See the notes of Table 3.3 for the details for the controls. I separately estimate the impact in each
period. Regressions are weighted using the size of employment in 2000. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered





Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 School District and CPUMA Crosswalk
The smallest geographical unit identifiable is the PUMA (Public Use
Microdata Area) in the publicly available Census and ACS. For consistency,
in this paper, I use Consistent PUMA (CPUMA), an aggregate of contingent
PUMAs to make the boundaries consistent over time. PUMA is based on the
population: each PUMA should have at least 100,000 population. Because
PUMAs are based on population, they are sometimes very small areas in pop-
ulated cities. The Census and ACS aggregate PUMAs to Migration PUMAs
(MPUMA) that resemble commuting or living zones and use them to identify
the location lived a year earlier (if relocated) and each respondent’s workplace
location.
There are 15,000 to 16,000 school districts in the US and slightly more
than 2,000 PUMAs. Matching school districts to PUMAs or CPUMAs is dif-
ficult because 1) school district boundaries change every year, and 2) school
districts and PUMAs are based on different geographical units. While PUMAs
are based on population, school districts are usually defined within a county,
a city boundary, or a commuting zone. Therefore, a single school district may
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contain several PUMAs in a large metropolitan area. For example, Austin,
Texas, comprises more than ten PUMAs, while most public schools are under
Austin Independent School District except for charter schools that are a sepa-
rate school district. In most parts of the country, PUMAs are larger than the
school districts and consist of several.
To match the school district to CPUMAs, I use the geocoordinates of
school district offices. To be specific, I do the following:
1. Match geocoordinate of the school district office to PUMA
2. Aggregate all matched school district into PUMA level
3. For PUMAs with no matched school district, use the average in the
MPUMA level
4. Using the matched PUMA level finance data, take a weighted average of
PUMAs to construct CPUMA level data
The CCD provides the geocoordinates of school districts from 2005 to
2014. For the rest of the years, addresses are only available. Using Google
and Bing map, I retrieved the latitude and longitude of school district offices
in the remaining years. I identify the PUMA on which each school district
office lies using QGIS and then construct PUMA level total revenue and ex-
penditure and public school enrollment. Most of the PUMAs are matched to
at least one school district. Panel A and B of Figure A.6 display the map
of PUMA and school districts in the school year 2007-2008, respectively. In
most cases, several school districts fit in a single PUMA. This is largely true
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for less populated areas such as the Mountain States. However, this is not
the case for some metropolitan areas. The east coast of Florida, for example,
is served by large pockets of school districts, while this area is divided into
a couple of small PUMAs. For these PUMAs without any matched school
district, I use MPUMA level financial and enrollment data instead.1 Then,
I estimate the average of constitutive PUMAs weighted by population and
construct CPUMA level finance information.2
There are a few adjustments that I made. First, some school districts
are aggregated into one district in the CCD finance file. Hawaii and New York
City school districts are divided into several districts and zones in practice;
however, the state and the city report their financial data as a united school
district to CCD. I assign all PUMAs in Hawaii and New York City to the
same school district to adjust this. Second, three PUMAs in Louisiana are
combined into one PUMA from 2006 to 2011 because the population went
below 100,000 in each PUMA after Hurricane Katrina. Therefore, I combine
these three PUMAs to one in 2000 and 2005 and define a new PUMA to make
it consistent over time.
1There is at least one matched school district in all MPUMAs as they represent com-
muting zones.
2I take a weighted average of PUMAs instead of directly matching SDs to CPUMAs
because it is difficult to determine the MPUMAs for some CPUMAs.
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A.2 Additional Robustness Checks
A.2.1 Balance Test on Other Expenditures in States
My identification strategy utilizes the variation in K-12 funding cut
coming from two state-level variables. In this section, I test whether the
identifying variation is correlated with spending in other government programs,
as it can indirectly affect private school attendance. For example, if the state
government cuts funding on cash assistance, some households may drop out
of private schools because of the negative income effect.
In Figure A.10, I test six categories of expenditures: total, higher edu-
cation, total health, Medicaid, cash assistance, and unemployment insurance.
I collect the data from the Annual Survey of State and Local Government
Finances (US Census Bureau (2020), through Urban Institutes), Medicaid
expenditure reports from MBES/CBES (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services), and official unemployment insurance budget data (US Department
of Labor). Similar to Figure 1.8, I display the event study results. All of
the monetary values are in 2010 dollars and normalized with the state’s total
population (i.e., expenditure per capita). The state expenditure includes both
expenditure of both state and local government, excluding intergovernmental
transfers.
In the first panel, I show the impact on total expenditure per capita.
The no income tax indicator is marginally correlated with a decrease in total
spending as the tax revenue declines (Figure 1.6). The total expenditures are
less sensitive because other state revenues and intergovernmental transfer act
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as a buffer. Other panels do not suggest a decline in expenditure. Although
not perfect, this figure supports that change in government expenditures is
unrelated to change in private school enrollment.
A.2.2 Permutation Test for No Income Tax States
In the first stage in section 1.4.3, I show that states without an income
tax have experienced a larger budget cut after the Great Recession. Florida
and Nevada are known to be two states with a sharp drop in property value
during the Great Recession, which could confound the private school choice
results as well. Also, it may be that other (unobserved) common characteristics
of the seven states result in slower tax recovery after the Great Recession, not
necessarily the income tax status.
I conduct a placebo test as additional evidence that it is not based on
spurious correlation. First, I randomly assign seven states to no state income
tax states. I then re-estimate the first stage and record the F-statistics. I do
this process 1,000 times and compare the re-estimated F-statistics with the
original F-statistics. If the original F-statistics is located at the tail of the
distribution, we can reject the hypothesis that the first stage is based on a
spurious correlation. Figure A.11 shows the cumulative distribution function
of the 1,000 F-statistics of the first stage. I display the F-statistics of the
original first stage (16.9) together in the figure. The figure shows that the
original first stage lies in the tail of the distribution, within the top 3% of
the distribution. This test resolves the question of the spurious relationship
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between no income tax states and education funding cuts.
A.2.3 Alternative Sample, Instrumental Variables, and Lagged Rev-
enue
Alternative samples—In Table A.5, I estimate the impact of education
revenue per pupil in different samples. First, I include Washington DC in
the sample in column 1. My main sample excludes DC because DC’s state
share is zero by definition. Although DC constitutes about 0.13 percent of
total observation, including DC may change the result because it is such an
outlier. The point estimate is almost identical to the main model. In column
2, I restrict the sample to children currently in school and get a very similar
result. Columns 3 and 4 compare native-born and foreign-born students and
find that the impacts are larger for native students, although not statistically
different.
Next, in columns 5 to 8, I remove some states that may respond dif-
ferently to the funding shock. First, I exclude Florida and Nevada because
they are two states without income tax known to have a very large decline
in property values during the Great Recession. Removing these two states
does not change the result much. Next, I remove the two largest states among
no income tax states, Florida and Texas. The point estimate declines by one
third, although it is not statistically different. I suspect removing these two
states from the sample reduces the point estimates because they are two of
the largest immigrant-receiving states. The impact is weaker in areas with a
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high share of immigrants, affecting the coefficient in column 6. In column 7, I
remove California from the sample because some of California’s state revenue
comes from locally raised property tax. California’s Proposition 98 guarantees
a minimum amount of education funding from the state’s General Funds and
local property taxes. Thus, California’s state revenue is less sensitive to the
business cycle because a portion of it comes from stable property tax. Exclud-
ing California only slightly increases the point estimates. Finally, I exclude
Alaska in column 8 because Alaska not collects neither income nor sales tax.3
Columns 7 and 8 are both not statistically different from the main estimate.
Finally, I remove the top 10 percent CPUMAs in private school enrollment in
2000 in columns 9 to test whether the impact is concentrated in certain areas
with high access to private schools. Point estimate in column 9 is smaller than
the main estimate because I remove the most responsive areas; however it is
not statistically different from the main result, implying the impact is still
found in less responsive areas.4
Alternative IVs—I try alternative instrumental variables to examine
the robustness of the IV used in the paper. In the main analysis, the instru-
mental variables are the state share, and an indicator for no income tax state
interacted with year indicator, taking 2007 as the base year. I consider that
the event study framework, which is more flexible, and thus more appropri-
3Some local government collects local sales tax in Alaska. Most of Alaska’s tax revenue
comes from natural resources
4Impact of funding cuts is stronger in high baseline private school enrollment CPUMAs.
Results available upon request.
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ate than the traditional difference-in-differences because the treatment effect
changes over time (e.g., Figure 1.7).
In Panel A of Table A.6, I test whether my results stay consistent
with the choice of instrumental variables. In column 1 of Panel A of Table
A.6, I use traditional difference-in-differences variables, Ss×Postt and NTs×
Postt, as the IVs. The point estimate is larger than the main analysis, by
0.11 percentage points. This could be interpreted as households ”predicting”
funding cuts and responding accordingly. The first stage F-statistics become
much smaller because 1)the funding cut started in 2010, and 2)it fades out
after 2013. When I use the event study variables of state share only in column
2, the point estimate gets smaller and loses statistical power. In column 3,
the coefficient is larger when I use the no income tax indicator as to the sole
identifying variation. Two columns show that the impact of education revenue
driven the by no income tax indicator is stronger than the state share, and
the main specification captures the average of the two. In column 4, I add the
interaction term of state share and no income tax indicator interacted with the
year dummies. A state with a high state share and no income tax may have
been through even deeper education funding cut if two variations strengthen
each other. The first stage F-statistics explodes with the interaction term’s
inclusion; however, the point estimates are closer to column 2. None of the
point estimates in Panel A is statistically different from the main estimate.
Lagged revenue—I use the lagged value of K-12 revenue per pupil in
Panel B. This helps to examine the cumulative impact of the funding cut.
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Parents may not perceive the funding cut immediately and make a decision
based on cumulative experience. If the lagged K-12 revenue has a much smaller
impact than the concurrent revenue, then it would raise a question of the true
impact of K-12 revenue.
In columns 1 to 3, I use 1, 2, 3 year lagged education revenue per pupil
(Revt−1, Revt−2, Revt−3), respectively. The first stage F-statistics is reason-
ably smaller than the main result and decreases over the column as I use more
lagged value. The point estimates in columns 1 to 3 are smaller than the main
impact of K-12 revenue per pupil; however, they are still large and statistically
significant. When using the average of the past three years of revenues, the
point estimate is almost identical to the main specification. Overall, results in
Panel B suggest the ”exposure” to funding cut is as important as the current
level of funding.
A.3 Additional Heterogeneity Analysis
A.3.1 Racial Difference in Heterogeneity in Effect by CPUMA
Characteristics
This section compares how the heterogeneity by CPUMA characteris-
tics in Table 1.9 differs across races. I redo the analysis in 1.9 separately by
race in Table A.8. Panel A, B, C, and D present the results for all races,
whites, Hispanics, and blacks, respectively.
Table 1.9 shows a larger impact in low SES areas for both high and
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low-income households. Panel A of Table A.8 shows this is indeed true with-
out dividing the sample by household income. The overall results for whites
in Panel B are not different from those in Panel A. All of the point estimates
are statistically significant and stronger, where it is in the main results. In-
terestingly, in columns 3 and 4, the difference between high and low baseline
minority population share is substantial. While a $1,000 decline in education
revenue per pupil leads to -0.35 percentage points increase in private school
enrollment in CPUMAs with a low minority population, the point estimate
is -1.6 percentage points in CPUMAs with high minority population, which
is much higher than the average impact in Panel A. The two coefficients are
statistically different from each other at the 1 percent level. The stunningly
large point estimate for high minority CPUMAs shows that whites respond
differentially to the budget shock depending on the composition of the popula-
tion. In other words, education budget shock strengthens the white flight from
public schools. White students have a stronger preference for private schools
when they attend schools with a larger concentration of nonwhite schoolchil-
dren (Brunner, Imazeki and Ross, 2010), and therefore they switch to private
schools more easily when the quality of the schools declines.
The patterns are slightly different for other races. The overall pattern—
stronger in low SES areas—is found for Hispanics as well; however, the differ-
ence is not as striking as whites. It may be because Hispanics are more likely
to be impoverished and immigrants and belong to the minority category as
well. It may be that these characteristics do not particularly make Hispanics’
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preference for private schools stronger. In Panel D, I present the results for
blacks. As the overall impact of the K-12 budget for blacks is small and sta-
tistically insignificant in Table 1.8, none of the point estimates in Panel D is
statistically significant.
A.3.2 Heterogeneity in Effect by Parental Characteristics
Studies like Barrow (2002) and Goldring and Phillips (2008) suggest
the importance of parental characteristics on school choice. In Table A.9, I
compare the impact of educational revenue by four parental characteristics:
the presence of both parents and whether at least one parent has a Bachelor’s
degree, high-paying occupation (using median occupational income in 2000),
and is immigrant. The results show that there is no heterogeneity in effect by
these parental characteristics. The point estimates in columns 1, 3, 5, and 7
are not statistically different from columns 2, 4, 6, and 8, respectively.
It is interesting that parental characteristics do not affect the competi-
tion between public and private schools like regional characteristics. High SES
parents have a stronger preference for private schools (Goldring and Phillips,
2008), so they should be more sensitive to the funding cut, based on the dis-
cussion in section 1.7. However, the heterogeneity by regional characteristics
may cancel out this. Because households sort themselves according to their
characteristics and preference, there is a large correlation between individual
characteristics and regional characteristics. They may have a stronger prefer-
ence for private schools, but they tend to live in high SES regions where the
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overall impact of funding cuts is weaker.
A.3.3 Heterogeneity in Effect by School Type
Religious affiliation is important private school characteristics when
parents consider private schools (Goldring and Phillips, 2008). Hispanics have
an especially high preference for Catholic schools, so it would be useful to
explore whether Hispanic students leave for Catholic schools because of funding
cuts. Also, the average tuition reasonably varies by religion. The tuition
for Catholic schools is particularly cheaper, where the average yearly tuition
in SY 2011-2012 for catholic, other religious, and nonsectarian schools are
$7,210, $9,100, and $22,570, respectively (Snyder, de Brey and Dillow, 2019).
Considering the stark difference in tuition, it would be interesting to find which
type of schools are the most elastic to the change in local public school funding,
especially whether relatively low-cost schools are more sensitive, considering
the massive economic shock caused by the Great Recession. This section
shows that Catholic schools have received the most students because of the
K-12 revenue shock.
In this section, I look into heterogeneity in effect by the religious affili-
ation of private schools using an alternative data source. The Private School
Universe Survey (PSS) from the NCES is a biennial survey targeting all pri-
vate schools in the US, containing school level enrollment and characteristics.5
5All private schools are in the universe; however, the actual number interviewed depends
on the response rate which is on average over 90%.
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To do so, I estimate the following equations:
Nipst = βRevpst + Ppstγ + θt + αi + εipst, (A.1)
Nipst = β1Revpst × 1[Catholic]i+
+ β2Revpst × 1[Other Religious]i+
+ β3Revpst × 1[Nonsectarian]i + Ppstγ + θt + αi + εipst, (A.2)
where Nipst is the number of students enrolled in school i in CPUMA p of
state s in school year t. Like in the main text, Revpst is total K-12 revenue
per pupil in CPUMA p where the school locates.6 I include year fixed ef-
fect (θt) and school fixed effect (αi) to control for macroeconomic conditions
and time-invariant school characteristics, respectively. Time-invariant school
characteristics include the religious type of the school as well.7
Table A.10 presents the estimation results. In column 1, the point esti-
mate means that a $1,000 increase in local public education revenue per pupil
reduces private school enrollment by 5.8 students. The point estimate stays
stable for the inclusion of CPUMA controls. In column 3, I estimate the impact
on different types of schools. While the impacts on other religious and non-
sectarian schools are smaller and insignificant, it is much stronger for Catholic
schools. The enrollment decreases by 18 students with a $1,000 increase in
6The PSS provides geocoordinates of most of the schools, so I match it to the CPUMA
in the Census and ACS.
7In the analysis, I exclude schools only with ungraded class or whose highest grade offered
is pre-Kindergarten level.
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per-pupil revenue in local public schools, which is statistically different from
other religious schools (-2.46) and nonsectarian schools (-1.36).
In columns 4 and 5, I test whether this holds for white and Hispanic
students. The pattern is similar in column 4 for white students, but not for
Hispanics in column 5. However, over 30 percent of schools do not have any
Hispanic students, and the median of Hispanic enrollment is only 3. Also,
Hispanics tend to be concentrated in some regions, so it is not logical to
include those schools in CPUMAs with very few Hispanics. In column 6, I
restrict the sample to schools in Hispanic-concentrated CPUMAs (above the
national mean). The results are consistent with column 3. Although the point
estimates are much smaller, it is large in percent because of the small baseline
enrollment. Overall, the result for Hispanics is consistent with the discussion
in section 1.7 that Hispanics may have switched to Catholic private schools.
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1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015
School Year
Total expenditure Annual growth of expenditure
Notes: This figure plots the trend of expenditure per pupil instead of revenue. All other
details are the same in Figure 1.1.
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Large cut CPUMAs Small cut CPUMAs + growth CPUMAs
Budget cut during 2007−2012 (by 50th percentile)
Mean in 2007: Large drop CPUMAs=9.65%, Small drop CPUMAs=11.76%
Notes: This figure shows the trend in private school enrollment by large and small budget
cut in CPUMA. The mean of private school enrollment is normalized with the value in 2007.
All other details same to Figure 1.3.
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Correlation between 2006&2000: 0.926, 2006&1990: 0.612
Notes: This figure compares the state share in 2006 (solid green), 2000 (oragne), and 1990
(navy). The correlation of the shares between 2000 and 2006 is very high—over 0.9. The
correlation is weaker between 2006 and 1990, 0.61, but it goes up to 0.75 when comparing
ranks.
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Mean in FY 2007: no income tax states=$2530, others=$3215
Notes: This figure replicates Figure 1.6 but excludes property tax revenue.
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Figure A.5: K-12 Revenue Per Pupil in CPUMAs in SY 2007
(a) K-12 Revenue Per Pupil in CPUMAs, SY 2007-2008
(b) Change in K-12 Revenue Per Pupil in CPUMAs, 2007-2012
Notes: Panel A shows the K-12 revenue per pupil in CPUMAs in SY 2007-2008. Panel B
displays the percent change during 2007-2012. The figures are obtained by matching school
districts to each CPUMA.
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Figure A.6: Rev per pupil in PUMAs and school districs in SY 2007-2008
(a) Rev per pupil in PUMA
(b) Rev per pupil in school district
Notes: This figure shows the K-12 revenue per pupil by PUMA (panel A) and school district
(panel B) in SY 2007-2008. Panel A is obtained by matching school districts to each PUMA.
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State share No income tax
Notes: Using state level K-12 funding data, I construct this first stage figure to include the
year of 2001-2004. The estimated equation is: Revst =
∑
k 6=2007[ βkSs×1(k = t)+γkNTs×
1(k = t)] + ρs + τt + εst. F-statistics for the event study variables is 30.89.
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State share No income tax
Notes: N=7,744,432. The reduced form result in the most preferred specification (including
full sets of controls) is presented in this figure. I display the coefficients of interaction terms
of year dummies and state share, and income tax status (βk’s and γk’s) along with 95%
confidence intervals. The coefficients are rescaled to represent private school enrollment in
percentage points. 2001-2004 ACS are excluded from the sample because CPUMA is not
identified in these years. F-statistics for the event study variables is 15.294. See the notes
of 1.3 for further information on the controls. Regression weighted using the Census and
ACS sample weights. Standard errors clustered at the state level.
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Figure A.9: Frist Stage and Reduced Form in Different Specifications









































































































































































































































































State share No income tax


























































































































































State share No income tax
Notes: This figure shows the first stage (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) in various
specifications. Each figure displays the coefficients for the interaction terms of state share
(green dots) and no income tax indicator (orange diamonds) with the year dummies along
with 95% confidence intervals calculated using standard errors clustered by the state level.
Column 1 includes no control variables. Column 2 adds individual controls, and column 3
includes household controls as well. See the notes of Table 1.3 for the details for the control
variables. Regressions are weighted using the Census and ACS sample weights. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level. F-statistics of the event study variables is presented
below each figure.
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Figure A.10: Placebo Test: State Expenditure Per Capita
Notes: All monetary values are in 2010 dollars. All variables are normalized with the
total population of the state. Data source: US Census Bureau’s Census of Governments
and the Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances retrieve through State
and Local Finance Initiative from Urban Institute (US Census Bureau, 2020), Medicaid
expenditure reports from MBES/CBES (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services), and
official unemployment insurance budget data (US Department of Labor). The expenditures
include those of both state and local governments.
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F−statistics of First Stage
Notes: This figure shows the cumulative density function of F-statistics of the first stages
of 1,000 randomizations with the main specification. The first stage is estimated with the
most preferred specification after randomly assigning seven states to no income tax states.
The red line (16.9) represents the F-statistics of the first stage of the main analysis. The
p-value is under 0.01 as well. The F-statistics falls in the tail of the distribution, supporting
the validity of the empirical strategy.
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Table A.1: Tax Revenue in State and Local Governments in the fiscal year
2007
Local Government State Government
Total Tax Rev Income Tax Sales Tax Property Tax Total Tax Rev Income Tax Sales Tax Property Tax
Alabama $4,642 3% 37% 39% $8,868 34% 26% 3%
Alaska $1,256 0% 14% 77% $3,688 0% 0% 2%
Arizona $8,925 0% 31% 59% $14,405 26% 46% 6%
Arkansas $1,769 0% 49% 40% $7,392 29% 39% 9%
California $65,133 0% 14% 71% $114,737 46% 28% 2%
Colorado $9,382 0% 31% 60% $9,217 52% 24% 0%
Connecticut $8,291 0% 0% 98% $13,272 48% 23% 0%
Delaware $749 6% 0% 76% $2,906 35% 0% 0%
Florida $34,192 0% 4% 78% $38,819 0% 59% 0%
Georgia $14,837 0% 27% 64% $18,253 48% 32% 0%
Hawaii $1,470 0% 0% 77% $5,090 31% 50% 0%
Idaho $1,199 0% 0% 91% $3,537 40% 36% 0%
Illinois $25,006 0% 5% 82% $30,066 31% 26% 0%
Indiana $7,606 14% 0% 82% $14,199 33% 38% 0%
Iowa $4,442 2% 12% 81% $6,470 41% 28% 0%
Kansas $4,460 0% 17% 76% $6,893 40% 33% 1%
Kentucky $3,797 26% 0% 55% $9,895 31% 28% 5%
Louisiana $6,622 0% 54% 39% $10,973 29% 32% 0%
Maine $2,052 0% 0% 99% $3,696 40% 29% 1%
Maryland $10,925 37% 0% 48% $15,094 44% 23% 4%
Massachusetts $11,424 0% 0% 97% $20,695 55% 20% 0%
Michigan $13,247 4% 0% 92% $23,849 27% 33% 10%
Minnesota $5,894 0% 1% 92% $17,768 41% 25% 4%
Mississippi $2,329 0% 0% 92% $6,482 22% 49% 1%
Missouri $8,411 3% 20% 61% $10,706 45% 31% 0%
Montana $942 0% 0% 95% $2,320 36% 0% 9%
Nebraska $3,107 0% 9% 77% $4,122 40% 36% 0%
Nevada $4,141 0% 8% 65% $6,305 0% 51% 3%
New Hampshire $2,567 0% 0% 98% $2,175 5% 0% 18%
New Jersey $21,937 0% 0% 98% $29,488 40% 29% 0%
New Mexico $1,922 0% 40% 49% $5,527 21% 35% 1%
New York $70,862 11% 16% 54% $63,162 55% 17% 0%
North Carolina $10,647 0% 26% 69% $22,613 47% 23% 0%
North Dakota $810 0% 11% 85% $1,783 18% 27% 0%
Ohio $19,937 20% 8% 67% $25,698 38% 30% 0%
Oklahoma $3,678 0% 39% 53% $8,141 34% 24% 0%
Oregon $4,991 0% 0% 79% $7,743 72% 0% 0%
Pennsylvania $21,255 18% 1% 70% $30,838 32% 28% 0%
Rhode Island $2,021 0% 0% 97% $2,766 39% 32% 0%
South Carolina $5,199 0% 3% 82% $8,689 37% 37% 0%
South Dakota $1,129 0% 23% 73% $1,266 0% 56% 0%
Tennessee $7,297 0% 27% 62% $11,390 2% 59% 0%
Texas $41,676 0% 12% 82% $40,315 0% 51% 0%
Utah $3,016 0% 20% 68% $6,076 42% 32% 0%
Vermont $374 0% 1% 94% $2,564 23% 13% 35%
Virginia $13,705 0% 8% 73% $18,667 55% 19% 0%
Washington $9,830 0% 23% 58% $17,706 0% 61% 10%
West Virginia $1,437 0% 0% 79% $4,642 29% 24% 0%
Wisconsin $8,839 0% 3% 94% $14,483 44% 29% 1%
Wyoming $1,222 0% 18% 76% $2,025 0% 34% 13%
US Total $525,792 5% 12% 72% $757,470,540 35% 31% 2%
Notes: All monetary values are presented in thousands of nominal dollars. Data source:
US Census Bureau’s Census of Governments and the Annual Survey of State and Local
Government Finances retrieve through State and Local Finance Initiative from Urban In-
stitute (US Census Bureau, 2020). Income and sales taxes include individual income tax
and general sales tax only, respectively.
152
Table A.2: First Stage Results
Dependent variable: Rev per pupil (in thousand)
State share No income tax State share No income tax State share No income tax State share No income tax
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Instrument × 2000 2.853 0.786 2.853 0.786 2.854 0.786 2.888 0.734
(2.106) (0.557) (2.106) (0.557) (2.106) (0.557) (2.018) (0.518)
Instrument × 2005 0.360 -0.196 0.361 -0.196 0.360 -0.196 0.382 -0.191
(0.839) (0.314) (0.839) (0.314) (0.839) (0.314) (0.827) (0.314)
Instrument × 2006 -0.163 -0.239 -0.163 -0.239 -0.163 -0.238 -0.207 -0.247
(0.585) (0.204) (0.584) (0.204) (0.584) (0.204) (0.570) (0.209)
Instrument × 2008 -0.986** -0.270* -0.986** -0.270* -0.987** -0.270* -0.992** -0.276**
(0.469) (0.140) (0.469) (0.140) (0.468) (0.140) (0.464) (0.134)
Instrument × 2009 -2.040* -0.539 -2.040* -0.539 -2.039* -0.539 -2.009* -0.517
(1.099) (0.481) (1.099) (0.481) (1.099) (0.481) (1.101) (0.460)
Instrument × 2010 -3.790** -0.643 -3.791** -0.643 -3.790** -0.642 -3.693** -0.600
(1.712) (0.561) (1.712) (0.561) (1.712) (0.560) (1.701) (0.530)
Instrument × 2011 -4.099*** -1.001 -4.099*** -1.001 -4.099*** -1.001 -4.011*** -0.951
(1.362) (0.614) (1.362) (0.614) (1.362) (0.614) (1.339) (0.578)
Instrument × 2012 -4.282*** -1.446* -4.282*** -1.445* -4.282*** -1.445* -4.205*** -1.405*
(1.388) (0.745) (1.388) (0.745) (1.387) (0.745) (1.375) (0.706)
Instrument × 2013 -5.703*** -1.403* -5.703*** -1.403* -5.703*** -1.403* -5.626*** -1.375*
(1.765) (0.730) (1.765) (0.730) (1.765) (0.730) (1.752) (0.692)
Instrument × 2014 -5.557*** -1.367* -5.557*** -1.366* -5.558*** -1.366* -5.488*** -1.326*
(1.796) (0.756) (1.796) (0.756) (1.796) (0.756) (1.776) (0.718)
Instrument × 2015 -4.900** -1.405* -4.900** -1.405* -4.901** -1.405* -4.849** -1.351*
(1.942) (0.807) (1.942) (0.807) (1.942) (0.806) (1.922) (0.760)
Instrument × 2016 -3.532 -1.462* -3.533 -1.462* -3.533 -1.462* -3.559 -1.406*
(2.529) (0.851) (2.529) (0.851) (2.528) (0.851) (2.514) (0.812)
F-stat of excluded IVs 23.2 23.24 23.11 16.24
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes
CPUMA Controls Yes
Notes: N=7,744,432. The identifying variation is indicated at the top of each column. The number on the top of the column
indicates the specification. Two columns with the same number are from a single regression. The coefficients are rescaled to
represent private school enrollment in percentage points. I use 2007 as the base year and thus omitted. I exclude 2001-2004
in the sample because the CPUMA is not identifiable in the ACS 2001-2004. All regressions include year and CPUMA
fixed effects. All regressions are weighted using sample weights from the Census and ACS. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses clustered by state. * significant at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table A.3: Main Results in OLS and Logs
Dependent variable: private school enrollment (in percentage point)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. OLS results
Rev per pupil -0.087* -0.112** -0.122*** -0.132**
(in thousand) (0.046) (0.0522) (0.0442) (0.0503)
Panel B. OLS with log of revenue per pupil
ln(Rev per pupil) × 100 -0.0099 -0.0136* -0.0155** -0.0173**
(0.0065) (0.0071) (0.0065) (0.0072)
Panel C. 2SLS with log of revnue per pupil
ln(Rev per pupil) × 100 -0.0648*** -0.0722*** -0.0746*** -0.0798***
(0.0237) (0.0243) (0.0251) (0.0259)
First stage F-Stat 23.26 23.29 23.24 17.75
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes
CPUMA Controls Yes
Notes: N=7,744,432. Each entry is a coefficient from separate OLS or 2SLS regression.
The coefficients are rescaled to represent private school enrollment in percentage points.
The instruments are the sets of interaction terms of state share and no state income tax
status with year indicators dummies. All regressions include year and CPUMA fixed effects.
See the notes of Table 1.3 for the descriptions of the control variables. All regressions are
weighted using sample weights from the Census and ACS. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses clustered by state. Panel A shows the OLS result of the Table 1.3. Panels B
and C show the result using log of K-12 revenue per pupil in OLS and 2SLS, respectively.
Each entry is a coefficient from a separate regression of the private school enrollment. The
instruments for Panel C are the sets of interaction terms of state share and no state income
tax status with year indicators dummies. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; ***
significance at 1%.
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Table A.4: Alternative Mechanism: Number of Schools
Dependent variable: Number of schools
TPS Charter Magnet All Public All Private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rev per pupil -0.0108 -0.0047 -0.0099 -0.0255* 0.0138
(in thousand) (0.0185) (0.0033) (0.0082) (0.0130) (0.0141)
First stage F-Stat 20.52 20.52 20.52 20.52 4.453
Observation 18,324 18,324 18,324 18,324 8622
Notes: Each entry is a coefficient from separate 2SLS regressions. Dependent variable is
the number of each type of schools indicated in the column title. The instruments are the
sets of interaction terms of state share and no state income tax status with year indicators
dummies. All regressions include year and CPUMA fixed effects. CPUMA level control
variables are also included. Regressions are weighted using the school-aged population in
CPUMA. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered by state. * significance at
10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table A.5: Alternative Samples
Dependent variable: private school enrollment(in percentage point)
Drop Native Immigrant Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop
Include DC Dropouts Only Only FL & NV FL and TX CA AK top 10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Rev per pupil -0.601*** -0.597*** -0.604*** -0.408** -0.541*** -0.396** -0.636*** -0.574*** -0.400**
(in thousand) (0.175) (0.178) (0.184) (0.162) (0.180) (0.165) (0.177) (0.175) (0.187)
10.62% 10.87% 10.91% 6.10% 10.60% 10.93% 10.62% 10.62% 9.29%
First stage F-Stat 16.32 15.73 15.83 18.17 24.73 17.85 13.99 17.39 15.42
Observations 7,754,355 7,590,031 7,316,582 427,850 7,275,774 6,678,736 6,783,015 7,723,844 7,076,346
Notes: Each entry is a coefficient from separate 2SLS regressions of the private school enrollment on real K-12 revenue
per pupil in CPUMA (in thousands of 2010 dollars). The coefficients are rescaled to represent private school enrollment
in percentage points. The instruments are the sets of interaction terms of state share and no state income tax status with
year indicators dummies. All regressions include year and CPUMA fixed effects and the full sets of controls, as in column
4 of Table 1.3. Regressions are weighted using sample weights from the Census and ACS. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses clustered by state. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table A.6: Alternative Instrumental Variables and Lagged Revenue
Dependent variable: private school enrollment (in percentage point)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Alternative IV
Diff-in-diff State share only NT only Add interaction
Rev per pupil -0.700*** -0.436* -0.779** -0.474***
(in thousand) (0.256) (0.251) (0.387) (0.126)
First stage F-Stat 4.655 4.059 9.312 >1,000
Observations 7,744,432 7,744,432 7,744,432 7,744,432
Panel B. Using lagged revenue per pupil
1-year 2-year 3-year 3-year
lag lag lag average
Rev per pupil -0.524*** -0.478** -0.464** -0.559***
(in thousand) (0.174) (0.181) (0.187) (0.179)
First stage F-Stat 9.424 9.573 5.501 10.32
Observations 7,744,432 7,744,432 7,744,432 7,744,432
Notes: Each entry is a coefficient from separate 2SLS regressions of the private school
enrollment on real K-12 revenue per pupil in CPUMA (in thousands of 2010 dollars). The
coefficients are rescaled to represent private school enrollment in percentage points. The
instruments are the sets of interaction terms of state share and no state income tax status
with year indicators dummies. All regressions include year and CPUMA fixed effects and
the full sets of controls, as in column 4 of Table 1.3. Regressions are weighted using sample
weights from the Census and ACS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered by
state. In Panel A, I use four alternative instrumental variables. In column 1, I use difference-
in-differences estimations—Ss×Postt and NTs×Postt —instead of event study estimations
to instrument for education revenue per pupil. Postt indicates after 2007 or the Great
Recession. I use the state share only in column 2 and no income tax indicator only in column
3 in the event study framework. In column 4, I add Ss×NTs, the interaction term of state
share and no income tax indicator interacted with year dummies as instrumental variables in
addition to the original instrumental variables. Panel B uses the lagged variables of CPUMA
education revenue per pupil. Columns 1-3 use Revt−1, Revt−2, Revt−3, respectively. In
column 4, I use cumulative average of past 3 years of education revenue per pupil. *
significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table A.7: Impact on Number of School-aged Children, and In- and Out-
migration
ln(Total number) ln(In-migration) ln(Out-migration)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Rev per pupil) 0.141 -0.579 0.0764
(0.579) (0.560) (0.657)
Notes: N=11,807. Each entry is a coefficient from separate 2SLS regressions of the private
school enrollment on the log of real K-12 revenue per pupil in MPUMA (in 2010 dollars).
The instruments are the sets of interaction terms of state share and no state income tax
status with year indicators dummies. State fixed effects and MPUMA level controls are
included. Regressions are weighted using the MPUMA population. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses clustered by state. First stage F-statistics is 9.421 for all regressions. *
significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table A.8: Heterogeneity by PUMA Characteristic and Race
Dependent variable: private school enrollment (in percentage point)
Poverty Rate Minority Population Foreign Population
High Low High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. All races
Rev per pupil -0.870*** -0.360** -0.914*** -0.303* -0.798*** -0.366**
(in thousand) (0.294) (0.147) (0.293) (0.151) (0.259) (0.150)
9.70% 11.32% 11.29% 10.17% 11.95% 9.72%
P-value of difference 0.038 0.012 0.041
First stage F-Stat 20.30 8.289 13.39 14.82 6.101 13.70
Observations 3,447,482 4,296,950 2,833,655 4,910,777 2,874,940 4,869,492
Panel B. White
Rev per pupil -0.862*** -0.379* -1.583*** -0.349* -1.071*** -0.369*
(in thousand) (0.320) (0.207) (0.461) (0.203) (0.237) (0.198)
13.03% 13.55% 17.70% 11.74% 17.42% 11.43%
P-value of difference 0.086 >0.01 >0.01
First stage F-Stat 20.15 12.77 10.44 19.50 5.702 12.44
Observations 1,955,679 2,879,773 1,206,624 3,628,828 1,403,979 3,431,473
Panel C. Hispanic
Rev per pupil -0.669** -0.415*** -0.648*** -0.320 -0.673*** -0.317**
(in thousand) (0.283) (0.122) (0.228) (0.200) (0.198) (0.145)
5.14% 5.63% 5.68% 4.96% 5.57% 5.10%
P-value of difference 0.395 0.317 0.066
First stage F-Stat 30.64 65.19 39.45 50.37 65.38 26.86
Observations 711,825 670,918 773,712 609,031 773,076 609,667
Panel D. Black
Rev per pupil -0.0644 -0.119 -0.176 0.00686 -0.0103 -0.217
(in thousand) (0.252) (0.244) (0.252) (0.221) (0.264) (0.221)
5.91% 5.98% 6.59% 4.66% 6.78% 5.22%
P-value of difference 0.792 0.441 0.417
First stage F-Stat 12.82 20.47 13.67 19.66 10.59 39.88
Observations 517,426 345,048 558,071 304,403 379,930 482,544
Notes: Each entry is a coefficient from separate 2SLS regressions of the private school
enrollment on real K-12 revenue per pupil in CPUMA (in thousands of 2010 dollars). The
coefficients are rescaled to represent private school enrollment in percentage points. The
instruments are the sets of interaction terms of state share and no state income tax status
with year indicators dummies. All regressions include year and CPUMA fixed effects and
the full sets of controls, as in column 4 of Table 1.3. Regressions are weighted using sample
weights from the Census and ACS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered by
state. The sample is divided into two groups by CPUMA characteristics presented in each
column’s title, like Table 1.9. Each panel is separately estimated by races. See the notes of
Table 1.9 for the other details.
* significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table A.9: Heterogeneity by Parental Characteristics
Dependent variable: private school enrollment (in percentage point)
Both parents present Has a Bachelor’s degree High earning occupation Immigrant
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rev per pupil -0.624*** -0.513*** -0.640** -0.529*** -0.615*** -0.383** -0.469*** -0.672***
(in thousand) (0.197) (0.152) (0.275) (0.176) (0.196) (0.164) (0.168) (0.207)
12.16% 6.29% 18.92% 6.60% 12.62% 5.44% 8.41% 11.28%
p-value of difference 0.491 0.641 0.186 0.154
First stage F-Stat 13.88 16.53 13.87 16.70 14.76 16.84 23.96 12.94
Observations 5,849,114 1,895,318 2,763,933 4,980,499 3,305,703 4,438,729 1,747,092 5,997,340
Notes: Each entry is a coefficient from separate 2SLS regressions of the private school enrollment on real K-12 revenue
per pupil in CPUMA (in thousands of 2010 dollars). The coefficients are rescaled to represent private school enrollment
in percentage points. The instruments are the sets of interaction terms of state share and no state income tax status with
year indicators dummies. All regressions include year and CPUMA fixed effects and the full sets of controls, as in column
4 of Table 1.3. Regressions are weighted using sample weights from the Census and ACS. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses clustered by state. The sample is divided into two groups by parental characteristics presented in the title of
each column. Columns 3 to 8 are ‘Yes’ if at least one parent satisfies the condition. Means of the private school enrollment
of each group are in italics below the standard errors. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table A.10: Impact on Number of Enrolled Students
Dependent variable: Enrolled students in private school
Hispanics in
High share
All Races Whites Hispanics CPUMA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rev per pupil in CPUMA -5.792* -5.459*
(3.342) (3.072)
Rev per pupil in CPUMA × Catholic -18.21*** -15.58*** -0.324 -1.259*
(2.475) (3.927) (0.628) (0.738)
Rev per pupil in CPUMA × Other Relig -2.456 4.085** -0.384 -0.345
(2.421) (1.916) (1.086) (1.211)
Rev per pupil in CPUMA × Nonsectarian -1.365 3.265 -0.221 -0.123
(1.744) (2.052) (1.178) (1.385)
CPUMA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 170658 170658 170658 170658 170658 103710
Notes: I use 2001-2015 Private School Universe Survey (NCES) in this table. The unit of observation is school-year. The
independent variable of interest is the public K-12 revenue per pupil in the CPUMA at which the school is located. The
instruments are the sets of interaction terms of state share and no state income tax status with year indicators dummies.
School fixed effects are included in all regressions. Columns 1-3 estimate the impact on school-level enrollment for all races.
Column 4 examines white enrollment and 5 and 6 Hispanics. Especially, I only include schools in Hispanic concentrated
CPUMA (share of Hispanics above 50th percentile) in column 6. See notes of Table 1.3 for further information on the control




Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Heterogeneity by Distance to Health Facilities
Proximity to health facilities is an important factor in access to health
services. If the health facility is too far away, it is difficult to seek care as
needed. The FBCP focuses on increasing utilization by removing the financial
barrier. Intuitively, the policy effect may be greater in areas with greater
physical access to health facilities. The Rwandan Ministry of Health provides
a complete list of the registered health facilities in the country. However,
the public data only provides the most recent information.1 In 2019, there
are 48 hospitals (district, provincial, and referral hospitals) and 508 health
centers in Rwanda. The geocodes are available for all of the hospitals and 465
health centers. Although the data includes the opening date of each facility,
they are overall inaccurate with a lot of missing values. Hence, I ignore the
opening dates and use all of the available facilities in 2019. This is potentially
problematic because the new opening of health facilities is not exogenous.
Nevertheless, I explore whether the treatment effect is stronger in areas with
greater health service access.
1In this study, I acquire the list of facilities in 2019.
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Using the geocodes of the primary sampling units of RDHS, I can iden-
tify the distance to the closest facilities. Because the prenatal care and basic
delivery services are provided at the health center, and complicated pregnan-
cies are transferred to hospitals, I estimate the distance to the health center
and the higher-level facility separately. The median of the minimum distance
to the health center is 2.5 km and to district/provincial/referral hospital is 8.8
km. I separate the sample into two groups by the distance to the closest facil-
ity, below and above the median distance. I separately evaluate the treatment
effect on the outcome variables above.
The results are presented in Table B.1. Panel A contains the impact
on FBD and prenatal care utilization, and Panel B contains the mortality
outcomes. Columns 1 and 2 depict the differential result by the distance to
the health center, the primary level facility. Mothers are more likely to give
birth in a health facility and have more prenatal visits when they live closer to
the facility. The differences are 9.9 percentage points and 0.2 times for FBD
and the number of prenatal visits, respectively, with a very high significance.
Despite this differential effect on FBD and prenatal care, this is not leading to
a larger effect on newborn and neonatal mortality in the districts with closer
proximity to the facility. However, there is a large difference in infant and
child mortality rates, a larger decline in areas where facilities are close. These
results are largely consistent with my main results: a large decline in infant
and child mortality rates, but not for newborn and neonatal mortality rates.
I find similar heterogeneity in effect when I divide the sample by the
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distance to the closest higher-level facility in columns 3 and 4. Although the
higher-level facilities are not the place for most babies’ delivery, the treatment
effect is much larger in the villages where the hospital is close. This is largely
coming from the correlation between the distance to the health center and
the hospital. Villages in a denser area are likely to be urban, which makes
them closer to everything. However, when I run the regressions only with
rural villages, the overall results don’t change much (result available upon
request). Although not statistically significant, treatment effects are larger in
districts where hospitals are close for all mortality rates. The difference in
point estimates is substantial for newborn and neonatal mortality: 10.6 and
8.2, respectively. Together with results in Table 2.7 for PBF, it seems that the
quality of the facility plays an important role in reducing mortality.
There is concern about using 2019 as the reference year because the
number of health facilities has increased substantially since 2006, and thus it
would not fully capture the access of health facilities in the baseline period.
However, the increase in health facilities is driven mainly by health posts
where the child delivery service is not provided, not health centers or district
hospitals (or higher level) (Rwanda Ministry of Health, 2009, 2015). The
largest increase in the number of health centers from 2008 to 20142 is five in
Rusizi and Musanze district. Since this number is non-negligible,3 I estimate
the same regressions for the two groups according to the average travel time to
2The information available from Rwandan Ministration of Health on the number of fa-
cilities in each district starts from 2008.
3The median number of health centers in each district in 2014 is six.
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the health facility in 2005.4 The results look very similar. The results change
little when I use travel time in 2014 instead (Results available upon request).
Although some mothers give birth at a private facility, the fraction is very
small (less than two percent).
B.2 Effect of the Expansion of Universal Health Insur-
ance
Expansion of universal health insurance is another policy that poten-
tially increased FBD and prenatal care utilization. This section examines how
much expansion of the CBHI scheme is associated with FBD and mortality
rates. The strategy I use here is similar to the main strategy. I define the treat-
ment districts as those whose baseline insurance coverage is below the 75th
percentile. I use the 75th percentile as the threshold because health insurance
coverage is more skewed than the FBD rate in the baseline period.
Table B.2 shows the treatment effect of insurance coverage. Unlike Ta-
bles 2.3 and 2.4, the effect on FBD and prenatal care is small and statistically
insignificant. The point estimates are smaller for mortality rates. Only is the
effect on child mortality statistically significant, with a similar magnitude in
Table 2.4. This result is consistent with Table 2.7, where an increase in in-
surance coverage is not associated with the treatment effect of free FBD and
prenatal care policy. To summarize, Tables 2.7 and B.2 imply that Facility-
Based Childbirth Policy was the main driver promoting FBD and prenatal



























































































































Months at the first prenatal visit
Notes: This figure shows the treatment effect on FBD and prenatal care utilization with the event study framework with the
preferred specification. I replace βLow FBDd × 1(t ≥ 2006) with
∑
k 6=2005 βkLow FBDd × 1(t = k) in Equation 2.1 and
plot the βk’s with their 95% confidence intervals. Controls are as same in Table 2.3. See the notes of Table 2.3 for further
information. Standard errors are clustered by the proper district.
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Notes: This figure shows the treatment effect on the mortality rates. Other specifications
are the same in Figure B.1.
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Table B.1: Heterogeneity by Distance to Health Facilities
Primary facility Difference Higher facility Difference
Close Far (1)-(2) P-value Close Far (5)-(6) P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. FBD and Prenatal Care
Facility-Based Delivery 0.1455*** 0.0500** 0.0955 0.0007*** 0.1360*** 0.0358 0.1002 0.0021***
(0.0223) (0.0206) (0.0227) (0.0238)
Number of Prenatal Visit 0.2454*** 0.0427 0.2026 0.0274** 0.0789 0.0891 -0.0102 0.8976
(0.0737) (0.0598) (0.0538) (0.0613)
Month at the First Prenatal Visit -0.1177 -0.1269 0.0093 0.9475 -0.0769 -0.0895 0.0126 0.9255
(0.1078) (0.1066) (0.1055) (0.0895)
Panel B. Mortality Rates
Newborn Mortality (7 days) -7.5091* -4.4298 -3.0793 0.5919 -10.7123** -0.1203 -10.592 0.1422
(4.3980) (3.9913) (5.3807) (4.6610)
Neonatal Mortality (30 days) -4.9189 -6.785 1.8661 0.7718 -9.3460* -1.1759 -8.1701 0.2665
(4.7247) (4.6034) (5.4599) (5.1528)
Infant Mortality (1 year) -25.9421*** -5.6041 -20.338 0.0445** -19.2714** -4.5328 -14.7386 0.2384
(8.3285) (7.9156) (8.7207) (9.5099)
Child Mortality (5 years) -50.0745*** -18.3917 -31.6828 0.1325 -30.5677*** -17.6239 -12.9438 0.6377
(14.6058) (14.0840) (11.8326) (22.6410)
Notes: This table shows the heterogeneity in the treatment effect by distance to health facilities. Because the Rwandan
Ministry of Health only provides the most recent list of health facilities, I use the recent data to divide the sample (2019
data in this paper). In columns 1 and 2, I divide the sample by districts with distance to the primary facility (health center)
and in columns 5 and 6, with secondary or above hospitals (district or provincial hospital). The median distance to the
closest primary and secondary or above facility is 2.5 km and 8.8 km, respectively. Other specification is same with Table
2.7. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered by the proper district. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%;
*** significance at 1%.
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Table B.2: Treatment Effect of Insurance Coverage
Prenatal Care Mortality Rates
FBD Frequency First Month NMR7 NMR IMR CMR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Low baseline Insurance 0.0304 -0.0389 -0.0263 -2.167 -2.587 -7.597 -25.95**
× Post (0.0187) (0.0536) (0.0908) (3.399) (3.420) (5.633) (12.02)
Observations 30,057 20,678 20,117 58,660 58,660 52,826 28,628
Notes: This table shows the treatment effect of expansion of CBHI on different outcome variables. Dependent variables are
presented as the column title. Each column presents β1 of Equation 2.1 with the preferred specification (column 4 in Table
2.3). Low insurance coverage means the insurance coverage of district was lower than the 75th percentile in 2005. Controls
are as same in Table 2.3. See the notes of Table 2.3 for further information. Robust standard errors are in parentheses
clustered by the proper district. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.170
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Constructing US’s Indian Import Data
The balance of payment (BOP) of the Survey of Current Business
(SCB) provides detailed information on service trade between the US and
other countries. Unfortunately, the exact amount of trade in 1996 is not avail-
able for all service types. The tradable white-collar services are a subset of
“other private services” in BEA classification. “Other private services (OPS)”
consist of education, finance, insurance, telecommunication, and business, pro-
fessional, and technical (BPT) services. The total dollar amount of recipient
and payment (for all countries) is available for both unaffiliated and affiliated
for each sector in 1996. However, at the country level, only unaffiliated trade
is available. The trade of OPS is available in Table 5 of the SCB. Fortunately,
the total OPS trade (affiliated and unaffiliated) between the US and each coun-
try is available through the supplement table. The BPT services are broken
into several sectors in Table 7 of the SCB. The BPT services comprise ad-
vertising, computer and information, research and development, management,
consulting and public relations, legal, construction and architecture, industrial
engineering, and installation and maintenance services. In 1996, only unaffili-
ated BPT trade data is obtainable through SCB for aggregated data and each
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country.
In Section 3.3, I mention that I ignore affiliated import from India in
1996 as it accounted for only 3 percent of total OPS import. In Tables 5
and 7 of SCB, all types of services are available for India. However, the total
import of each sector within BPT services is not available in 1996. Thus, I
approximate the total (unaffiliated and affiliated) import and export of each
sector of BPT services, assuming that the share of each sector accounting for
in the total unaffiliated trade is the same as the share in total affiliated trade.
For example, if the unaffiliated import of computer and information services
constitutes 10 percent of total unaffiliated import, then this service takes up
10 percent of the total affiliated import as well. This is a strong assumption;
however, it seems that this assumption holds well in 2006 when the data is
available for the total amount of trade.
C.2 Commuting Zone-Level Analysis
The occupation-level analysis compares the relative change in employ-
ment with different levels of import penetration; however, it is difficult to
identify the reallocation effects (Acemoglu et al., 2016). This section exam-
ines the impact of import penetration on employment in commuting zones
(CZ), following Acemoglu et al. (2016); Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013). The
import penetration is defined similarly to equations 3.1 and 3.2, with one more
weighted average using occupational composition in each CZ. In other words,
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where Lkz is number of workers in industry k in CZ z. Then, I estimate the
impact of trade exposure using a equation similar to Equation 3.3.
Table C.3 presents the impact of CZ-level import penetration on the
fraction of employed among the total working-age population (15-65 years
old), the log of the number unemployed, and the fraction in risky occupations
in the CZ. Risky occupations here are defined as occupations whose ∆IP
is in the top 25th percentile of table C.1. Results in Panels A and B are
consistent. In the earlier period, there is a positive impact on total CZ level
employment, although small and statistically insignificant. The results seem
inconsistent with the main result, showing a decrease in employment of highly
affected occupations. It may be that the reduction in employment of high IP
occupations is not large enough to affect the total employment in a CZ.
This is not necessarily true when combined with Panel C. Panel C’s
results display the impact on share in risky occupations. While there is a very
small and insignificant impact in the earlier period, a one standard deviation
increase in import penetration results in a 2.6 percentage points increase in
the share of risky occupations in the later period. This result corresponds to
the main result that there is an increase in occupation-level employment.
Overall, although not perfectly, the results here imply there is a sorting
effect caused by the increase in Indian service imports. While the employment
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of certain occupations declines in the earlier period, the total local employ-
ment even increases. Liu and Trefler (2019) present people with high import
penetration occupations are likely to switch occupations or to unemployed.
The results of my paper are in line with the literature.
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Table C.1: Ranking of ∆IP , All Occupations
Rank Occupation Title ∆IP × 100
1 Computer software developers 67.5502
2 Computer systems analysts and computer scientists 49.3654
3 Technical writers 40.6995
4 Physicists and astronomists 38.7210
5 Technicians, n.e.c. 34.6463
6 Physical scientists, n.e.c. 33.0064
7 Medical scientists 29.2978
8 Repairers of data processing equipment 25.6408
9 Biological scientists 25.3492
10 Social scientists and sociologists, n.e.c. 24.7227
11 Mathematicians and statisticians 21.8731
12 Lawyers and judges 20.4851
13 Computer and peripheral equipment operators 19.8436
14 Atmospheric and space scientists 18.5570
15 Chemists 18.5544
16 Geologists 18.2476
17 Legal assistants and paralegals 17.2559
18 Management analysts 17.0138
19 Data entry keyers 14.3558
20 Operations and systems researchers and analysts 13.7050
21 Biological technicians 13.5794
22 Engineers and other professionals, n.e.c. 12.9407
23 Electrical engineers 11.6488
24 Statistical clerks 11.5795
25 Agricultural and food scientists 11.4366
26 Office machine operators, n.e.c. 11.2605
27 Management support occupations 10.8143
28 Economists, market and survey researchers 10.6534
29 Sales engineers 10.4142
30 Personnel, HR, training, and labor rel. specialists 9.7391
31 Managers and specialists in marketing, advert., PR 8.6551
32 Designers 8.5078
33 Managers and administrators, n.e.c. 8.1676
34 Typists 7.3658
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Table C.1: Ranking of ∆IP , All Occupations
Rank Occupation Title ∆IP × 100
35 Proofreaders 6.7203
36 Human resources and labor relations managers 6.6341
37 Urban and regional planners 6.2050
38 Office supervisors 6.1879
39 Architects 6.0182
40 Mail clerks, outside of post office 5.9978
41 Writers and authors 5.9882
42 Bill and account collectors 5.9476
43 Drafters 5.6501
44 Other telecom operators 5.6213
45 Engineering technicians 5.5882
46 Painters, sculptors, craft-artists, and print-makers 5.5765
47 Surveryors, cartographers, mapping scientists/techs 5.3332
48 Inspectors and compliance officers, outside 5.1238
49 Secretaries and stenographers 5.0680
50 Administrative support jobs, n.e.c. 5.0613
51 Purchasing managers, agents, and buyers, n.e.c. 4.9749
52 Accountants and auditors 4.8978
53 Actuaries 4.8825
54 Customer service reps, invest., adjusters, excl. insur. 4.8274
55 Editors and reporters 4.7108
56 Industrial engineers 4.5940
57 Chemical engineers 4.5500
58 Interviewers, enumerators, and surveyors 4.5021
59 Mechanical engineers 4.4394
60 File clerks 4.4030
61 Financial managers 4.3575
62 Broadcast equipment operators 4.2783
63 Aerospace engineers 4.2235
64 Receptionists and other information clerks 3.6779
65 Business and promotion agents 3.6719
66 Records clerks 3.6305
67 Payroll and timekeeping clerks 3.5845
68 Civil engineers 3.5423
176
Table C.1: Ranking of ∆IP , All Occupations
Rank Occupation Title ∆IP × 100
69 Clinical laboratory technologies and technicians 3.5300
70 Human resources clerks, excl payroll and timekeeping 3.4523
71 General office clerks 3.4107
72 Retail salespersons and sales clerks 3.3869
73 Airplane pilots and navigators 3.3864
74 Other financial specialists 3.2748
75 Chemical technicians 3.2443
76 Other science technicians 3.1957
77 Bookkeepers and accounting and auditing clerks 3.1789
78 Production checkers, graders, and sorters in 3.1080
79 Actors, directors, and producers 2.9593
80 Sales demonstrators, promoters, and models 2.9106
81 Photographic process workers 2.8248
82 Bank tellers 2.6823
82 Financial service sales occupations 2.6823
84 Billing clerks and related financial records processing 2.6745
85 Teachers, n.e.c. 2.6618
86 Psychologists 2.5640
87 Telephone operators 2.5052
88 Material recording, sched., prod., plan., expediting cl. 2.4571
89 Metallurgical and materials engineers 2.4559
90 Messengers 2.4030
91 Machinery maintenance occupations 2.0941
92 Weighers, measurers, and checkers 2.0909
93 Advertising and related sales jobs 2.0341
94 Aircraft mechanics 1.9684
95 Mechanics and repairers, n.e.c. 1.9460
96 Dispatchers 1.9262
97 Supervisors of mechanics and repairers 1.9237
98 Heavy equipement and farm equipment mechanics 1.9078
99 Ship crews and marine engineers 1.8900
100 Art/entertainment performers and related occs 1.8875
101 Crane, derrick, winch, hoist, longshore operators 1.7747
102 Fire fighting, fire prevention, and fire inspection occs 1.7722
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Table C.1: Ranking of ∆IP , All Occupations
Rank Occupation Title ∆IP × 100
103 Correspondence and order clerks 1.7712
104 Police and detectives, public service 1.7635
105 Explosives workers 1.7271
106 Archivists and curators 1.6907
107 Librarians 1.6585
108 Telecom and line installers and repairers 1.6283
109 Miscellanious transportation occupations 1.6274
110 Sales supervisors and proprietors 1.6126
111 Industrial machinery repairers 1.6121
112 Health record technologists and technicians 1.6073
113 Plant and system operators, stationary engineers 1.5842
114 Foresters and conservation scientists 1.5805
115 Printing machine operators, n.e.c. 1.5696
116 Helpers, constructions 1.5483
117 Petroleum, mining, and geological engineers 1.5467
118 Personal service occupations, n.e.c 1.5205
119 Packers and packagers by hand 1.4980
120 Supervisors of guards 1.4882
121 Small engine repairers 1.4874
122 Typesetters and compositors 1.4728
123 Precision makers, repairers, and smiths 1.4042
124 Veterinarians 1.3989
125 Construction inspectors 1.3207
126 Salespersons, n.e.c. 1.2999
127 Guards and police, except public service 1.2124
128 Shipping and receiving clerks 1.1564
129 Insulation workers 1.1485
130 Health technologists and technicians, n.e.c. 1.1174
131 Photographers 1.0128
132 Repairers of industrial electrical equipment 0.9723
133 Eligibility clerks for government prog., social welfare 0.9529
134 Hand molders and shapers, except jewelers 0.9384
135 Dressmakers, seamstresses, and tailors 0.9153
136 Repairers of electrical equipment, n.e.c. 0.9130
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Table C.1: Ranking of ∆IP , All Occupations
Rank Occupation Title ∆IP × 100
137 Machine operators, n.e.c. 0.9019
138 Vehicle washers and equipment cleaners 0.8587
139 Insurance underwriters 0.8448
140 Programmers of numerically controlled machine tools 0.8429
141 Insurance adjusters, examiners, and investigators 0.8164
142 Laborers, freight, stock, and material handlers, n.e.c. 0.8087
143 Stock and inventory clerks 0.8013
144 Insurance sales occupations 0.7971
145 Subject instructors, college 0.7834
146 Library assistants 0.7829
147 Separating, filtering, and clarifying machine operators 0.7569
148 Dieticians and nutritionists 0.7558
149 Production helpers 0.7528
150 Other plant and system operators 0.7503
151 Repairers of household appliances and power tools 0.7364
152 Taxi cab drivers and chauffeurs 0.6861
153 Guides 0.6719
154 Production supervisors or foremen 0.6365
155 Bus, truck, and stationary engine mechanics 0.6315
156 Repairers of mechanical controls and valves 0.6311
157 Janitors 0.6276
158 Musicians and composers 0.5973
159 Cementing and gluing machne operators 0.5932
160 Assemblers of electrical equipment 0.5543
161 Vocational and educational counselors 0.5462
162 Machine feeders and offbearers 0.5455
163 Boilermakers 0.5374
164 Licensed practical nurses 0.5339
165 Welders, solderers, and metal cutters 0.5222
166 Motion picture projectionists 0.5126
167 Bookbinders 0.4949
168 Furniture/wood finishers, other prec. wood workers 0.4924
169 Registered nurses 0.4863
170 Heating, air conditioning, and refrigeration mechanics 0.4789
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Table C.1: Ranking of ∆IP , All Occupations
Rank Occupation Title ∆IP × 100
171 Operating engineers of construction equipment 0.4779
172 Animal caretakers, except farm 0.4698
173 Water and sewage treatment plant operators 0.4649
174 Truck, delivery, and tractor drivers 0.4643
175 Supervisors of motor vehicle transportation 0.4508
176 Upholsterers 0.4409
177 Stevedores and misc. material moving occupations 0.4389
178 Drillers of earth 0.4373
179 Managers of properties and real estate 0.4359
180 Health and nursing aides 0.4326
181 Shoemakers, other prec. apparel and fabric workers 0.4261
182 Dental laboratory and medical applicance technicians 0.4210
183 Miscellanious textile machine operators 0.4085
184 Social workers 0.4024
185 Drillers of oil wells 0.3995
186 Electric power installers and repairers 0.3927
187 Electricians 0.3838
188 Machinists 0.3837
189 Molders and casting machine operators 0.3822
190 Excavating and loading machine operators 0.3716
191 Mixing and blending machine operators 0.3670
192 Other mining occupations 0.3660
193 Millwrights 0.3571
194 Tool and die makers and die setters 0.3491
195 Garbage and recyclable material collectors 0.3490
196 Graders and sorters of agricultural products 0.3434
197 Extruding and forming machine operators 0.3356
198 Supervisors of cleaning and building service 0.2889
199 Announcers 0.2838
200 Transportation ticket and reservation agents 0.2764
201 Physicians 0.2753
202 Sawing machine operators and sawyers 0.2674
203 Radiologic technologists and technicians 0.2600
204 Slicing, cutting, crushing and grinding machine 0.2595
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Table C.1: Ranking of ∆IP , All Occupations
Rank Occupation Title ∆IP × 100
205 Therapists, n.e.c. 0.2542
206 Packers, fillers, and wrappers 0.2499
207 Physicians’ assistants 0.2484
208 Painting and decoration occupations 0.2461
209 Ushers 0.2459
210 Recreation and fitness workers 0.2357
211 Housekeepers, maids, butlers, and cleaners 0.2325
212 Engravers 0.2301
213 Gardeners and groundskeepers 0.2218
214 Pharmacists 0.2212
215 Baggage porters, bellhops and concierges 0.2159
216 Textile sewing machine operators 0.2154
217 Garage and service station related occupations 0.2152
218 Clothing pressing machine operators 0.2087
219 Other metal and plastic workers 0.2087
220 Pest control occupations 0.2056
221 Painters, construction and maintenance 0.2031
222 Real estate sales occupations 0.2016
223 Misc. construction and related occupations 0.1991
224 Inspectors of agricultural products 0.1934
225 Nail, tacking, shaping and joining mach ops (wood) 0.1894
226 Plumbers, pipe fitters, and steamfitters 0.1861
227 Helpers, surveyors 0.1790
228 Superv. of landscaping, lawn service, groundskeeping 0.1782
229 Paper folding machine operators 0.1713
230 Construction laborers 0.1709
231 Power plant operators 0.1622
232 Crossing guards 0.1613
233 Managers in education and related fields 0.1607
234 Carpenters 0.1556
235 Textile cutting and dyeing machine operators 0.1502
236 Laundry and dry cleaning workers 0.1456
237 Batch food makers 0.1428
238 Farm workers, incl. nursery farming 0.1425
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Table C.1: Ranking of ∆IP , All Occupations
Rank Occupation Title ∆IP × 100
239 Automobile mechanics and repairers 0.1397
240 Structural metal workers 0.1248
241 Respiratory therapists 0.1227
242 Supervisors of construction work 0.1198
243 Door-to-door sales, street sales, and news vendors 0.1072
244 Dancers 0.1047
245 Locksmiths and safe repairers 0.0993
246 Punching and stamping press operatives 0.0954
247 Other woodworking machine operators 0.0931
248 Athletes, sports instructors, and officials 0.0884
249 Timber, logging, and forestry workers 0.0878
250 Protective service, n.e.c. 0.0866
251 Food preparation workers 0.0851
252 Physical therapists 0.0786
253 Other precision and craft workers 0.0776
254 Recreation facility attendants 0.0766
255 Concrete and cement workers 0.0765
256 Speech therapists 0.0740
257 Furnance, kiln, and oven operators, apart from food 0.0726
258 Miscellanious food preparation and service workers 0.0715
259 Supervisors of personal service jobs, n.e.c 0.0712
260 Cashiers 0.0697
261 Parking lot attendants 0.0641
262 Public transportation attendants and inspectors 0.0600
263 Farm managers 0.0558
264 Cabinetmakers and bench carpeters 0.0550
265 Glaziers 0.0548
266 Child care workers 0.0545
267 Dental hygienists 0.0537
268 Welfare service workers 0.0529
269 Cooks 0.0505
270 Supervisors of food preparation and service 0.0477
271 Optical goods workers 0.0453
272 Occupational therapists 0.0409
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Table C.1: Ranking of ∆IP , All Occupations
Rank Occupation Title ∆IP × 100
273 Masons, tilers, and carpet installers 0.0383
274 Kindergarten and earlier school teachers 0.0331
275 Elevator installers and repairers 0.0326
276 Roofers and slaters 0.0325
277 Waiters and waitresses 0.0301
278 Forge and hammer operators 0.0279
279 Plasterers 0.0276
280 Teacher’s aides 0.0262
281 Bakers 0.0246
282 Bus drivers 0.0225
283 Butchers and meat cutters 0.0222
284 Bartenders 0.0215
285 Auto body repairers 0.0200
286 Knitters, loopers, and toppers textile operatives 0.0191
287 Other health and therapy occupations 0.0183
288 Railroad conductors and yardmasters 0.0172
289 Paving, surfacing, and tamping equipment operators 0.0172
290 Dental Assistants 0.0169
291 Locomotive operators: engineers and firemen 0.0169
292 Clergy and religious workers 0.0153
293 Fishers, marine life cultivators, hunters, and kindred 0.0150
294 Miners 0.0092
295 Drywall installers 0.0087
296 Funeral directors 0.0084
297 Special education teachers 0.0075
298 Hairdressers and cosmetologists 0.0060
299 Winding and twisting textile and apparel operatives 0.0058
300 Dentists 0.0056
301 Rollers, roll hands, and finishers of metal 0.0021
302 Optometrists 0.0015
303 Barbers 0.0000
303 Mail carriers for postal service 0.0000
303 Mail and paper handlers 0.0000
303 Hotel clerks 0.0000
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Table C.1: Ranking of ∆IP , All Occupations
Rank Occupation Title ∆IP × 100
303 Air traffic controllers 0.0000
303 Meter readers 0.0000
303 Primary school teachers 0.0000
303 Food roasting and baking machine operators 0.0000
303 Buyers, wholesale and retail trade 0.0000
303 Managers of medicine and health occupations 0.0000
303 Podiatrists 0.0000
303 Postal clerks, exluding mail carriers 0.0000
303 Purchasing agents and buyers of farm products 0.0000
303 Secondary school teachers 0.0000
Notes: Extended version of Table 3.2.
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Table C.2: Crosswalk Between Census Industry and Outsourcing Service Type
Industry Code (1990) Label Service Type
721 Advertising Advertising
882 Engineering, architectural, and surveying services Construction & Architecture
700 Banking Finance
701 Savings institutions, including credit unions Finance
702 Credit agencies, n.e.c. Finance
710 Security, commodity brokerage, and investment companies Finance
711 Insurance Insurance
841 Legal services Accounting
890 Accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services Legal Services
892 Management and public relations services Management
732 Computer and data processing services Computer and Information
891 Research, development, and testing services R&D and testing
441 Telephone communications telecommunication
442 Telegraph and miscellaneous communications services telecommunication
752 Electrical repair shops Installation and maintenance
760 Miscellaneous repair services Installation and maintenance
782 Shoe repair shops Installation and maintenance
731 Personnel supply services(Employment) Other Business Professionals, and Technical Services
741 Business services, n.e.c. Other Business Professionals, and Technical Services
742 Automotive rental and leasing, without drivers Leasing and rental
Notes: This table provides a crosswalk between Census industry codes (defined in 1990) and tradable white-collar services
used in the paper. I emulate the crosswalk provided by Liu and Trefler (2019).
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Table C.3: Impact of Import Penetration in CZ-Level
OLS 2SLS
All period All period All period 2000-2006 2006-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Share Employed
Z-score of 0.0297*** 0.0350*** -0.0129 0.101 -0.0716**
∆IP (0.00879) (0.00993) (0.0309) (0.0643) (0.0347)
Panel B. Ln(Unemployed)
Z-score of 0.0031*** 0.0030*** 0.0006 -0.0129* 0.0086**
∆IP (0.000683) (0.000844) (0.00340) (0.00666) (0.00373)
Panel C. Share in risky occupations
Z-score of -0.0309*** -0.0332*** -0.0146 -0.0076 0.0264*
∆IP (0.00638) (0.00596) (0.0161) (0.0365) (0.0157)
Observations 1482 1482 1482 741 741
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the impact of CZ level IP on the share of the
employed population, log of unemployment, and the share of risky occupations. Risky oc-
cupations mean that the increase of IP from 2000 to 2016 is greater than the median. Each
entry is a coefficient from a separate 2SLS regression. The coefficients are rescaled to rep-
resent the annual change in outcome variables. I also normalize IP for interpretation. The
instrument is the IP defined with Indian export to 15 EU countries. See the main text for
further information. Control variables include the CZ level share of college graduates, for-
eigners, women, white, and black, population, average offshorability (routine), and average
weekly wage at the beginning of each period. Regressions are weighted using the size of
the population in 2000. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered by state. *
significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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